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This research aims to investigate the significance of the Host Country Offices (HCOs) of 
International Volunteer Cooperation Organisations (IVCOs) in explaining the gap between the 
theory and practice of International Volunteering Service (IVS) in development. HCOs are 
operational arms of IVCOs that work in developing countries, but they are rarely studied in the 
literature and remain a ‘black box’. Focusing on five HCOs in Malawi, this study seeks to address 
the gaps in the literature by examining the different relationships between the HCOs and their 
multiple stakeholders: their head office, the key players involved in mobilising and implementing 
IVS in development projects (the government, the donors and the partner organisations), and the 
volunteers.  
 
The research uses the idea of ‘boundary managers’ to describe HCOs and their role in managing 
multiple mandates and negotiate relationships with different stakeholders. The conceptual 
framework is based on different kinds of trust and power relations to explore how HCOs negotiate 
these relationships and to demonstrate how other factors such as asymmetries in knowledge and 
information help explain the gap between the theory and practice of IVS. A cross-case study 
methodology is used that involves observation, document review and interviews with staff in head 
offices, HCOs, partners, beneficiaries and volunteers. The study shows that a development-focused 
IVS strategy, and fair and democratic organisational policies and structures that encourage staff 
contributions to knowledge, make more efficient use of human, physical and logistical resources, 
and can create trust-based relationships between the HCOs and their stakeholders leading to better 
processes, and potentially, to better and more consistent outcomes. 
 
The study makes empirical, theoretical, and policy contributions by identifying HCOs as influential 
actors in IVS, characterising their status as boundary managers, and making policy 
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1.1 Introduction  
 
Every year, thousands of people from the global North (and more recently, but to a lesser extent, 
from the developed countries of the South) travel to developing countries of the South as 
volunteers taking part in a variety of development programmes and projects through international 
volunteering service (IVS) (VOSESA, 2010; Hartman et al., 2014). The term IVS was first 
introduced by Sherradan et al. (2008, p. 397) and has been widely used in the literature (Devereux, 
2010; Lough, 2012; Lough and Carter-Black, 2015). It describes an organised period of 
engagement and contribution to society by volunteers who work across an international border, in 
another country, or countries. There is no common terminology for organisations that sponsor and 
facilitate international volunteering. They are variously referred to as international volunteer 
‘sending organisation’ (IVSO) (Sherraden et al., 2008; Lough and Carter-Black, 2015),‘sending 
agency (IVSA)’ (Impey and Overton, 2014) or ‘service organisation (IVSO)’ (Nelson and Child, 
2016) and ‘volunteering for development organisation (VfD)’ (Burns et al., 2015, p. 7). This thesis 





IVCOs base their actions on humanitarian or developmental goals such as poverty alleviation, 
empowerment, and participation of the marginalised people in poor countries. However, the 
literature on international volunteering shows that the intended goals of international volunteering 
are not always realised for the targeted beneficiaries, sometimes resulting in negative consequences 
within the host country which local actors have to negotiate in their daily lives long after the 
volunteers have left (Heron, 2005; Baillie Smith and Laurie, 2011; Aked, 2014; Impey and 
Overton, 2014; Trau, 2014; Burns et al., 2015; Ackers and Ackers-Johnson, 2017b). The tendency 
                                                     
1
 The IVCO Forum is recognised as ‘the most significant global network of international volunteer cooperation organisations’ (IVCO, 
2016, p. 4). 
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in scholarly literature is to focus on international volunteers when seeking to attribute the positive 
or negative impacts of IVS practice. But literature that focuses largely on volunteers often fails to 
explain the contradictions and imbalance between theory and practice of IVS and favours the type 
of outcomes which support the continuity and expansion of current practices in international 
volunteering. Host Country Offices (HCOs) of the IVCOs are pivotal to the course of determining 
development interventions appropriate for volunteer placement and managing all the processes 
involved before, during, and often after the volunteers’ time in post. In doing so, HCOs have to 
negotiate relationships with multiple and diverse IVS stakeholders with fast-changing interests, 
such as international donor agencies, the government, public and private sector institutions in the 
host country, international and national partner organisations, consultants, contractors and 
representatives of beneficiary groups, as well as their own IVCO head offices and the volunteers. 
However, the literature on IVS offers little or no focus on the role of HCOs, which are crucial in 
determining projects and placements for volunteers. Thus the existing literature demonstrates a gap 
between the theory and practice of development through IVS.   
 
This research aims to explain the gap between the theory and practice of development interventions 
through IVS by analysing how relationships are negotiated between HCOs and the stakeholders in 
IVS programmes. Negotiating relationships involves the range and unpredictability of human 
behaviour of which trust and power are key influential variables that shape the expectations and 
behaviours of people and organisations (Nierenberg, 1987; Koeszegi, 2004; Cornwall and Brock, 
2005; Olekalns and Smith, 2009; Pettit, 2013). In turn, types of trust and power relations influence, 
and are influenced by, a number of factors such as  histories (for example, past conflict among the 
actors, or the way organisations may have changed over time), differences in culture (for example, 
cultural norms associated with social status or gender), and use of language (such as the differences 
in the way people interpret certain words and phrases), but most crucially by information exchange 
and knowledge sharing between stakeholders (Hardy et al., 1998; Kopelman and Olekalns, 1999; 
Koeszegi, 2004; Fisher et. al, 2011). This study focuses on the roles of trust and power in analysing 
how relationships are negotiated between HCOs and the IVS stakeholders in order to gain insight 
3 
 
into the gap between the theory and practice of IVS. Using Malawi as the country context, the 
study examines five IVCOs: United Nations Volunteers (UNV), Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Voluntary Services Overseas International (VSO), The 
Peace Corps, and Progressio. Explanation on why and how Malawi and the above IVCOs were 
chosen for this research is given in Chapter 4, sections 4.4 and 4.5. The thesis is based on the 
analysis of field data on three categories of relationships between the HCOs and: 
i) The international volunteers, 
ii) Their IVCO head offices, and 
iii) The other stakeholders such as partner organisations, government and international 
funding agencies.  
 
This thesis argues that different types of trust, power relations and the way knowledge is shared in 
the negotiation of relationships between the HCOs and their IVS stakeholders, influence the course 
of IVS, and its contribution to development. HCOs have to negotiate relationships with a large 
array of heterogeneous individuals and organisations with diverse interests that are involved in the 
processes of development using IVS. In doing so, HCOs need to manage the boundary between the 
internal operations of the IVCOs’ organisations as well as the boundaries with their outside 
environment (Wallace and Kaplan, 2003; Igoe and Kelsall, 2005). However, these internal and 
external boundaries are not static but are permeable since the behaviours of individuals and 
organisations are shaped by trust and power relations which constrain or support the flow of 
knowledge (Clark et al., 2016). This framing of HCOs as boundary organisations/managers 
(Guston, 1999; Hanlin et al., 2018) reflects the critical and multiple challenges faced by HCOs in 
achieving consistency of aims, processes and outcomes in IVS. 
1.2 Locating myself as the researcher 
 
The research originated from my own experience of working as an international volunteer after a 
long-standing career in the private sector, corporate management. Based in Ghana, West Africa and 
subsequently, in Guyana, South America, living and working as an international volunteer 
embedded in the local community offered many insights into the perspectives of the different 
4 
 
stakeholders in development interventions that engage international volunteers. I witnessed first-
hand some of the administrative and personal challenges faced by staff working in HCOs. It was 
particularly significant that many of the same challenges to programme delivery experienced by 
host country staff in Ghana seemed to be faced in an entirely different country office, in a totally 
different geographical, political, social and economic context in Guyana. Moreover, social and 
professional contact with volunteers from other countries, as well as staff working for other IVCOs, 
and colleagues from partner organisations showed that these challenges were by no means 
exclusive to a specific IVCO or country, but were widely acknowledged by the diverse 
stakeholders of IVS. The challenges included uncertainties with regards to organisational priorities 
from head offices, high levels of inefficiency and wastage in programme resource management, 
lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of the host country staff, conflict among and 
between staff and volunteers, and high levels of staff and volunteer turnovers leading to incomplete 
or unsustainable programme outcomes.  
 
Pursuing further contact with other international volunteers, and exploring academic and grey 
literature such as volunteer blogs and media reports revealed that my experiences were not unusual, 
even among those who had volunteered through different IVCOs from other countries in Europe, 
Asia, Australia and the USA. These findings and the subsequent years of working as an 
international volunteer, and with international volunteers from different IVCOs, raised questions 
for me with regards to the impact and effectiveness of international volunteering and why similar 
challenges are faced by HCOs regardless of location, time and context. 
 
My research was also informed by both my personal and professional history. Having migrated 
from a country in the global South to one in the North at an early age, I had to learn to negotiate 
alien cultural traditions, societal norms and local power dynamics. Furthermore, my extensive 
experience of senior management in multi-national corporations provided me with valuable insight 
into organisational and human relations factors that influence congruity between policy and 
practice in decentralized organisations.  Consideration, therefore, has been given in reflection to my 
5 
 
own role and points of view and how they may influence the collection and analysis of data. While 
recognizing that my role in this research cannot be value-free (Ritchie et al., 2003), I considered 
my choices of Malawi, and the IVCO organisations in a manner that optimised the use of my 
personal and professional insights to raise questions, while minimising potential bias from my 
preconceptions, and prior associations with particular cultures or organisations, during data 
collection and analysis. Throughout the stages of developing the research from the review of the 
literature to design of the fieldwork, data collection and analysis, reflexivity became an enabling 
tool to enhance my consciousness of the implications of my research and review them accordingly. 
Further detail on the reflexivity is given in Chapter 4. 
 
1.3 Locating the research in the literature 
 
IVCOs are a sub-set of non-government organisations (NGOs)
2
 that are involved in international 
development at global or community levels. They base their actions on humanitarian or 
development goals such as poverty alleviation, empowerment, and participation of marginalized 
people in poor countries (Daftary and Moore McBride, 2004; GIZ, 2016a; Peace Corps, 2016a; 
VSO International, 2016a). Consequently, IVCOs fall within the scope of development 
management literature which addresses the management of the processes of development in its 
diverse forms, at different international, national, organisational and community levels. However, 
IVCOs can be distinguished from other development organisations in their imperative to provide 
technical assistance for development projects, specifically through international volunteers. IVCOs 
are required not only to provide volunteers with a satisfactory experience but to contribute to 
development activities, at the same time as working with donors and partner organisations across 
international and cultural boundaries (Grusky, 2000).  
 
                                                     
2
 The term NGO is restricted to independent non-government organisations but is used interchangeably with non-profit organisations in 
academic literature without making specific distinction between the different types of organisations. The term INGO applies to all 
NGOs that operate across multiple national boundaries. The distinction is blurred as many organisations, such as UN agencies, are non-
profit-making while, conversely, NGOs require “considerably more finance than that which is spent on their supposed beneficiaries” for 
their organisational survival (Allen and Thomas, 2000a, p. 210). Consequently the terms NGO, and INGO, will be used in this thesis to 
include non-profit organisations consisting of IVCOs such as GIZ and UNV as a sub set.  
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Despite their critical role in the provision of  volunteer services (Hustinx and Lammertyn, 2003; 
IVR, 2004; Sherraden et al., 2006, 2008; Studer and von Schnurbein, 2013), IVCOs are almost 
invisible in development management literature as an organisational form and have been chiefly 
overlooked by researchers of international volunteering (Musick and Wilson, 2008). Where IVCOs 
are mentioned, it is in the context of the volunteers’ placements, experiences, or the impact of the 
volunteers’ work (Jones, 2004; Sherraden et al., 2006; Baillie Smith et al., 2013; Lough, Sherraden 
and McBride, 2014; Ackers and Ackers-Johnson, 2017a). The dearth of literature on the role of 
IVCOs leaves a gap in knowledge that can only be answered through empirical evidence (Forsythe, 
2011; Trau, 2014; Burns et al., 2015). Although a number of scholars have called for more detailed 
organisational analysis of IVCOs (Sherraden et al., 2006; Devereux, 2010; Studer and von 
Schnurbein, 2013), as Nelson and Child (2016, p. 453) observe, “Virtually no empirical scholarship 
has examined [IVCOs] specifically….and [IVCO organisations] have remained a black box”. This 
research seeks to prise open the black box and examine what might be inside. 
 
One possible explanation for this oversight may be assumptions by scholars of development 
management literature that, as a sub-set of INGOs, IVCOs can be included in the broader stream of 
the same academic discourse, although the absence of reference to IVCOs in the literature makes 
this potential explanation difficult to substantiate. While the inclusion of IVCOs in the wider 
development management literature can offer a degree of contextual insight, it can, at the same 
time, underplay the central role of IVCOs in the international volunteering arena and the unique 
challenges that they face. Working through international volunteers introduces additional 
challenges for IVCOs when compared with those faced by other development agencies. These 
challenges are concerned with assumptions and expectations of different stakeholders of 
programmes or projects, including the IVCO head offices and the volunteers, based on their 
perceptions and interpretations of what constitutes volunteering and voluntary action (Grube and 




Even more conspicuous is the absence of IVCO host country offices in NGO management 
literature. HCOs navigate the course of international volunteer engagements in the host country 
through formal and informal relations with a multitude of stakeholders with diverse interests, while 
simultaneously acting as the brokers for skills transfer and exchange between international 
volunteers and intended service recipients (GIZ, 2016a; Peace Corps, 2016a; UNV, 2016b; VSO 
International, 2016a). They are a critical element of an IVS process, but their work is complicated 
by the diverse range and number of actors, including their own head office and the volunteers with 
whom they interface in their day to day functions. Although relatively new scholarly works that 
specifically focus on relationships between HCOs and their parent organisation do exist in NGO 
management literature (Brunt and McCourt, 2012; Elbers, 2012; Walsh, 2014), they are very scarce 
and do not include any reference to IVCOs. Thus there is a gap in the literature on NGO 
management that addresses the role and influence of HCO as a distinct component within the 
processes and the practice of IVS. However, parts of the literature on multinational corporations 
(MNC)
3
 examine trust and power in human relations between head offices and subsidiaries of 
international organisations. Therefore, elements of the literature on MNCs that deal with influential 
factors in the negotiation of relationships between HCOs and their head offices are used in this 
thesis to address some of the shortfalls in the literature on NGO management. 
 
The literature on boundary organisations offers an intersection with the literature on MNCs, where 
the relationships between head offices and their subsidiaries resemble one of the ‘social worlds’
4
 
that HCOs straddle. For example, the internal IVCO organisation represents one world, while the 
institutional landscape of development in the host country can represent the other. Guston (1999) 
offers insights into organisations that have multiple mandates and that function as intermediaries 
between diverse stakeholders (Hanlin et al., 2018). Although this literature does not typically look 
                                                     
3
 The abbreviation ‘MNC’ is used interchangeably with MNE (Multi-national Enterprises) in academic literature but will be used 
exclusively in this thesis, representing both terms. 
4
 Strauss (1978, 1984) describes a social world as an interactive unit that arises when a number of individuals strive to act in a collective 
way, often requiring the coordination of separate perspectives and the sharing of resources. Membership in a social world is therefore 




at IVCOs (see Chapter 2, section 2.6), it is important because it helps explain the role of the HCOs 
and the relationships they have to negotiate.  
 
It is uncommon to find literature on development management that does not include references or 
analysis of different forms, spaces, levels, and dynamics of power among the stakeholders (Fowler, 
2002; Mawdsley et al., 2005; Cornwall, 2007; Elbers, 2012; Lewis, 2014). However, scholarly 
work that specifically recognizes the importance of trust, and the interplay between trust and power 
as potentially influential elements in intra- and inter-organisational relationships among the actors 
in development management is sparse.  The tendency in development management literature is to 
draw on other academic disciplines including new public management (Mawdsley et al., 2005), 
project management literature (Diallo and Thuillier, 2005), inter-organisational relationships and 
cross-border alliances (Li, 2005). Framing HCOs as boundary managers that straddle multiple 
social worlds is useful in understanding the challenges that HCOs face in negotiating both their 
intra- and inter-organisational relationships.  
 
HCOs are also absent in the literature on volunteer management, and the bulk of that literature 
tends to focus primarily on volunteers working in their own countries (Juknevicius and Savicka, 
2003; Voicu and Voicu, 2003; Machin and Paine, 2008; Oppenheimer, 2008; Jakimow, 2010). 
While the theoretical basis for applying the insights from domestic to international volunteer 
management may highlight similarities, empirical study of issues related to managing international 
volunteers by HCOs has been relatively limited. Such work as exists in an international context has 
focused on data drawn on the INGO sector where foreign and national employees work alongside 
each other and with other foreigners such as consultants and general experts (Fowler, 1997; Pink, 
1998; Porter, 2003; Crewe and Fernando, 2006) and does not specifically address the management 
of foreign volunteers. Consequently, there is a gap in the knowledge of the role of HCOs in the 
management of international volunteers, as well as the challenges that they face in the management 




Chapter 2 provides key contributions from the literature on development management and NGO 
management. The literature is supplemented with relevant parts of the literature on MNCs and on 
boundary organisations that add to the understanding of development management as a multi-actor 
terrain and identify the gaps in the literature in respect of HCO relationships with the head offices 
and their other IVS stakeholders. A brief review of the appropriate parts of the literature on 
volunteer management is also provided in Chapter 2, which looks at the relevance and shortfalls of 
this literature in respect of IVS. Chapter 3 looks more specifically at the literature on negotiation, 
trust and power in human relations that add insight to the literature on development management, 
NGO management and volunteer management, when considering how relationships are negotiated 
between HCOs and their IVS stakeholders. 
 
1.4 The role of host country offices 
 
The activities leading to IVS placements in development programmes fall within the remit of the 
HCOs. HCOs’ work involves not only the justification of IVS within a development project and 
recruitment of international volunteers, but the provision of personal support (accommodation, 
living allowances, basic needs and services, and health and safety), as well as professional support 
(administration, resources, logistics of travel) for the volunteers during their stay. At the same time, 
they have to maintain an overview of the projects’ development mandate until, and subsequent to, 
the departure of the volunteers.  
 
The activities of IVS are similar in principle among IVCOs, although they may vary in specific 
operational mechanisms. Figure 1 is a generalised representation of typical steps involved in setting 
up an IVS placement and shows the division of activities that take place both within and outside the 
host country by HCOs and IVCO head offices respectively. Although exceptions to the listed 
activities do occur, they are extremely rare and do not represent customary practices. What is not 
shown in the diagram is the impact of time. Engaging a volunteer can take many months and span a 
recruitment drive across several countries to find a candidate with the necessary mix of skills and 
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Figure 1: A generalised representation of the typical processes involved in setting up an IVS placement (Source: author) 
 
It is widely acknowledged in NGO literature that management of development projects follows a 
series of steps, commonly referred to as a project cycle through which programmes need to be 
evaluated, and success and failure factors identified, prior to moving to the next steps (Biggs and 
Neame, 1996; European Commission, 2004; Fengler and Kharas, 2011; Akampurira, 2014). A 
typical example of a development project cycle is provided by Akampurira (2014) and represented 
HCO ACTIVITIES  





Negotiate IVS terms with stakeholders; agree job description 
 
 
Submit job description to head office 
 
 
Negotiate the logistics of volunteer’s visa and work permit, 
space of work, accommodation, health and safety requirements, 
domestic services, household supplies and transportation 












Volunteer host country orientation/training 
 
 
Volunteer starts placement 
 
 
Oversee volunteer’s welfare and IVS activities 
 
 
Project monitoring and evaluation 
 
 
Project reporting and placement closure/extension 
 
IVCO (head office) 
ACTIVITY 
 








(Secondary interview with 
HCO/partner in host country) 
 
 








in Figure 2 below. It is applicable to the type of project cycle that HCOs engage with, starting at 
problem identification. The diagram is adapted to show how IVS is incorporated in the project 
cycle. 
Figure 2 A typical cycle for a development project showing the incorporation of IVS (Source: adapted by the author 
from Akampurira (2014, p. 1))  
 
A development project can be described as a time-bound series of activities with measurable costs 
aimed at delivering assistance and the prospect of future benefits for targeted groups or 
communities (Cleaver, 2002; Akampurira, 2014); it can be a single funded initiative or a 
component of development programme divided into multiple funded projects (Fowler, 1997).  
 
As representatives of an international organisation in the host country, HCOs’ staff are expected to 
have the necessary levels of local knowledge, professional expertise, resources, and networks to 
deliver the organisational mandate of the IVCO in alignment with the host country strategies for 
development (Raleigh International, 2015; GIZ, 2016; Peace Corps, 2016; UNV, 2016; VSO 
International, 2016b). The incorporation of IVS within development projects is subject to 













Linkage to volunteer 
recruitment process 
through head office 
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Figure 3 below is a generalised representation of the arena for development activity in a developing 













Figure 3: A generalised representation of the arena for IVCO activity in a developing country (Source: author) 
 
In this diagram, the country context is the largest oval shape and shows features that exist outside 
the country or have connections within the country. The flow of international aid (funding or other 
forms of technical assistance) is denoted by arrows, loosely weighted according to the quantity of 
flow in Malawi. HCOs are shown as a dashed circle as they are the key focus of this research.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the range and diversity of stakeholders that HCOs negotiate relationships within 
their day to day activities. How HCOs negotiate these relationships ultimately shapes the processes 
of IVS. This thesis aims to analyse how relations of trust and power are likely to influence what 
happens between the HCOs, their parent organisation, donors and other stakeholders, including 
 









Key partner organisations: Local 
Government; HCOs of other aid 
agencies; umbrella institutions 
Contracted intermediaries: Local 
NGOs; consultants; specialists; 
international volunteers and counterparts 
Target beneficiary 
communities 
Flow of international aid 
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how they negotiate matters relating to IVS placements.  
 
1.5 Research question and objectives 
 
This thesis sets out to examine how relationships are negotiated between IVCO host country offices 
and the stakeholders in IVS programmes by focusing on the roles of trust and power in analysing 
how these relationships are negotiated. In doing so, the research seeks to develop a better 
understanding of how the relationships between the HCOs as boundary managers, and their IVS 
stakeholders, influence the aims and processes of IVS and its contribution to development 
programmes and projects. As such, the central research question of this thesis is: 
 
How do host country offices negotiate the multiple and diverse relationships involved in setting 
up and overseeing international volunteering service in development projects? 
 
This thesis examines this question by investigating how the host country offices of the five selected 
IVCOs in Malawi (UNV, GIZ, VSO, The Peace Corps, and Progressio) work with other 
stakeholders and the role of trust and power in shaping these relationships. Using the HCOs as the 
unit of analysis, the primary objective of this research is to better understand their role and function 
in the processes of development through international volunteering. Looking at the types of IVS 
stakeholders with whom HCOs have to negotiate relationships in their day to day work, and 
disaggregating these relationships, facilitates the appreciation of factors that support or constrain 
the negotiation of each of the relationships. In doing so, the research adds to development 
management and NGO management literature by drawing on relevant literature on MNCs and 
boundary organisations.     
 
A secondary objective is to deepen the understanding of the dynamics of the different relationships 
between the HCOs and their stakeholders. It does so by examining the types of trust and power 
relations as key influential elements that constrain or support the flow of knowledge, and hence, 
shape the behaviours of people and organisations in negotiating relationships. Three categories of 
key stakeholders were identified during the fieldwork in accordance with the main focus of the data 
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analysis, based on the patterns of interaction, and the level at which these relationships are 
negotiated:    
i) The international volunteers,  
ii) Their IVCO head offices, and  
iii) The other stakeholders such as partner organisations, government and international 
funding agencies.  
 
Table 1, below, presents a snapshot of key information about the five IVCOs studied in this 
research (Progressio, 2016c; GIZ, 2018b; The Peace Corps, 2018; UNV, 2018; VSO International, 
2018a). More detailed information is provided in Appendix1, A-E, obtained from their websites at 
























 Executive Coordinator of the 
UNV programme.  
 Reports to the UNDP 
Executive Board. 
UNV Programme Officer  
 Works through UNDP offices.   
 Is not part of UN Country Team but 
has access, and provides reports, to 
the UNCT 


















 Independent agency within the 
executive branch of the US 
government.  
 The Director appointed by the 
President of the United States 
 Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the House 
Committee on Foreign 
Affairs.  
  
 Peace Corps posts around the world 
are managed in three regions 
overseen by the Office of Global 
Operations. 
 Host country office managed by 






year by the US 
Congress  
GIZ 







 Registered as a non-profit, 
public limited enterprise 
(GmbH) in Germany; 
 It has a Management Board; 
shareholders, and a 
Supervisory Board; a Board of 
Trustees and a Private Sector 
Advisory Board  
 
 GIZ posts around the world are 
managed in regional sections 
overseen by the Heads of different 
Geographical Department 
 Host country office managed by 
Country Director and 70% of the total 
number of staff in countries are 
German or European.  
 
In 2015, 92% 
German 
Government. 














 Governed by the International 
Board and Executive Board 
 The CEO heads a 
management team. 
 Operates through a series of 
international fundraising and 
recruitment hubs and programme 
offices in developing countries.  
 Host country offices are managed by 
a Country Director and a mixture of 
national and some international staff. 
 








Est. 1940 as 






 Progressio is governed by a 
board of trustees  
 The CEO heads a 
management team.  
Host country offices managed by the 
Country Director and management 
staff. 
35% from DfID 
39% from VSO  
26% from other 
sources 
 
Table 1: Key background information for the IVCOs in this study (Source: author) 
*On 14th September 2016, Progressio began proceedings to close, and closure was finalized at the end of March 2017 
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1.6 Chapter structure 
 
The thesis is structured as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 argues that there is a gap in the literature that recognises the role of HCOs as key actors 
in development interventions through IVS. The chapter critically reviews the literature on 
international development and international volunteering, showing that both development and 
volunteering are contested concepts in literary discourse. It reveals how international and national 
political and economic histories have shaped power relations among developed and developing 
countries. The chapter moves on to describe the rise of IVCOs in the landscape of international 
development before turning to the literature on development management to explore overlaps and 
gaps with the literature on international volunteering. Next, the chapter examines the literature on 
NGO management, which is the arena in which IVCOs operate. Relevant parts of the literature on 
MNCs and boundary organisations are introduced to help explain the challenges of the multiple 
relationships that HCOs have to negotiate and add conceptual and empirical insight where 
shortfalls are identified in the literature on NGO management. Finally, the chapter examines the 
literature that describes the proliferation of terminology and ambiguities in the perceptions of 
volunteering as applied to IVS, then looks at volunteer management and its contributions and 
shortfalls in relation to the management of international volunteers. The chapter concludes by 
providing a summary of its findings. 
 
Chapter 3 argues that the negotiation of relationships in multi-stakeholder situations are influenced 
by different factors of which knowledge sharing is a critical element in shaping, and being shaped 
by, the interplay between different types of trust and power relations among the actors. The chapter 
provides an overview of the literature on negotiation and its relevance and importance in the 
context of development management. While the current literature on this subject has recognised 
differences in histories, cultural norms and language as influential elements in negotiation, it has 
chiefly focused on power relations, trust and symmetry of knowledge sharing as significant factors 
that influence the way relationships are negotiated. The chapter moves on to explain how different 
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forms of trust are linked to the central argument of this thesis concerning how relationships are 
negotiated between HCOs and the IVS stakeholders. It introduces Zucker’s (1986) categorisation 
of characteristic-based, process-based and institutional trust (Chapter 3, section 3.3) that are used in 
the analysis of data for this research. This section illustrates how each type of trust can influence 
relationships depending on whether trust between the actors is based on positive or negative 
experiences of past interactions, or based on assumptions or characteristics which may or may not 
be true. Next, the chapter provides a brief appraisal of the extensive literature on types of power 
and explains the role of power in negotiating relationships between stakeholders in IVS. Using 
Elgstrӧm’s (1992, pp. 22–24) “essential dimensions of power in negotiating processes” as a guide, 
it looks at the distribution of power over material (for example, funding, transportation and 
equipment) and non-material resources (for example knowledge and language), and power to 
influence in the negotiation of relationships between the HCOs and the IVS stakeholders. The 
chapter then wraps the preceding sections together to present the conceptual framework for the 
thesis before providing a summary of the literature and concluding remarks.  
 
Chapter 4 defines the scope of the research and the rationale behind the methodology used to 
gather and analyse data. This chapter explains how the research was designed to focus on five 
IVCOs using Malawi as the contextual background. The chapter also describes the processes used 
for the selection of the five IVCOs and for choosing Malawi as the host country. The methods 
chosen for data collection (fieldwork, semi-structured interviews, observations and document 
review alongside field notes and data transcriptions) are explained in this chapter and are followed 
by a discussion of the challenges, dilemmas and ethical considerations in at the time of preparation, 
during and after the fieldwork. Ethical considerations included permissions for conducting 
research, informed consent and confidentiality afforded to participants, as well as reflections on my 
own identity and role as a researcher and past international volunteer. Finally, the chapter explains 
the approach taken for data analysis which includes how the theoretical discussion was used within 
the process of data analysis, and how problems of validity and reliability in this research, 




Chapter 5 is the first of three chapters that analyse the data collected as part of this research. The 
focus of this chapter is on the relationships between the HCOs and the volunteers in Malawi; 
therefore it takes a bird’s eye view of the HCOs’ relationships with other stakeholders (such as 
partner organisations and beneficiary groups) which are analysed in-depth in Chapter 7. Chapter 5 
argues that the negotiation of the relationships between the HCOs’ staff and the volunteers is 
influenced by the diversity of perspectives on volunteering, the organisational focus of the IVCO 
and the contrasting expectations of the professional, personal and administrative support that HCOs 
can provide for the volunteers. The chapter shows that geographical and cultural barriers, and 
ambiguities in IVS terminology, make building process-based trust between the HCOs staff, the 
volunteers and their co-workers problematic. This has led to reliance on institutional or 
characteristic-based types of trust, and assumptions of power over resources and power to 
influence, that HCOs, as boundary managers, need to mediate. The relationships between the 
HCOs’ staff and the volunteers are influenced by whether the primary organisational focus of an 
IVCO is on development or volunteer placement. These two different types of organisational focus 
affect the approach the HCOs take to the identification, justification, planning and incorporation of 
IVS placements in development projects, and how information is exchanged between the HCOs, 
the volunteers and their co-workers in partner organisations. While an IVCO’s development-focus 
can support the HCOs’ ability to provide volunteers with professional and personal support, a 
placement-focus often constrains this HCO ability and can lead to problems in managing the 
volunteers’ expectations and retention. Successful management of relationships helps build 
process-based trust between the HCOs’ staff and the volunteers, while poorly managed 
relationships can result in mistrust and disappointment of volunteers and lead to volunteers 
complaining, working independently or leaving; all of which have serious implications for the 
HCO and the IVS.  
 
Chapter 6 looks at the way IVCO formal and informal structures and procedures support or 
constrain relationships between HCOs and their head offices. The chapter argues that discrepancies 
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exist between how the role of HCOs is described by the IVCOs and how it is experienced and 
enacted by the HCOs. These discrepancies are related to the original aim of IVCO organisations 
when they were established, as well as current and historical changes to power relations within 
IVCO organisations, in response to external and internal influences. The ability of an IVCO to 
respond to emerging global trends is directed by the types of information that it considers important 
for it to continue functioning and how external information is interpreted into internal policies and 
procedures. The chapter makes a distinction between development-focused and placement-focused 
IVCOs with the former having evolved to be more adaptable to change and a more positive 
relationship between the HCO and their head offices, whereas the latter has struggled to respond to 
changes that have added complexity to historical power relations and diminished institutional trust.  
Drawing parallels between NGO management literature, the literature on MNCs and on boundary 
organisations, the chapter shows that organisational structures and the language used to convey the 
policies, as well as opportunities and spaces available for knowledge sharing, participation in 
democratic processes, and the way management makes and enacts decisions affecting its own staff 
influence the day to day operations of the HCOs. As boundary managers, HCOs also have to 
negotiate relationships with other actors outside the IVCO; consequently, the incorporation of 
HCOs into the IVCOs’ overall strategy is not always as seamless as it is portrayed. Finally, the 
chapter looks at the extent to which IVCOs’ espoused principles and values are reflected not only 
in the quantity of the provision of resources to HCOs but to transparency and mechanisms for 
resource allocations within the wider organisation. It shows that power over resources and 
generation of process-based trust between the head offices and HCOs reflect the levels of IVCOs' 
commitment to staff training and development and fair remuneration packages.  
 
Chapter 7 examines the boundaries that HCOs have to manage across three different kinds of 
inter-organisational relationships, described in this thesis as strategic, mobilising and implementing 
partnerships (see Chapter 7, section 7.1). It argues that contextual factors in the institutional 
landscape of development in Malawi influence the dynamics of trust and power relations between 
the HCOs and their three types of partners in Malawi. As boundary managers, HCOs’ 
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accountability to multiple partners makes building process-based trust problematic. This is 
illustrated by the changes in the dynamics of institutional and characteristic-based types of trust, 
and the distribution of power over financial resources between the donor agencies and the INGO 
(including IVCO) host country offices as a result of a history of financial irregularities and capacity 
issues in the Government of Malawi.  
 
The HCOs’ multiple accountabilities blur the distinctions between not only what is being 
accounted for, but to whom it should be accounted. Thus HCOs can act as gate-keepers of 
knowledge and information exchange between their three sets of partnerships and, in doing so, they 
are guided by whether their organisational focus is on development or placement of volunteers. The 
inclusion of IVS in development programmes cannot be assumed and has to be justified when 
negotiating relationships with mobilising partners, for whom IVS may not be a priority, and hence 
HCOs sometimes construct or inflate the expectations on which institutional and characteristic-
based of their partners are grounded. The chapter shows that unlike development-focused HCOs for 
which IVS is one of many tools for development intervention, failure to secure IVS placements 
presents a bigger risk for placement-focused HCOs whose organisational survival depends entirely 
on placing volunteers. While a development-focused approach usually leads to an IVS placement 
requested by a partner organisation, a placement-focused approach relies on an offer of IVS being 
accepted by a partner organisation. Thus Malawian partners often consent to the power of the 
placement-focused HCOs over resources on offer through IVS, for reasons that are sometimes 
different from the aims of IVS and can impact its aims and processes. Six reasons are identified: i) 
cultural norms in Malawi, ii) financial benefits for the Malawian partner, iii) issues related to 
human resources, iv) increased access to materials and equipment, v) the transience of relationships 
and vi) reputation and prestige. The chapter shows that a lack of an HCO’s responsiveness to 
contextual changes in the host country and persistence in promoting IVS, constrain the 
relationships between the HCOs and their implementing partners. This diminishes institutional trust 
in IVS and characteristic-based trust of HCOs, sometimes reinforcing internalised inequalities 
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associated with historical or economic supremacy and adversely impacting on knowledge 
exchange. 
 
Chapter 8 presents a discussion of the main empirical findings of this study and shows how they 
contribute to and move forward, the existing understanding of the role of HCOs in international 
volunteering, starting with a summary of the key findings from Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This research 
represents an initial effort to open the ‘black box’ that allows further exploration of the 
organisational factors that the impact of IVS and its contribution to empirical, theoretical and 
policy are presented in this chapter. Separating of relationships from the functional dimensions of 
HCOs’ work, and analysing them independently, has revealed the importance of human factors that 
add to the understanding of development through IVS. The contribution of the research to theory is 
set out in terms of addressing the gap in the literature on development management, NGO 
management and volunteer management, by linking them to the literature on MNCs and on 
boundary organisations. In policy terms, the research recognises the importance of intra-
organisational strategies, policies and procedures that promote building process-based trust, 
democratic spaces for participation and openness in knowledge sharing.  
 
The chapter revisits the theoretical framework used in this thesis to discuss how it supported the 
analysis of data, and its limitations in exploring the range and depth of influential elements in 
negotiating relationships between HCOs and their stakeholders. The chapter then brings together 
the preceding sections to answer the overarching research question and present the overall 
conclusion of this thesis. It concludes that HCOs, as boundary managers, act as gatekeepers of 
useful knowledge and information among the IVS stakeholders. This is because the diversity of the 
stakeholder and multi-national setting of development interventions through IVS create a dynamic 
environment where changes in power relations make it difficult for HCOs, to build and maintain 
process-based trust among the stakeholders. This opens opportunities and spaces for IVS actors, 
including HCOs to pursue self-serving agendas, which may have positive or negative consequences 
for IVS. The chapter then turns to suggestions for possible further research that could be conducted 
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to confirm and expand the findings of this project. Recommendations include a more in-depth 
exploration of the role of HCOs as boundary managers with particular emphasis on knowledge 
sharing and information exchange; the study of the relationships between host country employees 
and employed foreign staff in the same organisation; evaluation of the policy and practice of South-
South volunteering as well as of national volunteering by IVCOs, and the potential for ‘reciprocity’ 
in IVS (involving IVS placement for host country nationals in the home country of the IVCO head 










International volunteering has witnessed significant expansion since the mid-20
th
 Century and has 
subsequently become the focus of considerable scholarly attention (Anheier and Salamon, 1999; 
Simpson, 2004; Sherraden et al., 2006, 2008; Jones, 2008; Devereux, 2010; Boesten et al., 2011; 
Baillie Smith et al., 2013; Burns et al., 2015; Nelson and Child, 2016; Ackers and Ackers-Johnson, 
2017a). Technological advances in communications, easier access to overseas travel, and increased 
knowledge of the conditions in the poorest countries of the global South have stimulated the 
growth of volunteer-based programmes and enabled linkages to emerging concepts such as those of 
global citizenship (Baillie Smith and Laurie, 2011), awareness-development in youths (Grusky, 
2000; Dwyer, 2004), and mutually beneficial cultural exchanges (Lewis, 2005; Devereux, 2010; 
Burns et al., 2015). On the other hand, IVS is rooted in colonial histories (Perold et al., 2013), 
global politics (Grubbs, 2009), and neoliberal economic structures of international aid and 
development processes (Engel and Georgeou, 2011). Consequently, it can also be considered as 
“patronising, self-serving and exploitative” (Schech et al., 2015, p. 359). Although there is a wealth 
of literature on international volunteering, the tendency in scholarly literature is to focus on 
international volunteers when seeking to attribute the positive or negative impacts of IVS practice. 
Scholarly work on the organisational elements of IVS is sparse (Sherraden et al., 2006; Nelson and 
Child, 2016) and there is little or no focus on the role of the host country offices of the IVCOs 
which are crucial in determining projects and placements for volunteers.  
 
This chapter argues that there is a gap in the literature that recognises the role of HCOs as key 
actors in development interventions through IVS and limits the understanding of IVS in practice. It 
examines the key literature on international volunteering and its connection with development 
management as well as the literature on NGO management and volunteer management. It shows 
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that while much has been written about the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of international volunteering, the 
literature on the ‘how’ – the processes of IVS – is relatively light. The scarcity of academic 
research on how IVS processes are organised suggests both a lack of awareness of the multiple 
relationships that IVCOs have to manage and an understanding of the division of roles, 
responsibilities and accountabilities between IVCO head offices and their HCOs.  
 
Section 2.2 starts by looking at the key contextual insights from the literature on international 
development and international volunteering, highlighting historical, institutional and relational 
perspectives on development intervention through IVS. The section seeks to identify overlaps and 
gaps between the evolving perspectives of international development and international 
volunteering. It shows that despite over sixty years having passed since the inception of the 
contemporary forms of international volunteering, many of its weaknesses that are identified in the 
literature remain unchanged, as IVCOs struggle to put into practice measures that resolve the 
challenges that they face in managing IVS.  
 
Section 2.3 reviews academic discourse on development management and identifies its 
contribution to this research as well as gaps in the literature in respect of the role and function of 
IVS. This section argues that issues raised in the development management literature on inter-
organisational relationships between the global North and South, also have implications for IVS.  
  
Section 2.4 turns to the literature on NGO management and examines its applicability to IVCOs as 
a subset of INGOs. The section argues that there is a gap in the literature on NGO management that 
fails to make a distinction between the role and functions of INGOs’ (and IVCOs’) central offices 
and their HCOs, and thus does not address the role and influence of HCOs as a distinct component 
within the processes and the practices of IVS. Although the literature on NGO management 
distinguishes between NGOs, INGOs and even NGDOs
5
, it refers to the latter two when, in fact, it 
is describing the work of their host country offices in a developing country. This creates the 
                                                     
5
 NGDO is the term used by Fowler (1997)  and by Edwards and Fowler (2002)  to describe non-government development organisation, 
of which IVCOs are a sub-set.  
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impression of seamless accord between INGO aims, policy and practice - its head office and the 
HCO - that may not reflect the realities on the ground.  
 
Section 2.5 provides a summary of the relevant parts of the literature on MNCs that examine how 
relations between head offices and subsidiaries of international organisations are informed by trust 
and power. This literature provides insights into how IVCO-HCO relations may function and how 
HCO roles might be integrated within the wider parent organisations. Overlaying elements of the 
literature on MNCs that deal with influential factors in the negotiation of relationships between 
HCOs and their head offices, this section explores the tensions arising in the relationships between 
geographically and culturally diverse central offices and HCOs in international organisations. 
Drawing on the literature on MNCs, allows this research to explore the extent to which the internal 
dynamics within IVCOs are related to disparity in shared values, unequal power relations, and 
assumptions and expectations based on degrees of trust between the two organisational units.  
 
Section 2.6 Looks at the literature on boundary organisations (Guston, 1999) for insights into 
organisations that have multiple mandates and accountabilities (Hanlin et al., 2018). Although this 
literature does not typically look at IVCOs, it is important because it helps explain the relationships 
HCOs have to negotiate with other key IVS stakeholders (donors, state departments, partner 
organisations, beneficiary groups and volunteers). Framing HCOs as boundary managers that 
straddle two (or more) social worlds - one being the internal IVCO organisation and the other the 
institutional landscape of development in the host country - and are accountable to both, is useful in 
understanding the challenges that HCOs face in negotiating several relationships with diverse 
stakeholders. 
 
Section 2.7 discusses key literature on volunteer management and its overlaps and shortfalls in 
relation to the management of people who undertake volunteer work outside their home country, in 
IVS programmes and projects. It argues that there is a gap in the knowledge of the role of HCOs in 
the management and coordination of international volunteers in IVS. The bulk of the literature on 
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volunteer management tends to focus primarily on volunteers working in their own countries 
(Juknevicius and Savicka, 2003; Voicu and Voicu, 2003; Machin and Paine, 2008; Oppenheimer, 
2008). Such work as exists in an international context has focused on data drawn on the INGO 
sector where foreign and national employees work alongside each other and with other foreigners 
such as consultants and ‘generalist experts’ (Fowler, 1997; Pink, 1998; Porter, 2003; Crewe and 
Fernando, 2006) and does not specifically address the management of foreign volunteers.   
 
Section 2.8 concludes the chapter by providing a summary of its findings. 
 
2.2 Evolving perspectives on international volunteering in development 
 
This section looks at relevant literature on international development and examines how shifting 
views in international development have also shaped the discourse on international volunteering. It 
argues that global trends in international development also impact on international volunteering and 
its subsequent role in development interventions. This section reinforces the view that IVS is an 
activity grounded in Western philosophies, history and culture (Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Kothari, 
2005; Grubbs, 2009; Perold et al., 2013) and “plays a legitimating role in the donor/state/NGO 
international aid system” (Engel and Georgeou, 2011, p. 298). However, while the literature on 
international volunteering recognises the importance of organisational factors in the aims and 
processes of IVS, it largely focuses on the values of volunteering and the (positive or negative) 
contribution of volunteers.   
 
The historical origins of international volunteering can be traced back to the expansion of European 
colonialism and the activities of religious missionaries (Beigbeder, 1991; Ross, 2013) and their 
contested role either as political agents of imperial powers, or advocates of  justice for the 
indigenous people against the tyrannies of colonialism (Crush, 1995; Escobar, 1995; Cowen and 





 emerged following the two world wars when a number of independent organisations 
were set up with the aim of facilitating the placement of volunteers from the developed countries in 
programmes addressing basic needs issues of impoverished people in countries of the South 
(Beigbeder, 1991). Voluntary Services Overseas, VSO (the UK, 1957), Peace Corps (the USA, 
1961), Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, JOVC (1965), and United Nations Volunteers, 
UNV (1971) are among many such organisations that were set up at this time (Sherraden et al., 
2006). Following the collapse of the structuralist approach to development by the 1980s, and the 
subsequent failure of neoliberal economic policies to deliver the promised development goals in the 
1990 - 2000s, it became apparent that development did not translate into a shift in the balance of 
power between the North and the South (Hewitt, 2000; Kothari, 2005). Moreover, it highlighted 
that neither the state nor the market could reliably oversee development in the interest of the poor
7
. 
This facilitated the proliferation of a variety of agencies, including NGOs and INGOs (Lewis, 
2002) - and IVCOs as a subset of INGOs - occupying the space created between the ‘state’ and the 
‘market’ and engaging in the development of others. 
 
The post-war discourse on development policy and practice stimulated an international effort to 
facilitate the economic growth of poor countries through internationally coordinated financial 
support, based on assumptions that the benefits would subsequently trickle down to the rest of the 
population (Hewitt, 2000). Some of the new initiatives, such as overseas development programmes 
in Europe, America and Australia (Hewitt, 2000, p. 291), recognised the potential values of 
volunteering as complementary to the emerging aspirations for development in poor countries. For 
example, the Commonwealth government assistance for international voluntary aid organisations in 
the 1960s led to the growth in the number of volunteers from Western countries participating in 
development programmes in countries of the South (Oppenheimer, 2008). However, given their 
                                                     
6
 Beigbeder (1991, p. 9) describes ‘modern forms of voluntary service’ as both secular and religious activities that require “the analysis 
of economic, social and human reality as a basis for a strategy to eliminate the causes of alienation, [and] create the conditions for the 
underprivileged to take charge of their own destiny.”, and are distinct from benevolence and charity which only deal with the symptoms 
of problems. 
7
 Historically, states acted as agents for development (Allen and Thomas, 2000b, p. 193), but the severe control exercised by states was 
contested, through the emergence of “ideas of liberal market economy unimpeded by interference from the state” (Brown and Hanlin, 
2013b, p. 36) that later developed into the  neoliberal economic approach in the 1980s’ (Brown & Hanlin, 2013b). Proponents of 
neoliberalism believe that the freedom of trade and competition within the market will generate overall wealth for the society which will 
eventually trickle down to all members (Brown and Hanlin, 2013b, p. 36). 
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recent colonial experiences, many of the earliest volunteer-hosting countries were suspicious of the 
intentions of the sending countries (Ball et al., 1976; Bird, 1998; Amin, 1999), but had to 
acknowledge that their nation’s economic and social development would be dependent on revenue, 
resources and skills from overseas (Grubbs, 2009). 
 
Diverse perspectives on international development are also reflected in the literature on IVS. 
Advocates of international volunteering consider its values as both the transfer of skills, knowledge 
and resources, and the promotion of concepts such as cultural exchange, international 
understanding, and solidarity (Brown, 1999; Lewis, 2005; Devereux, 2010; Lough, 2011; Burns et 
al., 2015; Schech et al., 2015). Critics of international volunteering argue that empirical evidence 
from volunteers and beneficiary groups (Appadurai, 1988; Heron, 2005; Noxolo, 2011; Trau, 2014) 
points to gaps between the theory and practice of IVS, and speculate on possible forms of IVS that 
may be constructed in an environment of inherent inequality as a consequence of residual colonial 
history or neo-liberal economics (Simpson, 2004; Forsythe, 2011; Perold et al., 2013; Trau, 2014).  
 
These gaps in theory and practice have persisted over time. The 1976 International Conference on 
Volunteer Service, Vienna, is an example of sustained unequal power relations in IVS processes 
between the volunteer sending and volunteer receiving countries. The summary report from the 
conference shows a disparity between the goals and values of the volunteer-exporting and 
volunteer-receiving countries within any given project (Ball et al., 1976, p. 30). While developing 
countries aimed to supplement their technical skills, the goals for the export country appeared to be 
providing “experience to the volunteer in a foreign setting” (Ball et al., 1976, p. 30). Almost forty 
years later, a similar discrepancy is reported by Burns et al. (2015, pp. 38–39) who observe that 
although IVCOs are “delivering quality work, they are not necessarily delivering what 
communities need.” The report from the Vienna conference also showed that the need for technical 
assistance from foreign volunteers was already becoming redundant due to the growing number of 
skilled professional in host countries, with representatives proposing the introduction of reciprocal 
schemes based on exchange of volunteers (Ball et al., 1976, pp. 29–30). Nearly forty years later, 
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research conducted by Lough and Carter-Black (2015, p. 219) echoes the voices of participants 
from 1976 by concluding that reciprocity of international exchange and culturally immersive 
relationships would redress the real or perceived power of the white (Western) volunteers “which 
tend to result in a comparative denigration of indigenous ideas and practices.”  
 
The findings of Lough and Carter-Black (2015) and Burns et al. (2015) suggest a lack of sensitivity 
to contextual changes in the host-countries and the needs of the intended beneficiaries, as well as 
persistence in the promotion of the interests of the volunteer-sending countries in IVS policy and 
practice. This sustained lack of responsiveness implies enduring unequal power relations between 
the volunteer sending agencies and the volunteer receiving countries which stem from the early 
days of IVS over sixty years ago, continue through the course of its evolution, and remain 
unresolved to the present day. Although unequal power relations are recognised in the literature on 
international volunteering (Simpson, 2004, 2005; Perold et al., 2013; Trau, 2014; Lough and 
Carter-Black, 2015), they are focused largely on the relationships between the volunteers and the 
beneficiary groups and the values and principles of volunteering. Little attention is given to 
research that focuses on the organisational processes that contribute to IVS in practice, and are 
triggered by the way relationships are negotiated between HCOs and the other IVS actors. The next 
section turns to the contribution and limits of development management literature in explaining 
some of the challenges in IVS. 
 
2.3 Development management, changing patterns of aid and implications 
for IVS 
 
Development management addresses the management of the processes of development in its 
diverse forms, at different international, national, organisational and community levels. As an 
integral but distinct constituent of international development, issues raised in the development 
management literature on inter-organisational relationships between the global North and South, 
also have implications for IVS. IVCOs are subject to external pressures arising from global trends 
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in international development, worldwide political and economic movements, as well as domestic 
concerns in the countries where IVCO host country offices operate.  
 
Development is an imprecise and contested issue (Chambers, 1983; Crush, 1995; Cowen and 
Shenton, 1996; Biekart, 1999; Allen and Thomas, 2000b; Cleaver, 2001; Kothari, 2005; Brown and 
Hanlin, 2013b) and can be used in different ways, for example,  i) as a vision of transformation into 
a more desirable form for the society, ii) as a historical process of social change over time and iii) 
deliberate efforts (intention) aimed at positive transformation by various agencies, on behalf of 
others (Thomas, 1996; Hewitt, 2000; Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Brown & Hanlin, 2013a). This 
thesis is concerned with development as ‘deliberate interventions’ through international 
volunteering, and uses Thomas’s (1996, pp. 99–100) designation of development management as 
“The management of the development effort…[aimed to] deliberately influence the course of social 
change in a positive and sustainable way”.  Deliberate development intervention is aligned to the 
concept of ‘trusteeship’ as “the intent….by one source of agency to develop the capacities of 
another” (Cowen and Shenton, 1996, p. 25). Linking trusteeship with agency, Thomas and Allen 
(2000a, p. 189) define agency as “the action of individuals or groups, and their capacity to 
influence events” and argue that while intentional development necessitates the presence of 
development agencies to assume the responsibility for  trusteeships, it questions authority and 
motives of the agents to implement development on behalf of others. Thomas (2000, p. 41) 
observes that “Trusteeship may be taken on by an agency on another’s behalf without ‘the other’ 
asking to ‘be developed’ or even being aware that the intention to ‘develop’ them is there”.  
 
Contrary to conventional management, which is customarily intent on achieving internal 
organisational objectives, development management relates to the management of interventions 
aimed at external social goals (Thomas, 1996; Robinson et al., 2000). This requires negotiating the 
mobilisation, coordination and access to resources with multiple actors and their diverse interests 
(Fowler, 1997; Bond, 2002; Lavagnon, 2012). Management of international development takes 
place at different levels: global and strategic, national project design and implementation, and at the 
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community level, where complexities arise in relation to the multitude of actors and their different 
values and aspirations (Robinson et al., 2000). The diversity of actors makes the practice of 
development management difficult because individuals and organisations may not share the same 
level of commitment to the goals of development, or may be motivated by different incentives and 
agendas.  
 
Escobar (1995) suggests that narratives of post-war development influenced the recipients of 
development interventions to internalise how they perceived themselves in the arena of global 
power relations. He thus captures the significance of forms of trust (as in trusteeship) and power 
relations (a potential obstacle to trust) in development management, which are also present in IVS 
(Pink, 1998; Heron, 2005; Trau, 2014). Unequal power relations can influence the aims and 
processes of interventions, including those using IVS, diminish trust among the actors and 
undermine the legitimacy of the agents of development (Thomas, 1996). Since the 1990s, a 
plethora of donor-driven initiatives has emerged aimed at addressing power inequalities between 
the global North and South (OECD, 2005, 2008, 2011; The World Bank, 2016; United Nations, 
2017), inspired by concepts such as empowerment through participation, partnership, capacity-
building and sustainability (Thomas, 1992). Funding for aid, which historically used to flow from 
Northern governments, or international organisations, to the governments of developing countries, 
has since become increasingly diverted directly through international and national agencies, 
including NGOs, INGOs and IVCOs for programme implementation (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Lewis, 
2002; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013).  
 
Emphasis on the policies and practices of development management has shifted from top-down 
approaches often pursued during the period of structural adjustment in the 80s and 90s, to 
partnerships between donors, states, national and international aid agencies and community 
representatives and beneficiary groups (Lewis, 1998; Edwards and Fowler, 2002; Rondinelli, 2002; 
Elbers, 2012). The discourse informing partnerships is that of equality, capacity building and 
mutual exchange (Lister, 1999; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Pickard, 2007). However, the structural 
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inequalities between the global North and South, and sustained economic advantages in the North 
limit the realisation of such goals (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Jentsch and Pilley, 2003; Cornwall and 
Brock, 2005). This finds congruence in the literature on IVS, where it is shown that the intended 
aims of IVS are not always realised in equal partnerships. For example, Nelson and Child (2016, p. 
543) observe that the outcome of partnerships between IVCOs and local stakeholders in Southern 
India was contradictory to the intended aims of IVS because they served the interests of the 
volunteers rather than local needs. Other authors suggest that host country partners have low 
expectations of positive outcomes from development interventions through working with IVCOs 
(Appadurai, 1988; Heron, 2011; Lough, 2011; Trau, 2014). The examples from the literature on 
IVS recognise the presence of unequal power relations in partnerships with power more favourably 
tilted towards the interests of the volunteers, but they fall short of the analysis of the underlying 
factors that shape the relationships between the key IVS actors. 
 
Equity in power relations is related to the concepts of trusteeship and agency and implies either the 
necessity for the presence of trust, or accountability, or both within the relationship between the 
development agent and the service recipients. Accountability is referred to when suppliers are only 
rewarded when they provide satisfactory services or products to the intended recipients and can be 
penalised in cases of failure (Brett, 1993, p. 42). Edwards and Hulme (1996, p. 189) argue that the 
effectiveness of performance and transparency in reporting are fundamental elements of 
responsible practice. This has led to donor mandates for ‘professionalization’ in accounting 
systems for financial reporting and technical performance monitoring which include greater 
emphasis on legal frameworks, documentation, strategic planning, and the use of business tools for 
training, monitoring and evaluation and impact assessments (Hauge, 2002; Rochester et al., 2010; 
Liao-Troth, 2008; Lindenberg & Dobel, 1999). Donor organisations’ calls for professionalization is 
considered by some authors to be contrary to the rhetoric of participation, ownership and 
downward accountability, but based on management theories and procedures that help maintain the 
dominance of Western philosophies and values while creating dependency in developing countries 
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(Brinkerhoff, 2002; Kapoor, 2002; Alsop, 2004; Mosse, 2005; Avant et al., 2010; Battilana and 
Casciaro, 2012; Africa, 2013; Gulrajani, 2014).  
 
Engel and Georgeou (2011, p. 298) consider IVS to be a “largely a donor-dominated activity rooted 
in Western philosophical traditions, history and culture, and it plays a legitimating role in the donor 
state/NGO international aid system”. Thus, donor imperative for professionalization has 
increasingly become applied to IVCOs in recent years with the introduction of procedures to 
measure, quantify and qualify volunteering activities (Lewis, 2001; Merrill and Safrit, 2003; 
Oppenheimer, 2008). However, not only is this type of intervention hard to get right but it is also 
very difficult to capture (Bolton, 2007; Ackers and Ackers-Johnson, 2017a, p. 55) as providing 
evidence requires specific skills and capacities associated with managing and coordinating 
volunteer programmes (Safrit and Merrill, 2007). Some authors contend that the donor demands for 
professionalization in IVCOs prioritises measurements that produce expected results rather than 
accountability in processes or procedures (Engel and Georgeou, 2011).   
 
Some scholars argue that pressure to raise funds steers aid agencies to simplify and overstate the 
effectiveness of aid (Bolton, 2007; Ackers and Ackers-Johnson, 2017a), while an emerging body of 
literature points to the challenges of professionalization resulting in tensions at the interface 
between INGO head offices and their HCOs (Porter, 2003; Elbers, 2012; Walsh, 2014). The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005) laid out an action-oriented roadmap that included 
increased ownership of strategic development work by the developing countries and making donors 
more accountable for the development results, among a number of measures aimed at addressing 
the imbalances in the aid delivery systems. The combined effect of increased emphasis on aid 
effectiveness and the economic crisis of the mid-2000s on all global actors of international 
development has led to changes in donor strategy to fund disbursement, away from unrestricted to 
restricted funding
8
. Aligned with a neo-liberal approach to economic policy, this has led to 
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 Also known as ‘undesignated funding’ or ‘core funding’, ‘unrestricted’ is the term commonly applied to funding that is 




increasing competition among NGOs and INGOs (including IVCOs) as they are required to 
identify their market niche, demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness, and use performance 
indicators to attract funding and resources (Robinson et al., 2000; Lewis, 2001; Engel and 
Georgeou, 2011).  
 
The implications of changes in donor strategies to fund disbursement are particularly significant for 
IVCOs, as unrestricted funding was historically allocated to many of the IVCOs through strategic 
alliances or donors in support of IVCO programmes using international volunteers (Engel and 
Georgeou, 2011; Lough and Allum, 2013), some of which continue to remain so to this day 
(Allum, 2007; Engel and Georgeou, 2011)
9
. With the exception of UNV which was set up as an 
agency within the UN, the other four IVCOs studied in this research were set up and operated with 
unrestricted government funding for several decades (Appendix 1A-E). A good example of the 
changes in donor strategy on fund disbursement is illustrated by looking at the recent history of 
VSO (Appendix 1C), which shows how the amount of unrestricted funding to VSO from DFID was 
reduced from around 90% in the late 1990s to 35% in 2013/14 (OECD 2010, p.151; Ledward and 
Trivedy, 2010). However, a study of the impact of the challenges of restricted funding on IVCOs is 
almost non-existent in the literature on IVS, with the exception of research on the subject by Lough 
and Allum (2013, p. 914) which was acknowledged to be “based largely on the perceptions from 
IVCO administrators, which may not necessarily reflect reality.”  
 
Despite the changes in the balance of restricted and unrestricted funding support, a significant 
number of IVCOs continue to receive substantial amounts of their funding from their own or other 
governments. For example, in 2015/16, 78% of VSO income and 74% of Progressio’s income were 
from restricted government funding, which raises questions about their independence (Bird, 1998; 
Graff, 2006; Grubbs, 2009; Rochester et al., 2010). Furthermore, shortfalls in unrestricted-funding 
                                                                                                                                                              
restrictions placed in order to hold NGOs accountable for delivering pre-defined outcomes in accordance with the 
principles of aid effectiveness stated in the 2005 Paris Declaration (Nijs and Renard, 2009, p. 10)  
9
 A survey commissioned by the Association Learning and Helping Overseas (AKLHUE) showed that: 35% of IVCOs 
were funded entirely by governments, and national governments provided in excess of 50% of the funding for 75% of all 
programmes (Euler et al., 2016, p. 32)  
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are being filled by alternative sources of restricted financing through donor-supported projects and 
programmes (Liao-Troth, 2008; Rochester et al., 2010; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013). The flow of 
international aid from donor governments can be direct to IVCOs (in the form of both restricted 
and unrestricted funding) or to international organisations such as the World Bank, or other INGOs, 
who then enter into a contractual arrangement with an IVCO to fund a specific project (restricted 
funding). Increasingly, entire or sections of projects are sub-contracted to consultants and other 
technical specialist groups or individuals (Edwards and Fowler, 2002), resulting in the 
fragmentation of the supply chain of IVS service delivery (Wearing, 2016). This adds complexity 
at the point of project implementation where HCOs work and raises questions with regards to the 
legitimacy and accountability of the multiple stakeholders. 
 
This section has shown the IVCOs are exposed to external pressures from global trends in the 
policies and practices of development management that have implications on power relations and 
bring into question the forms of trust within relationships between stakeholders. Fleuret (1988) 
suggests that the adoption of a frame of reference for development management should include not 
only a focus on the final impact of a development activity, but also factors that influence its 
conception, design, and implementation. The next section looks at the key readings in NGO 
management literature to examine the extent to which organisational dynamics influence INGOs’ 
day to day operations and their implications for IVCOs and IVS.  
2.4 NGO management  
 
The literature on NGO management is not concerned with “how to manage an NGO but about how 
NGOs function and how their effectiveness can be improved” (Fowler, 1997, p. xi). This section 
contends that there is a gap in the NGO management literature that fails to make the distinction 
between the role and functions of INGOs’ (and IVCOs’) central offices and their HCOs. Although 
the literature on NGO management distinguishes between NGOs, INGOs and even NGDOs
10
, it 
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 NGDO is the term used by Fowler (1997)  and by Edwards and Fowler (2002)  to describe non-government development 
organisation, of which IVCOs are a sub-set.  
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refers to the latter two when, in fact, it is describing the work of their host country offices in a 
developing country. This creates the impression of seamless accord between INGO aims, policy 
and practice - the work of its head office and the HCOs - that may not reflect the realities on the 
ground. The section looks at the literature on NGO management where IVCOs and their host 
country offices work. Although IVCOs are a subset of INGOs, their multiple mandates to deliver 
technical assistance explicitly through IVS, add a distinguishing feature to their organisational 
characteristics. However, the literature on NGO management does not differentiate IVCOs from 
INGOs; therefore, the discussion on INGOs in this section also applies to IVCOs, although any 
significant points of divergence are highlighted where appropriate.  
 
INGOs have to manage an array of complex value-based challenges both within and outside of 
their organisations, across national and international boundaries, and often in unequal partnerships 
with donors, governments, communities and individuals (Lewis, 2014). The tasks of managing 
development projects involve planning, organising, leading, and controlling activities, often in 
situations of social, political, economic or cultural conflict. Thus INGOs’, and NGOs’, association 
with the poor and marginalised may lead to suspicion of their motives and activities by more 
powerful actors, particularly governments and their agencies (Edwards and Fowler, 2002, p. 4). 
Although INGOs are largely reliant on the state
11
 for funding and support towards goal 
achievement, they have neither the statutory powers of the state nor the economic influence of the 
donors (Edwards and Fowler, 2002, pp. 3–4), thus the achievement of both their organisational, and 
development goals lie beyond the INGOs’ span of control. Consequently, INGOs have to rely on 
negotiating relationships with multiple stakeholders to achieve their goals, which makes the quality 
of their relationships with their stakeholders crucially important to their organisational 
effectiveness and survival.   
 
                                                     
11
Although INGOs also receive funding through public donations and philanthropic individuals, they are largely funded by states or 
donor agencies – see footnote 8 
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Negotiating relationships involves a variety of unpredictable human behaviours of which trust and 
power are key influential variables that shape the expectations and behaviours of people and 
organisations (Nierenberg, 1987; Koeszegi, 2004; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Olekalns and Smith, 
2009; Pettit, 2013). Much is discussed about power relations in the NGO management literature, 
for example between Northern INGOs and Southern NGOs (Fowler, 1997; Hearn, 2007; Lavagnon, 
2012; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013); donors, government agencies and NGOs (Igoe and Kelsall, 
2005; Mosse, 2005; Wallace, 2009; Gulrajani, 2014); NGOs and their partner organisations 
(Penrose, 2000; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Elbers, 2012) and NGOs and their beneficiary groups (Gardner 
and Lewis, 2000; Lewis, 2002; Rossi, 2006). Choudry and Kapoor (2013, p. 15) observe that 
“NGOs often create and become enmeshed and invested in maintaining webs of power and 
bureaucracy, which divert energy and focus away from building oppositional movements for social 
change”. Some scholars have suggested that NGOs have come too close to being donor-driven 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996). This view is widely shared by other authors who argue that there is 
excessive emphasis within aid agencies on professionalization and in reporting quantifiable data to 
stakeholders, and not enough on the significance of indirect outcomes and failures within internal 
management to inform decision-making procedures that could support realistic development goals 
and positive outcomes (Mawdsley et al., 2005; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013; Gulrajani, 2014).  
 
References to trust and the interplay between different forms of trust and power relations in the 
negotiation of the relationships between INGOs, NGOs, and their stakeholders are rare and tend to 
be anecdotal in the NGO management literature (Fowler, 1997; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Lewis, 2014), 
although it is recognised as a success factor in the management of development projects (Diallo 
and Thuillier, 2005). Harriss (2003, p. 764) suggests that “the significance of trust is overestimated 
in some of the literature because many inter-firm relationships involve power as well as, or more 
than, trust”. In the context of cooperation in inter-organisational relations, Harriss identifies 
different forms of trust as influential elements because social relationships that create trust lead to 
increased efficiency in the use of resources (Harriss, 2000, p. 179). Mawdsley et al. (2005) appear 
to make a similar point viewed from a different perspective, by cautioning against over-reliance on 
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documentation, targets, and indicators which can undermine trust in personal relationships between 
donors and INGOs, and their Southern NGO partners.  
 
The way knowledge and information are shared also plays a role in the way relationships are 
negotiated between actors in NGO management literature and are, therefore, areas for investigation 
in this research. Nauta (2006, p. 168) observes that NGOs can strategically translate the needs of 
the different stakeholders in a way that allows NGOs “to control the messages that are relayed from 
“grassroots” to government and vice versa”. Nauta’s (2006) work not only draws attention to the 
importance of information exchange between the NGOs and their stakeholders but suggests that far 
from being relatively powerless or passive participants, NGOs may use knowledge in strategies and 
behaviours that help them shape their relationships with the other stakeholders. The studies of 
Ebrahim (2002, 2005) showed how two Indian NGOs were highly selective in sharing information, 
which they produced not for their own decision-making, but solely to satisfy their donors, in order 
to safeguard their main activities from interference and lend legitimacy to their activities. The 
implications are that NGOs can be seen as positioning themselves as the gatekeepers of information 
between groups of stakeholders (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013, p. 9).  
 
The descriptions of NGOs in developing countries closely resemble the role of the HCOs. HCOs 
are intermediaries between national stakeholders and the head offices of INGO that are based 
overseas, with whom they have to negotiate relationships. However, their geographical distance 
from the central decision-making offices of INGO organisations means that the delivery of INGOs’ 
intra-organisational priorities may be challenged by the choices that HCOs face in their inter-
organisational relationships with the other development actors (Fowler, 1997, p. 52). In his 
influential work, Striking a Balance, Fowler (1997, p. 54) observes that “the responsibility, 
authority and accountability for negotiation, design quality and subsequent performance [of 
development processes] belong to those doing the work [and not to the central bodies]”. He argues 
that what might seem a good idea at the head office of an INGO might appear to be less so, to those 
parts of the organisation which are working in the field and have to balance their priorities with 
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those of diverse stakeholders and the donor conditionalities for releasing funds (Fowler, 1997, p. 
52). The implications are that rather than being an extension of INGO head office, the function of 
an HCO is closer to the way local development NGOs
12
 in Southern countries are described in the 
NGO management literature. However, this is not how HCOs are described in IVS literature, for 
example, Burns et al. (2015, p. 35) note that IVCOs often choose their local partners “Because on 
paper they had the right infrastructures in place to support the programme objectives of the relevant 
IVCO or INGO”. Burns et al.’s (2015) description creates the impression that partnership decisions 
at host country level are made, or are endorsed by, IVCO head office rather than their HCOs.   
 
INGOs are described in the NGO management literature as international development agencies 
located between donors in one continent, and the stakeholders in another, facilitating the generation 
and transfer of resources, knowledge, technology, funding and information to the stakeholders 
(Fowler, 1997, p. 26), and are typically preoccupied with the logistics of delivery systems (Bennett, 
2000). INGO aims, and objectives are related to strengthening civil society, supporting local 
infrastructures that can facilitate sustainable development, empowerment of local organisations and 
the promotion of cooperative relationships through knowledge sharing (Penrose, 2000, p. 243). On 
the other hand, INGOs have been criticised for being indifferent to whether local NGOs genuinely 
represent a grassroots base or “a professional class of NGO representatives with access to 
international networks” (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013, p. 9). 
   
Local NGOs are recognised through their work in programmes or projects areas that provide basic 
health & education and poverty reduction activities and are generally considered to be more 
sensitive to local cultures and traditions (Penrose, 2000; Lewis, 2002). NGOs are drawn into a 
network of contractual agreements and have multiple accountabilities which have to be negotiated 
with a large array of heterogeneous individuals and organisations with diverse interests that are 
involved in the processes of development (Bennett, 2000; Edwards and Fowler, 2002; Choudry and 
                                                     
12
 Here, distinction is being made between NGOs that are development organisations – work within the framework of international 
cooperation and work to reduce global poverty and injustice (Fowler, 1997, p. 38)- rather than those working in humanitarian or 
emergency-relief work.  
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Kapoor, 2013; Lewis, 2014). Local NGOs have been criticised for competing with statutory 
services (Hanlon, 1991), or help maintain “the existing power structure intact” (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2006, p. 20), by employing former civil servants, thus undermining the basis for 
improved and sustainable social change. Critics also note that NGOs are weak at the contextual 
analysis of local society; have a poor approach to monitoring and evaluation, and lack key technical 
skills (Lewis, 2002). Bennett (2000, p. 179) suggests that local NGOs often lack the skills and 
funding to do their work because they are promoted to provide “extension services for the larger 
donors and are rarely given money even for administration, let alone capacity building”. 
 
Although the description of HCOs parallels the work of local NGOs, there are dissimilarities 
because HCOs are also positioned within the internal structure of their foreign parent organisation 
and mandated by its social and administrative rules and culture. Therefore, examining INGOs as a 
single operational entity underestimates the divisions of authority, responsibility and 
accountability, and limits the understanding of the influential factors in the relationships between 
head office and the HCOs and the decisions that each has to make. While some authors 
acknowledge the challenges of managing value-based, decentralized organisations (Edwards and 
Hulme, 1996; Fowler, 2000; Lewis, 2014), relatively few scholarly works exist that specifically 
focus on relationships between HCOs and their parent organisation (Brunt and McCourt, 2012; 
Elbers, 2012; Walsh, 2014) and they do not include reference to IVCOs. There is, therefore, a gap 
in the NGO management literature that distinguishes between the roles and functions of INGOs’ 
central offices their HCOs and analyses the relationships between them. However, parts of the 
literature on MNCs examine relationships between head offices and subsidiaries of international 
organisations and can be used to address the gaps in the literature on NGO management. 
2.5 Parent/subsidiary relationships in multi-national corporations   
 
This section argues that the relationship between HCOs and IVCO head offices resembles some 
aspects of the parent/subsidiary relationship in the literature on MNCs. IVCOs rely on HCOs in 
foreign countries to maintain strong connections to their local communities and to offer insights 
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into the needs of potential beneficiaries (Nelson and Child, 2016, p. 535). However, the literature 
on MNCs offers interesting insights particularly on the relationship between how a representative 
office or subsidiary office works with their central office, which resonates with the decentralised 
governance, structures and internal procedures of INGOs.   
 
Multinational corporations are defined as “consisting of a group of geographically dispersed and 
goal-disparate organisations that include its headquarters and the different national subsidiaries” 
(Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990, p. 603). They function in environmental settings that represent very 
different economic, social, and cultural milieus and are internally differentiated in complex ways to 
respond to both environmental and organisational differences (Noharia and Ghoshal, 1994, p. 608). 
INGOs correspond with the above definition in the sense that their governance structures include a 
central head office in a developed country and HCOs as operational units - subsidiaries – with 
varying degrees of legal separation and delegated responsibilities that are based in a number of 
developing countries (Table 1, p. 14). Subsidiaries have been defined in various ways which 
include how they are linked to the strategies at the headquarters level; the way an MNC has 
evolved into an international firm; or the strategies that an MNC uses in the arena of its 
international market (Enright and Subramanian, 2007, p. 897). In this thesis, the position of IVCO 
host country offices is considered to correspond with Li’s (2005) description of the subsidiary of an 
MNC, that is “simultaneously embedded in the [MNC’s] corporate network as well as in its 
external local market network” (Li, 2005, p. 78).   
 
The MNC literature that scrutinises the relationships between geographically and culturally diverse 
organisational entities reveals tensions between the parent/subsidiary units that are related to 
disparity in shared values (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004; Li, 2005), unequal power relations 
(Reiche, 2007; Huxham and Beech, 2008), and assumptions and expectations based on degrees of 
trust (Carson et al., 2003; McEvily et al., 2003; Li, 2005). It shows that organisational problems are 
associated with intra-organisational factors that are influenced by human behaviour, rather than 
financial or technical orientation. These behavioural factors are symptoms of physical and cultural 
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distance (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Andersson and Forsgren, 1996), conflicts or misalignment of 
interest (Noharia and Ghoshal, 1994; Mudambi and Pederson, 2007), and inequalities between 
foreign and national staff (Caprar, 2011; Harvey et. al, 2011). Andersson and Forsgren (1996, p. 
487) draw attention to the difficulties of retaining control in MNCs because rather than being a 
single entity facing a homogeneous environment, each subunit of the MNC has its own 
differentiated organisational norms, structures and work practices. These dissimilarities may 
potentially hinder the integration of head offices and subsidiaries and the processes of knowledge 
transfer between them (Li, 2005, p. 93).  
 
It is possible to draw parallels between insight from MNC literature to examine the relationship 
between INGO head offices and their HCOs. There are several ways in which INGOs have 
attempted to respond to the complexities of multi-national and global management of their 
organisations while aiming to retain their institutional values through declarations of vision and 
mission statements and collaborative strategies. Table 1 (Chapter 1, p. 14) illustrates examples of 
the different types of international organisational arrangements and styles of governance for IVCOs 
studied in this research. However, although the structures are complex, with varying levels of 
centralised reporting and administration controls, all these HCOs are directly under the 
administration of the parent organisation. Thus the challenge for IVCO head offices is to decide on 
the level of decentralisation, or operational autonomy, allotted to the HCOs. Decentralisation 
relates to the degree to which power is held centrally and how, and to what level it cascades to the 
other units within the organisation (Gibbs et al., 2000; Pratt, 2000). Fowler (2000, p. 10) observes 
that decision-making authority, when placed closer to the point of action, supports more 
meaningful participation and increases the potential for the empowerment of local actors, local 
ownership, commitment and sustainability. For INGOs (including IVCOs) the disadvantages of 
decentralization have been described by Fowler (2000, p. 10) as “erosion of identity, more complex 
and weaker accountability, empire building, unhealthy dominance or interference of [INGO] field 
staff due to their proximity, loss of quality control, enhanced potential for fragmentation of effort 
and conflicting interpretation of policies”. 
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The challenges faced by INGOs lie in the choice between being responsive to their intended 
beneficiaries and demands of its donor agency (Johansson et al., 2010, p. 371). Foreman (1999) 
points out that INGO globalization adds additional costs associated with overheads (governance 
structures and their maintenance, personnel development, travel, accommodation and facilities), as 
well as funds needed for soft administrative purposes such as information dissemination and 
exchange through seminars, reviews, and various meetings and visits necessary for interaction 
between national member organisations and with the head office. She notes that the costs of 
overheads and soft administrative purposes can be extremely high and difficult to justify to a donor, 
thus can constrain an organisation’s ability to enact its desired management policies (Foreman, 
1999, p. 192). The potential implications are that inter-organisational relationships between INGO 
and donor agencies affect the intra-organisational relationships between INGO head offices and 
their HCOs. Conversely, it also reveals that intra-organisational factors, such as the inability to 
provide the necessary resources for the softer administrative purposes, can have an impact on the 
HCOs’ inter-organisational relationships with the external stakeholders. This is particularly 
pertinent for HCOs that have to justify the incorporation and contribution of international 
volunteers in the design and delivery of their development programmes. It draws attention to 
challenges within the relationship between HCOs and their head offices that may constrain HCOs 
from the effective delivery of mandates. These challenges are of crucial interest in this research and 
are explored in chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
 
Divergent motivations, cultural diversity and unequal power relations, as well as the multiplicity of 
stakeholders, add complexity to HCO operations, particularly in relation to the choice of 
development partners and beneficiaries, as well as programme design. Some authors observe that 
subsidiary staff are not always representative of the country where they work, from which they may 
be alienated through association with their foreign-based head offices (Noharia and Ghoshal, 1994; 
Mudambi and Pederson, 2007). This view is shared by Caprar (2011) who observes that national 
staff of HCOs do not necessarily represent the culture of the rest of the host country population, but 
a combination of national culture, and their position within the internal culture of their parent 
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organisation (Caprar, 2011, p. 608). Cultural differences are not limited to the relationship between 
HCOs and the foreign-based INGO head offices but also exist within HCOs where national and 
international employed staff and volunteers work side by side.  
 
Andersson and Forsgren (1996, p. 490) argue that a subsidiary of a multinational corporation is 
“surrounded by stakeholders who try to shape its behaviour in accordance with their own interests”. 
This suggests that subsidiaries are not mechanical instruments of head office and often pursue their 
own interests (Uzzi, 1997). Although the literature on MNCs is helpful in understanding the 
relationships between the HCOs and their head offices, it is also necessary to gain insight into the 
way HCOs negotiate relationships with external stakeholders in the host country. The literature on 
boundary organisations offers an intersection with the literature on MNCs where the relationship 
between head offices and their subsidiaries represents one of the multiple mandates that HCOs are 
accountable for, as they straddle different social worlds
13
. The next section turns to examine the 
applicable parts of the literature on boundary organisations and their relevance to this research. 
 
2.6 Boundary organisations: Adding insight to the NGO management 
literature  
 
This section argues that HCOs are similar to boundary organisations with multiple mandates and 
accountabilities in relationships where there is asymmetry of knowledge between actors. HCOs 
resemble local NGOs because they work within a network of diverse interests and practices where 
the boundaries between individuals, groups and organisations are never clear, thus there are areas 
of overlapping uncertainty between different ‘worlds’ that are inclined to function according to 
different sets of rules (Lewis, 2014, p. 146). The idea of organisations that straddle two or more 
‘worlds’  resonates with the concept of boundary organisations: agencies with multiple 
accountabilities that act as intermediaries between different stakeholders (Guston, 1999; Hanlin et 
al., 2018). The concept was originally developed to distinguish between the scientific efforts of 
                                                     
13
A social world is described as an interactive unit that arises when a number of individuals strive to act in a collective way  (Strauss, 
1978, 1984). (Also see Chapter 1, footnote 4)   
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research agencies from non-scientific work (Gieryn, 1983), but has since been used to discuss other 
forms of interactions between knowledge and action (Molinga, 2010; Clark et al., 2016; Sheikh et 
al., 2016; Hanlin et al., 2018), including in international development studies (Ng’Ang’A, 2012; 
Velasco, 2013). Although a detailed analysis of boundary organisations is beyond the scope of this 
research, there are useful cross-cutting elements that can provide relevant insights into factors that 
affect HCOs’ relationships with their stakeholders.  
 
The characteristics of the role and activities of HCOs parallel Guston’s (1999, p. 93) definition of 
boundary organisations for two reasons: a) their function involves participation in multiple 
relationships where one party has more or less information than another (Hanlin et al., 2018), and 
b) they exist on the frontier of at least two relatively distinct social worlds (for example, 
development interventions, volunteering and the host country’s institutional context) with lines of 
responsibility and accountability to each. HCOs are therefore shaped by the demands of the 
multiple stakeholders which they have to reconcile (Hanlin et al., 2018, pp. 3–4).  
 
The core concept of boundary work is focused on tensions that arise at the interface (boundary) 
between individuals and organisations that have different perspectives on the type and quality of 
knowledge that is useful to them (Clark et al., 2016). Boundaries can be solid and prevent 
meaningful communication, or they can be highly fragmented, allowing infusion of facts with 
personal views, politics or other social influences that can undermine the value of the knowledge 
being created or shared (Clark et al., 2016). Boundary work, therefore, refers to the effective 
management of the interface between the diverse and multiple stakeholders in order to optimise the 
use of knowledge in the intended activity (Jasanoff, 2004) and involves communicating knowledge, 
values, and priorities; mediating conflicts and problems; and translating information between actors 
from different institutional backgrounds (Cash et al., 2003; Kristjanson et al., 2008; McNie et al., 
2008; Velasco, 2013). Consequently, more recent discussions on boundary work have focused on 
the degree to which boundary organisations are ‘boundary managers’ (Parker and Crona, 2012; 
Leith et al., 2016; Hanlin et al., 2018).  
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Guston (1999, p. 105) observes that a multiplicity of mandates weakens the link between the 
different actors and the boundary organisation. Drawing on the analysis of interactions between 
scientists (the Agents) and their political sponsors (the Principals), Guston (1999, pp. 92–105) 
suggests that “the transition from a relationship of trust to one emphasizing accountability, 
reinforces asymmetry of information between the actors [which may lead to the] consensual 
production of falsifiable knowledge.” Guston’s point draws attention to the importance of trust and 
integrity in knowledge sharing for accountability, which is a key element of all development 
interventions, including those in which IVS is incorporated. Moreover, Sheik et al. (2016) note that 
the challenges of bridging diverse and multiple boundaries limit the potential for coordination of 
activities needed to address complex problems in development and constrain goal achievement for 
target communities. They observe that certain types of boundaries can be embedded in power 
imbalances by geography or politics and suggest that boundary managers need to consider when to 
withdraw and allow local actors and institutions to take over (Sheikh et al., 2016, p. 5). This 
supports the notion that HCOs, like other NGOs, face challenges in managing boundaries because 
of the difficulties of demonstrating tangible achievements that satisfy the potentially conflicting 
expectations of key stakeholders. For example, balancing a donor or government’s imperative to 
support capacity building in the host country by engaging suitably qualified nationals, may clash 
with IVCO head office’s organisational mandate to promote IVS which involves importing foreign 
nationals who may obstruct a potential vacancy for a qualified national. 
 
In countries where the tier of educated professionals is still at the level of a minority of ‘urban-
based elite’ (Porter, 2003, p. 139), questions arise concerning the factors that influence the 
relationship between foreign volunteers and professional national staff of HCOs. Furthermore, the 
status of the volunteers in the host country presents contradictory perspectives. On the one hand, 
they are perceived as technical experts (Burns et al., 2015), with the power to access resources and 
networks that are not usually available to the partner organisation and sometimes not even to the 
staff of the HCO. On the other hand, they are reliant on the HCOs for professional support and 
personal welfare in alien environments where their familiar terms of reference no longer apply. 
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Volunteers are, therefore, one of the stakeholders with whom HCOs have to negotiate relationships. 
The next section explores literature on volunteer management and its contribution to IVS.  
2.7 HCOs and volunteer management 
 
Pearce (1993, p. 142) notes that “The tensions that can exist between volunteers and employee co-
workers remain one of the unpleasant secrets of non-profit organisations”. Twenty-five years later, 
Musick and Wilson (2008) observe that a review of the organisational factors affecting volunteers 
is absent from the literature on volunteer management, which generally focuses on issues that 
affect volunteer performances. This means that the challenges and conflicts that affect the 
relationships between HCOs’ staff and the volunteers, and how the outcomes of these relationships 
impact on their day to day work, remain unexplored.  
 
HCOs are absent in the literature on volunteer management, and the bulk of that literature tends to 
focus primarily on volunteers working in their own countries (Juknevicius and Savicka, 2003; 
Voicu and Voicu, 2003; Machin and Paine, 2008; Oppenheimer, 2008). While the theoretical basis 
for applying the insights from domestic to international volunteer management may highlight 
similarities, empirical study of issues related to managing international volunteers by HCOs has 
been relatively limited. Such work as exists in an international context has focused on data drawn 
on the INGO sector where foreign and national employees work alongside each other and with 
other foreigners such as consultants and general experts (Fowler, 1997; Pink, 1998; Porter, 2003; 
Crewe and Fernando, 2006) and does not specifically address the management of foreign 
volunteers. Consequently, there is a gap in the knowledge of the role of HCOs in the management 
of international volunteers, as well as the challenges that they face in the management of 
development programmes that use these volunteers.   
 
While there is not a unique universal definition which would cover the complexities of voluntary 
activities, there is general consensus on some of the attributes of what constitutes volunteering, 
which include commitment, freewill, non-profit objective, common social interest and belonging to 
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a group or structure (Beigbeder, 1991, p. 103; Rochester et al., 2010). The literature on 
volunteering reveals that some of these elements remain contested; for example, some authors 
contend that there is a small step from reimbursement of expenses to acceptance of payment below 
the market value, which could be interpreted as work being unpaid, to work being undertaken 
primarily for financial gain (Pink, 1998; Noxolo, 2011; Trau, 2014).  
 
Discourse on optimising the values and contribution of volunteers and their work has led to a 
relatively new but expanding strand of literature on volunteer management. Volunteer management 
is loosely defined in academic literature (Cnaan et al., 1996; Hustinx et al., 2010; Brudney and 
Meijs, 2014), and is often used interchangeably with the terms volunteer coordination and 
volunteer administration. Volunteer management is generally associated with “organisational 
settings [that] support (and restrict) volunteer coordination…. [such as] gaining, orientating, 
retaining, and organising volunteers in a formal organisation to provide a public good” (Studer and 
von Schnurbein, 2013, p. 406). However, it is acknowledged that there is no one size fits all 
solution to the challenges of managing volunteers (Rochester, 1999; Paull, 2000; Machin and 
Paine, 2008; Meijs and Ten Hoorn, 2008). A growing body of research aims to capture the nuances 
of managing and coordinating the activities of volunteers based on the motives and dispositions of 
the volunteers (Studer and von Schnurbein, 2013, pp. 405–6) as well as length and duration of 
service (Daftary and Moore McBride, 2004; Sherraden et al., 2008), with frequent comparison 
made to paid staff (Carroll and Harris, 2000; Hager and Brudney, 2004; Liao-Troth, 2008; Machin 
and Paine, 2008; Rochester et al., 2010; Engel and Georgeou, 2011; Brudney and Meijs, 2014).  
 
The terminology applied to IVS has expanded in the past decades from the original designations of 
volunteering and its association with selfless goals and non-profit motives of the volunteer, to ones 
that more closely reflect the changing landscape of development assistance and involvement of 
volunteers in development. Examples of some of the more recent terms include ‘Development 
Worker’ (Progressio, 2016), ‘professional volunteer’ (Ackers and Ackers-Johnson, 2017c), 
Development Advisor (GIZ, 2016a), and International Recruit (Impey and Overton, 2014). The 
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change of terminology has been accompanied by increased benefit packages allocated to 
development workers by some IVCOs (Appendix 2) in recognition of the development workers’ 
contribution to programmes, and easing some of the financial and career anxiety felt by the 
volunteers on return home (Verhoeven, 2002). The shift away from former designations of 
volunteering to alternative terminology is in acknowledgement of the social and cultural benefits in 
the types and programmes of volunteering being offered rather than the philanthropic goals of IVS 
(Engel and Georgeou, 2011).  
 
The range of terminology that is being applied to IVS introduces additional complexity since the 
terms ‘volunteer’, and ‘development’ are both contested (Engel and Georgeou, 2011). Some 
authors see volunteers as laypersons and helpers (Merrell, 2000), while others consider volunteers 
as experts (Clotfelter, 1999). Still, others argue that volunteers should be viewed as cooperation 
partners (Zimmeck, 2001; Studer and von Schnurbein, 2013). The expansion of other forms of 
international volunteering such as voluntourism, and gap-year volunteering (Simpson, 2004; Jones, 
2008; Forsythe, 2011) have added to the confusion among the stakeholders of IVS. Moreover, there 
has been resistance to the use of the term volunteer in IVS by the increasing number of older, more 
qualified and experienced volunteers from the global North who are unhappy with the associations 
of  the term volunteer with “unfounded idealism” (Verhoeven, 2002, p. 17), and lack of 
professionalism and inexperience of youths (Clotfelter, 1999; Dwyer, 2004; Baillie Smith and 
Laurie, 2011; Aked, 2014).  
 
Diverse characterisations of international volunteering in academic work, as well as in grey 
literature, illustrate the evolving nature of global trends in international development through IVS, 
and the increasing ambiguity in the meanings and perceptions of IVS among the stakeholders that 
differentiate it from home-country volunteering (Sherraden, 2001; Daftary and Moore McBride, 
2004; Leigh, 2011; Noxolo, 2011). Ambiguity implies that the bases on which expectations and 
perceptions of trust and power relations are constructed in the relationships between the HCOs, the 
volunteers and the other stakeholders are unclear, and therefore more difficult to manage when 
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compared to local volunteering. This potentially adds to the complexity of the role of HCO as 
boundary managers and the types of skills and training that they require to deal with the challenges 
that they face.  
 
Although the role of international volunteers is customarily incorporated within a contractual 
agreement or memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the partner organisation, in practice, the 
reporting structure is very loosely functional and often unclear on what and to whom is the 
volunteer accountable (Ackers and Ackers-Johnson, 2017c). The resulting operational challenges 
for HCOs are evidenced in academic and grey literature spanning several decades that report 
conflicts between international volunteers and paid staff (Ball et al., 1976; Pearce, 1993; Smith, 
1997; Bird, 1998; van Eekelen et al., 2012; Amin, 2014; Burns et al., 2015). For example, Amin 
(2014) reports persistent problems the international volunteers and the HCOs’ staff that include: 
volunteers arriving “with no clearly defined job, waiting, and no one even expecting them” (Amin, 
2014, p. 328); or lack of language skills, which was included in Peace Corps reports in 1960 and 
again in 2001, 2006, 2008 and 2011 (Amin, 2014, p. 324). Similarly, Bird (1998, p. 170) notes an 
increase in the number of VSO volunteers who returned home before completing at least eighteen 
months of their two-year postings from 1% in 1968, to 20% in 1998. In 2012, a consultant’s report 
showed that in one country, the percentage of early returned VSO volunteers was as much as 43% 
(van Eekelen et al., 2012, p. 22).  
 
Volunteer retention is recognised as a key performance indicator in the volunteer management 
literature (Safrit and Merrill, 2007; Machin and Paine, 2008; Rochester et al., 2010) and has been 
associated with the volunteer management capacity in organisations, and the availability of funding 
to support specific training of paid staff in volunteer management skills (Machin and Paine, 2008). 
However, there is no indication of research into the underlying issues that affect volunteer retention 
in IVS, and the figures reported in the above examples remain unchallenged although they are 
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significantly more than those that exist for home-country volunteering
14
. This implies the 
persistence of problems in the relationships between the volunteers and the paid staff who are 
responsible for managing and coordinating their work during their placements in the host countries 
- the HCO staff. However, despite the expanding literature on international volunteering, none 
reviews the role of host country offices of IVCOs, which necessitates the management of 
geographically and culturally diverse volunteers as an organisational goal. The assumptions, beliefs 
and behaviours of people who act as development agents are central to the work that they carry out. 
Zimmeck (2001) observes: 
“[Volunteers] work, but they are not employees: they do not have to do what they do; they 
do it in more episodic, circuitous and idiosyncratic ways; they are not paid 15for doing it; 
and, if they do not feel that they are properly involved, supported or cherished, they will 
walk away” (Zimmeck, 2001, p. 4). 
 
Diallo and Thuillier (2005) observe that the dynamics of the relationships and interactions between 
key actors become important success factors in development management, irrespective of the levels 
of technical knowledge, skills and experiences required. One of the aims of this research is to gain 
insight on the managing and coordination of volunteers in the process of IVS, by looking at 
different types of trust and power relations as influential factors in the negotiation of relationships 
between the HCO staff and the international volunteers.   
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the histories of international development and IVS are intertwined and 
how the evolving perspectives on development have led to opportunities for the expansion of IVS 
as an instrument of development intervention. However, the terms development and volunteering 
are both contested and are enmeshed in the discourse of unequal power relations between the 
global North and South, associated with colonialism and Western economic supremacy. The 
                                                     
14
 In a national survey of volunteer management capacity in the UK, Machin and Paine (2008, p. 7) report that: “Retention had been less 
of an issue, with over half (56 per cent) of respondents saying that their organisation did not have any problems with retention. However, 
it had caused ‘a little’ difficulty for 35 per cent of respondents and ‘a lot’ of difficulties for 9 per cent.” 
15
 Volunteers often receive some monetary support so they are not always out of pocket or subsidising themselves 
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literature shows that unresolved issues have prevailed in the practice of IVS for several decades 
and reflect the persistence of unequal power relations between the volunteer sending agencies and 
the volunteer receiving countries, while the literature has focused largely on volunteers. This points 
to a gap in the organisational elements that contribute to IVS as an instrument of intervention in the 
management of development interventions.  
 
The literature on development management illustrated the significance of the role of IVCOs in the 
processes of development management which involve forms of trust (as in trusteeship) and power 
relations (a potential obstacle to trust) in the inter-organisational relationships between the global 
North and South. Although the rhetoric of development management promotes partnerships, 
empowerment and downward accountability, the literature shows that unequal power relations 
persist in partnerships and the practice of development management through IVS, for example, 
power can be used in pursuit of the interest of the volunteers or an IVCO’s organisational mandate 
rather than the intended aims for the beneficiaries. While IVCOs can benefit from increased 
opportunities to access donor funding, they are also under pressure to comply with donor 
imperatives for professionalization, which are difficult to attribute directly to IVS. Changes in 
donor strategies to fund disbursement mean that IVCOs work in a more competitive environment 
where they have to mediate the conflicting mandates between organisational survival and their 
organisational values. The combination of over-reliance on documentation, targets, and indicators, 
as well as the competitive environment for access to funds, can undermine trust in the relationships 
between donors and INGOs, and their Southern NGO partners. 
 
A part of HCOs’ work resembles that of a local NGO because HCOs work through partnerships 
with the ‘users’ of their services and other national stakeholders with whom they have to negotiate 
relationships. HCOs are therefore often intertwined in webs of power and bureaucracy and can be 
criticised for being almost donor-driven. HCOs can act as gatekeepers of knowledge between the 
stakeholders because their work involves close interactions with the grassroots, and they can 
exercise flexibility in what and how they communicate information. In contrast, they can be 
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mistrusted as the instruments of the interests of powerful actors such as donors or foreign 
governments. Unlike local NGOs, HCOs are also positioned within the internal structure of their 
foreign parent organisation and mandated by its social and administrative rules and culture. The 
absence of direct reference to HCOs in NGO management literature makes it difficult to analyse 
the role that HCOs play in influencing relationships with their stakeholders. Examining INGOs as a 
single operational entity underestimates the divisions of authority, responsibility and 
accountability, and limits the understanding of the influential factors in the relationships INGO 
head office and the HCOs that affect the work of the HCOs and the decisions that they make. 
 
Parts of the literature on MNCs add insight into intra-organisational relationships between IVCO 
head offices and HCOs. The MNC literature shows that tensions between IVCO head offices and 
HCOs can be associated with assumptions and expectations based on degrees of trust, conflicts or 
misalignment of interest, inequalities between foreign and national staff, as well as the physical and 
cultural distance that constrain the exchange of information between them. The implications are 
that inter-organisational relationships between the HCO and its stakeholders have an effect on, and 
are affected by, the intra-organisational relationships between IVCO head office and its HCOs. 
However, the MNC literature is insufficient in addressing the array of complex value-based 
challenges that HCOs have to manage, with internal and external stakeholders, and often in unequal 
partnerships with donors, governments as well as communities and individuals. HCOs are similar 
to boundary managers with multiple mandates and accountabilities in relationships where there is 
asymmetry of knowledge between actors. The effective management of the interface involves 
communicating knowledge, values, and priorities; mediating conflicts and problems; and 
translating information between actors from different institutional backgrounds. However, 
increasing demand for accountability, as in donor demands for professionalization, can reinforce 
asymmetry of information between the actors because of the difficulties in demonstrating tangible 




Finally, this chapter showed that the proliferation of terminology that is being applied to IVS has 
introduced ambiguities in the definition of international volunteering. Ambiguity affects power 
relations and implies that the bases on which expectations and perceptions of trust are constructed 
are unclear in the relationships between the HCOs, the volunteers and the other IVS stakeholders. 
This potentially adds to the complexity of the role of HCOs and the types of skills and training that 
they require to deal with the challenges that they face. Despite a reported history of tensions 
between HCOs and the volunteers, studies on volunteer management do not include an appraisal of 
the role of HCOs, which necessitates the management of geographically and culturally diverse 
volunteers as an organisational goal. There is, therefore, a gap in the literature that addresses the 
role of HCOs in the management and coordination of international volunteers and has potential 
implications for IVS, and the management of international volunteers. 
 
This chapter has shown that HCOs not mechanical extensions of head offices, but straddle multiple 
‘worlds’ where they have different internal and external mandates and accountabilities. Thus the 
challenges for HCOs are associated with organisational factors that are influenced by human 
behaviour, rather than financial or technical orientation, and are triggered by the way relationships 
are negotiated between HCOs and the other IVS actors. While trust is recognised as a success 
factor in the management of development projects, HCOs often work within networks of power 
and bureaucracy and can act as gatekeepers of knowledge and information exchange between IVS 
stakeholders. To better understand how the role of HCOs is perceived and played out in their 
relationships with the other IVS stakeholders, it is necessary to review the literature on theories of 













This chapter examines the significance of trust and power relations in situations in which 
organisations have to negotiate relationships with multiple stakeholders. Edwards and Fowler 
(2002) observe that the challenge in achieving consistency between policy and practice in 
development work is that it cannot be accomplished by an individual organisation imposing a 
strategy because development is only achievable through negotiation and dialogue with external 
actors. The work of host country offices includes not only to navigate the course of international 
volunteers’ placements, activities and welfare in the host country but to contribute to development 
activities. HCOs need to negotiate formal and informal relationships
16
 with multiple donors, partner 
organisations, volunteers with diverse interests, as well as their own head offices, across 
international and cultural boundaries (Grusky, 2000; GIZ, 2016a; Peace Corps, 2016a; UNV, 
2016b; VSO International, 2016a). This chapter examines current academic literature on 
negotiation and recognises the factors that influence the way negotiation of relationships takes 
place, with a specific focus on knowledge sharing which, as shown in the previous chapter, is of 
particular interest in this research. It introduces the concepts of trust and power and looks at how 
they impact on, and are impacted by, the negotiation of relationships between the HCOs and their 
IVS stakeholders.   
 
This chapter argues that the outcomes of the negotiation of relationships in multi-stakeholder 
situations are influenced by a number of factors of which knowledge sharing is a critical element in 
shaping, and being shaped by, the interplay between different types of trust and power relations 
among the actors. The expectations on which trust is based can vary depending on institutional 
                                                     
16
To recap: formal relationships are defined through structures, policies and procedures which are legally recognised, deemed valid 
according to the rules of a system, and are verifiable through documents and primary sources of data (Nierenberg, 1987; Fowler, 1997). 
Informal relationships are “those that rely on interpersonal networks…which can be familial and customary rather than enshrined in 
organisational constitutions” (Fowler, 1997, p. 21). 
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values, characteristics of the actors (for example, age, ethnicity or gender), or the experience of 
past interactions. The different forms of trust affect, and are affected by, power relations in ways 
that influence, not only how relationships are negotiated, but the outcomes of those relationships. 
However, there is a gap in the literature of NGO management in general, and IVS in particular, that 
analyses the contribution and limitations of the interplay between different types of trust and power 
relations in the way relationships are negotiated between HCOs and their IVS stakeholders.  
 
Section 3.2 provides an overview of the literature on negotiation and its relevance in this research. 
It shows that the current literature on this subject has recognised differences in histories, cultural 
norms and language as influential elements in negotiation, although it has chiefly focused on the 
significance of knowledge sharing in the interplay between forms of trust and power relations in 
negotiating relationships. The section sets out the factors that influence the negotiation of 
relationships and the importance of knowledge sharing and information exchange, making 
connections with the literature on trust and power.  
 
Section 3.3 shows that although different types of trust are recognised in the literature (Blomqvist, 
1997; Hardy et al., 1998; Simons, 2002; Harriss, 2003; McEvily et al., 2003), they are largely 
nuanced adaptations of Zucker’s categorization of a) characteristic-based trust (on the social 
characteristics which are linked to, for example, a person’s ethnicity, gender, or family); b) 
process-based trust (on the expectations based on past experiences, for example, those arising from 
a history of past interactions); or c) institutional trust (as in formal structures, rules, norms, and 
conventions that regulate the behaviour of others within society, for example, rules that govern 
banks, trade and public services). The different types of trust can influence the negotiation of 
relationships depending on whether trust between the actors is based on positive or negative 
experiences of past interactions, or on assumptions or characteristics which may or may not be true, 




Section 3.4 provides a brief appraisal of the extensive literature on types of power relations, then 
focuses on how power can influence the negotiation of relationships. It uses Elgstrӧm’s (1992, pp. 
22–24) duo of “essential dimensions of power in negotiating processes” as a guide: the distribution 
of power over material (for example, funding, transportation and equipment) and non-material 
resources (for example, knowledge and language), and power to influence the negotiation of 
relationships between IVS stakeholders, including the HCOs.  
 
Section 3.5 brings the preceding sections together to present the conceptual framework for the 
thesis. It illustrates how the analytical framework for the research has been developed to capture 
the interplay between the different sets of concepts relating to trust and power and their points of 
convergence in the negotiation of relationships between HCOs and their IVS stakeholders.  
Section 3.6 provides a summary of the literature and the concluding remarks of this chapter. 
3.2 Negotiation  
 
How relationships are negotiated between the HCO and the IVS stakeholders shape the 
justification, design, and terms and conditions of IVS programmes, and characterise the 
expectations of the diverse actors in relation to their roles within the projects. Negotiation is 
described as a process involving a chain of activities whereby two or more people gather to address 
demands and exchange information, with the intent of changing their relationship (Nierenberg, 
1987; Giebels et al., 2000; Stark and Flaherty, 2004; Kim et al., 2005; Odell, 2010). Negotiation 
involves not only sharing knowledge or technical expertise, but also flexibility of approach, 
honesty and the “ability to listen to ideas that are different to one’s own and learn” (Johnson, 
2016b), otherwise the potential to develop rapport or build on long term cooperation can be 
reduced (Kopelman and Olekalns, 1999). Thus negotiation processes are not purely concerned with 
technical issues, resources or contractual agreements, but are also about human and social 
interactions that govern relationships, shared values and reciprocity of benefits from agreed 
objectives (Hewitt and Robinson, 2000). Consequently, as in other forms of social exchange, 
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negotiation generates risk, ambiguity and the potential for exploitation (Koeszegi, 2004; Olekalns 
and Smith, 2009).  
 
It is widely acknowledged in the literature that the nature of negotiation implies that the aims, 
approaches and expectations of one participant may not be the same as another, resulting in a 
number of different possible outcomes (Kopelman and Olekalns, 1999; Koeszegi, 2004; Stark and 
Flaherty, 2004; Metcalf et al., 2007; Johansson et al., 2010; Odell, 2010). The simplest forms of 
outcomes are reproduced below from work by Stark and Flaherty (2004, p. 53) and supplemented 
by alternative, more descriptive terms in which they are described in the literature:  
 Win-lose or lose-win (also ‘distributive’ (Brett, 2000; Metcalf et al., 2007) and ‘interest-
based’ (Johnson, 2016c)): one counterpart loses and the other wins 
 Win-win: (also ‘integrative’ (Brett, 2000; Metcalf et al., 2007) and ‘value-based’ 
(Johnson, 2016c)): the needs and goals of both parties are met, so they both walk away 
with a positive feeling and a willingness to negotiate with each other again 
 Lose-lose: neither party achieves his or her needs or wants 
 No outcome: neither party wins or loses, which most likely leaves both parties willing to 
return to the negotiating table at a later date. 
 
Negotiating relationships can be seen as an attempt to manage interdependence and conflict 
between parties (Koeszegi, 2004, p. 640), for example, in intra- and inter-organisational 
relationships where negotiation involves “navigating through a complex process of transactions and 
rapidly fluctuating interests” (Wu and Laws, 2003). Furthermore, the negotiation of relationships in 
multinational organisations presents specific challenges for the actors because it involves 
mitigation of the cultural diversity of staff and partners (Faure, 2002). Faure identifies a number of 
risks associated with inter-organisational negotiation, including conflict of interest between parties, 
cultural disparity, damage to reputation, and organisational survival. Koeszegi  (2004, pp. 642–3) 
suggests that while some of these risks can be attributed to human behaviour, others are related to 
external influences, for example, by competitors, through changes in political or legal systems, or 




Negotiation of relationships then, can be seen as an interpersonal and inter-organisational decision-
making process aimed at reaching a settlement among interdependent parties with divergent 
interests, as well as a mechanism to form or redefine the relationship between actors (Giebels et al., 
2000; Koeszegi, 2004; Kim et al., 2005). The literature on negotiation shows a number of 
influential elements in the processes of negotiating relationships of which the most prominent are  
historical factors (Checkland, 1997; Kopelman and Olekalns, 1999; Fisher et al., 2011); cultural 
norms (Butler, 1999; Brett, 2000); language (Isaacs, 1993; Cornwall, 2007; Olwig, 2013) and 
knowledge sharing (Nierenberg, 1987; Butler, 1999; Koeszegi, 2004; Olekalns and Smith, 2009).  
 
3.2.1 Historical factors 
Historical factors refer to past events and experiences that shape the characteristics, values and 
beliefs of the institutions, organisations and individual actors in IVS. The literature on international 
volunteering (Chapter 2, section 2.7) reveals that understanding of host country socio-political 
history has been a significant challenge in IVS from the early days (Ball et al., 1976; Amin, 2014) 
and remain so to the present. Some academics have argued that donor organisations and INGOs fail 
to take into account the host country context in terms of its historical background and political, 
economic, geographic, sociocultural characteristics in the design and implementation of 
development programmes (Salole, 1991; Lister, 1999; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Shutt, 2006; Pickard, 
2007; Gulrajani, 2014). Others argue that despite the rhetoric of North-South partnerships based on 
‘equality’, ‘capacity building’, and ‘mutual exchange’, the prevailing structural inequalities 
founded on historical supremacy of the North over the South and sustained economic advantages in 
the North limit the realisation of such goals (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Jentsch and Pilley, 2003; Cornwall 
and Brock, 2005). Noxolo (2011, p. 221) extends this argument to include IVS by stating that in 
practice, IVS accentuates cultural and economic diversity through the inequality of wealth and 
opportunity between the international volunteer and his/her counterpart.  
 
The history of institutions and organisations is also pertinent in negotiating relationships and is 
described as ‘path dependency’ in organisation literature. Path dependency refers to the capacity of 
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institutions and organisations to change by taking into account their histories, aims and structures 
and the way these histories continue to influence their decision-making processes in the present 
(Greener, 2002; Barnes et al., 2004; Peters et al., 2005). Although a detailed discussion of the 
concept of path-dependency is outside the scope of this thesis, understanding how the histories of 
organisations shape their standpoint (see footnote17, section 3.2.4) in negotiating relationships with 
other IVS stakeholders is helpful in this research.   
 
3.2.2 Cultural norms:  
Culture is widely used in the literature to denote a variety of concepts and meanings. In this thesis, 
Fowler’s (1997, pp. 69–70) definition is used: “Cultural identity is constructed and differentiated 
by, for example, ethnicity, region, country, language, gender, generation, class, status, occupation, 
and organisational affiliation….it is a mix of cultural attributes which each individual brings into 
his or her work setting…..”. Cultural norms may vary depending on religion, race, gender, and 
social orders in ways that are not easily discernible by others who are not part of that particular 
group (Mendonca and Kanungo, 1996; Mosse, 2006; Metcalf et al., 2007). People from different 
cultural backgrounds utilise different strategies to influence the negotiation processes and outcomes 
(Cohen, 1997; Brett and Okumura, 1998; Kopelman and Olekalns, 1999).  
 
Cohen (1997) notes that cultural factors can complicate, prolong, and frustrate negotiating 
relationships because of a fundamental philosophical difference of views about the nature and 
value of social relationships. The multi-national nature of actors in IVS processes means that inter-
cultural factors add to the complexity of the relationships that HCOs have to negotiate. The view is 
shared by Koeszegi (2004) who observes important differences in the perspectives of stakeholders 
from diverse cultural backgrounds that shape the way they perceive and calculate risk in 
negotiating professional collaborations. Cultural differences related to goals, and attitudes towards 
power and social relationships, not only vary within geographical areas (Kopelman and Olekalns, 
1999) but within and between organisations (Johansson et al., 2010). Thus, cultural differences 
have an effect on both intra- and inter-organisational relationships between the HCOs, their head 
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office and their IVS stakeholders. Reiche (2007, p. 528) draws attention to conflicts between local 
and foreign staff of MNCs that are related to intercultural barriers and suggests that the 
performance of subsidiaries that are managed by local staff is more positive as a result of 
“employees feeling respected, recognized, trusted and thus more attached to the local unit”. On the 
other hand, Caprar (2011) questions whether host country staff who work for sustained periods in a 
foreign organisation that might be very different from their own culture can be assumed to be 
culturally representative of the host country population. 
 
3.2.3 Language 
As an essential form of communication, the use of appropriate language allows individuals and 
organisation involved in negotiating relationships to appreciate views and issues expressed by each 
participant in understandable ways (Isaacs, 1993). Mutual trust promotes openness in information 
exchange between actors (Butler, 1999; Koeszegi, 2004; Li, 2005). However, Hardy et al. (1998) 
argue that the presence of honesty and mutual aims are insufficient for creating trust without actors 
being able to communicate with each other, for example, through shared language. Language 
barriers have long been identified as obstacles to productive relationships among IVS actors (Ball 
et al., 1976; Amin, 2014; Burns et al., 2015). Being multisector and multicultural, the work of HCO 
and other IVS stakeholders involves being able to “speak the ‘development language’ on one hand, 
and the ‘peasant language’, on the other and to be an expert in translating from one language to the 
other” (Bierschenk et al., 2002, p. 431).  
 
Different forms of power have also  been perceived through the prevalence of Western 
practitioners, expats, consultants and volunteers in positions of trust and high rank (Borda-
Rodriguez and Johnson, 2013; Trau, 2014) and the use of the ‘language’ and ‘buzzwords’ of 
development (Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Sørensen, 2008; Olwig, 2013), which are considered by 
some as examples of efforts to maintain Western supremacy (Simpson, 2004; Baillie Smith and 
Laurie, 2011; Forsythe, 2011). Others concur that buzzwords in the language of international 
development appear as a pre-requisite ingredient in funding proposals as well as websites and 
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promotional material of development organisations and individual practitioners (Leal, 2007; Olwig, 
2013). Some authors go even further to suggest that ambiguity in the use of words and phrases can 
be a deliberate and essential tool used by opportunistic participants who apply their own 
interpretations to validate the concepts under negotiation (Koeszegi, 2004; Cornwall, 2007).   
 
3.2.4 Knowledge sharing and information exchange  
There are numerous definitions of knowledge and information in the literature. In seeking the most 
appropriate definitions for this research, the descriptions offered by Meadow et al. (2000) are used 
to differentiate between information and knowledge. Information involves the use of factual data 
that “may have no universally accepted meaning but generally carries the connotation of being 
evaluated, validated or useful data” (Meadow et al., 2000, p. 35). In this research, information 
would include personal, financial, technical or other specific data included in reports, job 
descriptions, on websites or other forms of communication. Knowledge is described as “the 
condition of knowing something gained through experience or apprehending truth… It has a higher 
degree of certainty or validity than information…and has the characteristic of information shared 
and agreed upon within a community” (Meadow et al., 2000, p. 38). Knowledge can embody 
political, social or cultural insight, understanding of the environment or institutions, technical 
expertise, or specialist skills.  
 
The extent of knowledge sharing and information exchange is a principal element of negotiating 
relationships (Butler, 1999). Nonetheless, revealing information is risky: open disclosures of aims 
and intentions may facilitate achievement of desirable outcomes but can also expose an actor to 
opportunistic behaviour by the other actors (Brett, 2000; Koeszegi, 2004; Olekalns and Smith, 
2009). Two types of information are particularly pertinent: information about parties’ power (such 
as power over economic or physical resources, power to influence), and information about parties’ 
interests (for example, values and motivations) that shape their particular standpoints
17
 (Brett, 
                                                     
17
Standpoint’ in negotiations is defined by Johnson (2016a, p. 13) as “Attitudes or outlooks arising from one’s circumstances or beliefs, 
or how we see the world. Standpoint… will be affected by our own histories (personal and professional) and the social context in which 
we have lived them.”  
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2000; Fisher et al., 2011). However, acquiring such information and deciding on the degree of the 
disclosure can be challenging. In the absence of necessary information about the other party, actors 
are unable to find opportunities for compromise, hence may be tempted to suppress or misrepresent 
information as a way of strengthening their standpoint and influencing more favourable outcomes 
which, in turn, increases the potential for exploitation of the other party (Olekalns and Smith, 
2009).   
 
Differences in culture also affect information sharing, both in the way information is regarded as 
important in negotiation and the style that information relevant to negotiation is shared (Brett and 
Okumura, 1998). Brett and Okumura observe that the information is shared in different social 
groups reflects cultural values that shape choices and primacy for some goals rather than others; the 
subtleties of within-culture expressions of communications, or whether social status implies social 
power and knowledge of status dictates how people will interact…where social inferiors are 
obligated to defer to social superiors and comply with their requests” (Brett and Okumura, 1998, 
pp. 99–101). 
 
Koeszegi (2004, p. 643) argues that often actors “are confronted with asymmetrical information 
and knowledge about the negotiated issue, i.e. one party has considerably more information than 
the other.” An asymmetric level of knowledge and information among actors is likely to 
disadvantage members of the less powerful groups who are more likely to need to collect 
information about the dominant group prior to the processes of negotiating relationships. On the 
other hand, reliance of the dominant group on stereotypical assumptions, may block their 
understanding of the other parties and reinforce existing power structures (Kopelman and Olekalns, 
1999). Individuals who are viewed as low in competence can raise uncertainties about their ability 
to accurately use information and make positive contributions to the negotiation, while individuals 
of low perceived integrity raise questions with regards to the veracity of their intentions (Olekalns 




Symmetry in knowledge sharing resonates with the literature on boundary organisations (Chapter 
2, section 2.6). Clark et al. (2016, p. 1) identify three key factors that contribute to effective 
boundary work: i) participatory and meaningful knowledge creation by stakeholders across the 
various boundaries (ii) organisational structures and processes that deliver accountability to 
appropriate stakeholders; and (iii) the production of “boundary objects” defined as “collaborative 
outputs such as reports, models, maps, or standards that reflect the views of actors on different 
sides of the boundaries”. However, Cash et al. (2003, p. 8808) suggest that effectiveness of 
boundary management reduces when information exchange is one-way, irregular, or when 
stakeholders from either side of the boundaries feel left out of the communication processes for 
knowledge sharing or make assumptions.  
 
From a different perspective, in examining the relationship between principals (non-scientist 
policy-makers) and agents (scientists) in boundary organisations, Guston (1999, p. 93) observes 
that the transition from a relationship of trust to one emphasizing accountability presents a ‘moral 
hazard’ to the policy-makers who may be disadvantaged by inequality of information. He argues 
that the integrity of the work of the agents - how they conduct their work and report their findings 
honestly, and the productivity of the work- whether or not the work actually contributes to the 
intended goal, both can lead to a moral hazard.  “After the principal selects agents, the latter have 
relatively wide latitude in the performance of [their work], even to the point of dishonesty or 
unproductive dabbling” (Guston, 1999, p. 93). The principal/agent relationship described by 
Guston is similar to the interdependent relationship between HCOs and their more powerful 
stakeholders such as donors, governments or IVCO head office to whom HCOs are accountable for 
different mandates. Guston’s (1999) proposition parallels Nierenberg’s (1987, pp. 81–83) 
description of a “calculated risk”. Nierenberg observes that although assumptions are an essential 
part of negotiation, actors take a calculated risk when they behave as though an assumption is a 
certainty. Guston’s moral hazard and Nierenberg’s calculated risk have implications for IVS 
because they raise questions not only regarding the integrity of information exchange between 
HCOs and the key stakeholders but how the information is analysed and turned into action.  
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Symmetry in knowledge sharing and information exchange is therefore recognised as the 
cornerstone of effective negotiation (Nierenberg, 1987; Butler, 1999; Cornwall, 2002; Koeszegi, 
2004; Stark and Flaherty, 2004; Olwig, 2013). Negotiation requires participants to have access to 
knowledge and information (Koeszegi, 2004), and a common language that facilitates mutual 
understanding (Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Olwig, 2013). Consequently, symmetry in knowledge 
sharing is an important influential element in the negotiation of relationships.   
 
The discussion above shows that negotiation of relationships involves navigating through a 
complex process and interests. Since it not always possible to fully determine the objectives and 
motivations of the other participants, negotiating relationships can be viewed as heavily reliant on 
the human behaviours of which trust and power are salient dimensions. Trust and power relations 
shape the expectations and behaviours of people and organisations that are IVS stakeholders and 
influence what and how they share knowledge and information. It is, therefore, necessary to 
understand how the negotiation of relationships between HCOs and their IVS stakeholders has an 
impact on, or is impacted by, forms of trust and power. The next section examines the 
conceptualisation of trust. 
3.3 Trust 
 
Trust stems from positive beliefs about another person’s motives and intentions and can be defined 
as ‘‘a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another’’ (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). A slightly 
different perspective is offered by Woolthuis et al., (2005, p. 816) who, rather than considering 
trust based on something that the other party might do, reflects on what the partner might not do: 
“[trust is] the expectation that a partner will not engage in opportunistic behaviour, even in the face 
of opportunities and incentives for opportunism, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control 
that party.”  Others consider that trust improves the efficacy of decision-making processes by 
simplifying the assimilation and analysis of information (McEvily et al., 2003, p. 93). Trust is 
viewed as a form of a gamble taken on the behaviour of another, with the expectation of reduced 
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levels of the cost, or damaging effects of the risk (Luhmann, 1979; Diallo and Thuillier, 2005; Li, 
2005). Blomqvist (1997, p. 279) suggests that uncertainty, vulnerability and the potential for 
avoiding risk, and information about the other party or situation, are seen as necessary conditions 
for the existence of trust, which he then relates to concepts such as loyalty, confidence, 
competence, credibility, and faith. 
 
Common definitions of trust describe two distinctive bases for trust:  as ‘predictability’, defined as 
the probability with which an actor assesses that another actor will act in a certain way (Luhmann, 
1979; Zucker, 1986) and the role of ‘goodwill’ defined as mutual expectations of reciprocity 
between partners (Ring and Van De Ven, 1992). Trust means that it is not necessary to gain the full 
range of information in order to formulate rational decisions; it involves constructing expectations 
through the use of information that is available, and the necessity to “fill the gaps in information 
and uncertainties [by making] ‘judgement calls’ and ‘leaps of faith’ based on social knowledge” 
(McEvily et al., 2003, p. 99). Some consider that trust promotes more effective inter-organisational 
relations by restricting opportunistic behaviours, reducing complexity, and by stimulating 
coordination and cooperation in ways that are not possible through contractual agreements alone 
(Hardy et al., 1998, p. 1). However, Harriss (2003, p. 758)  argues that the complexity of 
globalisation creates challenges for the construction of trust among the actors because of the 
growing levels of risk in present-day social interactions.  
 
Li (2005, p. 81) suggests that trust can play a key role in tempering the potentials for opportunistic 
behaviours in inter-organisational relationships where formal control mechanisms are difficult to 
and costly to institute. However, Li contends that in intra-organisational relationships, trust may be 
less important because the risks associated with possible undesirable behaviours or practices can be 
reduced through a combination of authority (management structures, policies and procedures) and 
organisational culture (Li, 2005, p. 81). On the other hand, Andersson and Forsgren (1996, p. 489) 
note that although subsidiary behaviour is influenced by strategies policies, and procedures used by 
head office to control and assimilate their subsidiaries within the wider organisation, “subsidiaries 
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are also embedded in networks that include other actors inside and outside the MNC.” They argue 
that a subsidiary's role in networks “is shaped and developed in interaction with these actors rather 
than through any specific decision by headquarters….and is based on relationships developed over 
a long time” (Andersson and Forsgren, 1996, p. 489).  
 
The presence of trust in social interactions plays a central role in intra-organisational relationships 
in ways that extend beyond the controls that are formally enacted through organisational principles 
and management procedures (Hardy et al., 1998; McEvily et al., 2003; Diallo and Thuillier, 2005; 
Li, 2005). For example, according to Simons (2002, p. 18), the perception of whether a manager's 
words tend to align with his or her deeds is critically important for the development of trust in 
employees and can noticeably influence the manager’s credibility. In particular, Simons (2002, pp. 
28–9) observes that in organisations where there is a great need to manage the perceptions of 
diverse stakeholders, the demands of certain managerial tasks encourage managers to represent 
themselves differently to different parties which, when noticed by employees, may affect their 
levels of trust in the behavioural integrity of the more senior staff.  
 
The level of trust in relationships is subject to fluctuations as organisations evolve and alter, and 
people’s behaviours and attitudes may also change in response to different experiences or a 
miscalculation of the other party's trustworthiness (Blomqvist, 1997). As conditions change, 
maintaining commitments and promises may become impractical for individuals and organisations 
at some point. In such situations, it becomes necessary to rebuild trust, in addition to creating and 
maintaining it (McEvily et al., 2003, p. 100). Trust can be built by creating conditions that promote 
the generation of trust (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Zucker, 1986; Harriss, 2000). During the 
processes of negotiating relationships, there are instances when the ability to trust increases or 
lessens; is created or lost; trust is, therefore, dynamic rather than static in quality (Wu and Laws, 
2003). Trust may be damaged by competition, the fear that shared information  may be misused in 
some way (Li, 2005), or through interactions that underpin the maintenance of asymmetrical power 
relations. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish between trustworthy partners and others who 
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assert trustworthiness while manipulating others through opportunistic behaviours (Hardy et al., 
1998). Trust can be undermined in a number of ways: it may be damaged when the negotiation that 
is experienced is different from the negotiation that was expected (Kopelman and Olekalns, 1999), 
or it may gradually erode after recurrent episodes of perceived distrust (Fox, 1975; Zucker, 1986; 
Blomqvist, 1997). Competition can also undermine trust in collaborations, by creating suspicions 
that shared information may be misused by self-interested actors to increase their power to 
influence within relationships (Li, 2005). 
 
Zucker (1986) asserts that trust may be based (a) on the social characteristics which are linked to, 
for example, a person’s ethnicity, gender, or family; or (b) on process (expectations based on past 
experiences, for example, those arising from a history of past interactions); or (c) on institutions (as 
in formal structures, rules, norms, and conventions that regulate the behaviour of others within 
society, for example rules that govern banks, trade and public services). Zucker’s argument has 
been particularly influential in the literature (Blomqvist, 1997; Hardy et al., 1998; Simons, 2002; 
Harriss, 2003; McEvily et al., 2003) and informs organisation literature among other scholarly 
work (Li, 2005; Lumineau and Schilke, 2018). However, the terminology used to describe different 
types of trust in the literature is inconsistent and demonstrates considerable overlaps. Hardy et al. 
(1998) distinguish between two forms of trust: spontaneous trust and generated trust. Spontaneous 
trust refers to when shared meaning permits trust to occur between parties who may not know each 
other, although they may be able to make judgements and communicate with each other based on 
the recognition of long-standing symbols such as an organisation’s reputation or history of service 
(Hardy et al., 1998, pp. 21–22). Hardy et al.’s description of spontaneous trust corresponds with 
Zucker’s typology of characteristic-based and institutional trust because neither is reliant on past 
experience (process-based trust). Generated trust refers to when a trusting relationship develops by 
using verbal and non-verbal communication symbols to create shared meanings where none existed 
before (Hardy et al., 1998, p. 23). This description implies a time-reliant process (process-based) 
by means of which trust can be generated or increased between parties as a result of the continued 
realisation of expectations and positive outcomes of interactions. 
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Schilke et al. (2016) distinguish between affect-based trust “considered as being similar to ‘trust at 
first sight’” (corresponds with spontaneous, characteristic-based and institutional trust) or 
knowledge-based trust which is “built steadily on ongoing relations between the parties over time” 
and grows, in particular, through professional communication (corresponding with process-based 
trust). Harriss’s (2003, p. 761) use of the term ‘personal trust’ is less explicit since it is based on 
ethnic or social connections (characteristic-based), or an organisation’s reputation (institutional), or 
on past experience of collaboration (process-based trust). Table 2 summarises the key elements in 
this discussion. 
Characteristics of trust Contribution to negotiation Challenges 
Predictability: Assumptions 
made by a person on the 
likelihood of another to act in 




expectations of reciprocity 
between partners (Hardy et al., 
1998) 
 Restricts opportunistic behaviour 
 Promotes cooperative attitudes 
 Simplifies communications 
 Facilitates knowledge sharing 
 It is difficult to maintain, 
especially when multiple 
stakeholders are involved 
 It is dynamic, can erode or be lost 
 Over-reliance can block new 
relationships 
 Over-reliance can lead to 
vulnerability  
Types of trust Definition and interconnections 
Characteristic-based/ 
personal trust 
Trust is tied to a person /ethnicity/gender/family or other social order.  
(Zucker, 1986). Corresponds with spontaneous trust (Hardy et al., 1998), 
personal trust (Harriss, 2003), and affect-based trust (Schilke et al., 2016)  
 
Process-based trust Trusting expectations are based on past experiences (Zucker, 1986). 
Corresponds with generated trust (Hardy et al., 1998), personal trust 
(Harriss, 2003)and knowledge-based trust (Schilke et al., 2016)   
 
Institutional trust When trust is based on formal structures, rules, norms, and conventions 
that regulate the behaviour of others within society. (Zucker, 1986).  
Corresponds with spontaneous trust (Hardy et al., 1998), personal trust 
(Harriss, 2003), and affect-based trust (Schilke et al., 2016) 
 
Table 2: Summary of the key elements of trust in negotiation (Source: author) 
 
Uzzi’s (1997) description of embeddedness (Chapter 2, section 2.5) suggests that the degree to 
which someone is known to an individual will determine the level of trust that permits that 
individual to enter into contractual or network situation with them. Furthermore, Li (2005, p. 93) 
observes that the effects of trust between individuals from different national or corporate cultural 
backgrounds, may be different from intra- and inter-organisational trust. The implications are that 
different types of trust are likely to exist between the HCOs and head offices compared to the HCO 
and its local network of actors or the HCO and the volunteers. This is particularly relevant in intra-
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organisational relations both within and between the different operational units of IVCOs, 
including HCOs and head offices, where staff from diverse backgrounds interact with each other at 
different levels of the organisation on a frequent or regular basis.  
 
In this research, the typology of trust as set out by Zucker (1986) is used in the analysis of data as it 
most closely reflects the diversity of the IVS actors and situations where relationships between the 
HCOs and the IVS stakeholders are negotiated. Zucker’s (1986, pp. 60–64) categorisation of trust 
provides a connection between trust and knowledge sharing in negotiating relationships by showing 
how the construction of each type of trust relies on the accuracy of information exchange between 
the parties:  
 In process-based trust, the production of trust is reliant on a history of prior information 
exchange, or association of positive outcomes to previous exchanges. This, points to the 
necessity for an iterative process over a long period.  
 
 Characteristic-based trust requires only information regarding ‘social similarity’. It 
depends on characteristics such as affiliation with a specific cultural system or shared 
background expectations, on the basis of which, social judgements can be made 
legitimately.  
 
 In institutional trust, the exchange takes place across group boundaries and uses formal 
structures, norms and rules to produce trust. Institutional trust “is a commodity that can be 
manufactured by individuals or firms ….and can be ‘signalled’ by association, for 
example, memberships of a group of organisations of a particular type, or and adopting 
organisational forms, regardless of its effects on firm’s performance.” Furthermore, 
institutional trust relies on “the legitimate concerns that the transaction may not be 
completed or may fail to produce the expected outcome through no fault of either party 
involved in the exchange.” (Zucker, 1986, p. 64).  
 
The discussion in this section illustrates the positive and negative contributions of trust to the 
processes of negotiating relationships. However, Harriss (2003, p. 746) contends that the 
significance of trust is overestimated in some of the literature because many relationships involve 
power as well as, or more than, trust, thus implying some parties’ preference for dominance in 
negotiating relationships rather than partnership or collaboration.  On the other hand, Bachman 
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(1998, p. 313) notes that: “Power in the form of hierarchy and structural domination can enable 
social actors to trust each other at the impersonal level”. These accounts suggest that varying forms 
of power can shape, and be shaped by, different types of trust in negotiating relationships.  The 
centrality of trust and power in the negotiation of relationships has been expressed in different 
ways by different scholars. Hardy et al. (1998) note the importance of taking power into account 
when defining trust, as relationships that give the impression of trust may sometimes conceal 
efforts to reinforce asymmetrical power relations. Brinkerhoff (2002) suggests that an actor’s 
approach to negotiating relationships is driven by his or her willingness to share power. Koeszegi 
(2004, p. 641) observes that in negotiation “trust creates dependency and dependency is associated 
with power”, while Olekalns and Smith (2009, p. 358) consider that characteristics of the settings 
in negotiation are related to power distribution while the characteristics of actors reflect 
trustworthiness. The next sub-section examines the conceptualisation of power.  
3.4 Power 
 
Constructions of power are numerous, varied in forms and can be described in many different 
ways. Power is seen as “part of the fabric of our social structures and norms and as operating in 
ways that are neither obvious to us, nor very easy to see” (Pettit, 2013, p. 31). In its simplest form, 
an early definition was offered by Dahl (1957, pp. 202–3) as “A has power over B to the extent that 
he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. Interpreted in this way, power can 
appear as a negative or even a threatening force, but it can also be exercised in positive ways, for 
example, to promote social change in favour of the poor or justice for the disadvantaged (Eyben et 
al., 2006). Consequently, the diverse conceptualisations of power in academic work reflect the 
multiple dimensions of expressions, forms, extent, and sources of power (Lukes, 1974; VeneKlasen 
and Miller, 2002; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Huxham and Beech, 2008) as well as levels and 
spaces where power is exercised (Gaventa, 2005; Allen, 2015). 
 
Power can be present in both formal and informal forms. Formal power can be viewed as “the 
visible, recognised structures of power that are part of the way in which institutions mediate the 
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relationship between those with legitimate authority and those who are subject to that authority, the 
laws and rules that define what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, and how those who break 
laws and flout norms are treated” (Pettit, 2013, p. 39). Informal power considers human behaviour 
and social interactions as both enabling and constraining actors’ capacity to act (Lawrence, 2008, p. 
174). Pettit describes informal power as a form of ‘invisible power’ (Gaventa, 2006) that can be 
viewed “as the socialised norms, discourses and cultural practices that are part of our everyday 
lives. Informal power relations are internalised through socialisation from a young age, starting 
with acceptance of inequality in roles” (Pettit, 2013, p. 39).  
 
Power can also be expressed in different ways. ‘Power over’ relates to the control of the 
relationship, and the ability of the dominant actor to influence the activities and beliefs of the weak 
(Huxham and Beech, 2008). ‘Power to’  is concerned with the capacity to exert power, rather than 
the relationship itself (Lukes, 1974; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2002). ‘Power with’ refers to the 
building of consensus among actors with diverse interests, and developing of collaborative 
strategies that strengthen the organisation as a collective (Rowlands, 1997; VeneKlasen and Miller, 
2002); and ‘power within’ has to do with a person’s sense of the sense of confidence, dignity and 
self-awareness that pre-empts an individual or a group’s actions (Chambers, 1994; Pettit, 2013). 
Power is also relational, meaning that people can occupy more than one position of power 
depending on the context: they can be dominant in one situation and subordinate in another 
(Chambers, 1997; Gaventa, 2005; Pantazidou, 2012). This relational portrayal of power mirrors 
Foucault’s (1982) view of power as residing not in individuals, but in the positions that they 
occupy. 
 
Hardy et al. (1998) note that power can create the illusion of trust through manipulation or consent, 
which they define as: 
 “Manipulation [is when] power is used to manage meaning and to bring about 
cooperation. However, these actions are part of a strategy to increase power: as one party 




 Consenting to power: [is a] situation in which cooperation between parties with vastly 
differing power reserves create a façade of trust….[hence] cooperation is not achieved 
through trust but, rather, through dependency where conditioning and power combine, to 
produce acceptance and submission” (Hardy et al., 1998, p. 24). 
 
Manipulation can look like trust (Hardy et al., 1998, p. 26) and act through strategies that maintain 
or reinforce inequalities or feelings of powerlessness (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Chambers, 2006; 
Lawrence, 2008). For example, when one actor is dependent on another for a critical resource, they 
can use their control over critical resources as a tactical manoeuver to place the dependent 
organisation at a power disadvantage and effect a change of behaviour in others (Elbers, 2012). 
This finds congruence in MNC literature (Chapter 2, section 2.5) where Andersson and Forsgren 
(1996) note that the control of critical resources is an important basis of power in intra-
organisational relations. They argue that “power based on the control of critical resources is 
multidirectional and can flow upwards, downwards or horizontally, i.e. from subsidiaries to head 
offices as well as the other way” (Andersson and Forsgren, 1996, p. 490). Crucially, they extend 
the argument by suggesting that “ relationships with the actors that surround the subsidiary are 
sources of power that affect the subsidiary and can be used by it to exert influence on other actors” 
(Andersson and Forsgren, 1996, p. 490). 
 
In her research of victims of class and racial discrimination in Haitian society, Moncrieffe (2006) 
questions whether people consent to power through lack of alternative options or due to social 
norms that prevent them from challenging power. She reflects that consenting to power may imply 
adapting while continuing to have the ability to resist and even dominate some situations 
(Moncrieffe, 2006), which parallels Scott’s (1985) description of resistance as a weapon used by 
the weak over the strong. This suggests that different actors can have the power to influence the 
negotiation of relationships depending on the level of the power they have over resources. Power 
over a critical resource may relate to tangible matters such as funding, access to equipment or 
services, or intangible elements such as knowledge, cultural insight or language (Shutt, 2006). 
Pettit (2013, p. 41) suggests a number of different sources of power that include perceived moral 
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authority, and physical attributes (such as age, health, skill, or charisma) or social identity (gender, 
ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation). Thus, as some authors observe, power can also exist 
among the ‘powerless’ as power rooted in scarce resources is essentially the power of sanctions; it 
relies on the possibility that the threat of pulling out of the relationship may be real (Huxham and 
Beech, 2008, p. 566). In most cases subordinates defer to superiors on the assumptions of the 
latter’s right to exercise power by virtue of their position, thus imparting legitimacy to the 
authority.  
 
The multiple constructions of power are inter-connected, infiltrate all aspects of human 
relationships, institutions and systems of knowledge, and are part of the way societies and cultures 
work (Pettit, 2013, p. 39). For example, in the context of development, ‘power with’ could apply to 
a collaborative approach to programme identification, design and implementation among the 
stakeholders among actors, and ‘power within’ might describe a charismatic community leader or a 
volunteer whose maturity, experience or cultural sensitivity helps drive the projects towards their 
intended goals. Power can exist at the different levels within a given development programme, for 
example, in the HCO’s relationship with multi-and bilateral donors, governments and international 
aid agencies; or with their head office or partner organisations in the host country, and between the 
HCO and volunteers. Formal power can be exercised through national government and 
international development policies, as well as inter- and intra-organisational rules, structures and 
procedures that govern the interactions between HCOs, their partner organisations and their head 
office. Informal power can relate to social and cultural interactions between individuals and 
organisations that reflect the way that they relate to each other (Huxham ad Beech, 2008).  
 
Negotiating relationships is a form of social exchange (Olekalns and Smith, 2009, p. 347) between 
actors who want something; otherwise, there would be nothing to negotiate (Nierenberg, 1987). 
This means that negotiation is about compromise, based on the belief of each actor that the other 
has power over a valued - tangible or intangible - resource that they are willing to share. The extent 
of sharing depends on each actor’s ability to persuade – the power to influence – the other to 
74 
 
wholly or partially release the desired resource. Thomas (2000) observes that while resources are 
directed to goal achievement in conventional management, development management involves the 
use of resources to influence social processes. Moreover, Fisher (1983, p. 150) argues that “the 
‘real negotiating power’ is the ability to influence the decisions of others”. This makes 
understanding the distribution of power over tangible (for example, funding, transportation and 
equipment) and intangible resources (for example knowledge and language), and power to 
influence in negotiating relationships critical to this research. This approach also concurs with 
Elgstrӧm’s (1992, pp. 22–24) suggestion that the distribution of power over resources and 
influential norms are “essential dimensions of power in negotiating processes”. Consequently, 
‘power over resources’ - both tangible and intangible (Pettit, 2013) - and ‘power to influence’ are 
used in the analysis of data as they most closely reflect those power relations between the HCO and 
the IVS stakeholders that are the focus of this study.  
 
This section has laid out how power relations shape the contexts, the structures and the behaviours 
of actors, and influence the standpoint (section 3.2) that they adopt in the negotiating relationships. 
Negotiation can be seen as an attempt to manage interdependence and as a process to establish, 
define, or redefine the relationship (Koeszegi, 2004, p. 640), but is dependent on actors’ 
willingness to share power as a way of building relationships rather than relying on the mechanics 
of contracts and procedures (Brinkerhoff, 2002). Access to and control over certain resources is 
necessary for achieving organisational goals, hence the exercise of power in negotiating 
relationships inevitably generates resistance, compliance and strategic consent (Long, 2001, p. 71). 
Power can also influence the negotiation of relationships between key stakeholders of development 
interventions, including IVS, by shaping the language of policies and processes that help secure 
funding and support (Cornwall, 2007, p. 474). Thus understanding power in negotiating 
relationships is useful in understanding its connection to the literature on trust and their relevance 
























A force for social good (Pettit, 2013, p. 39) 
 
Something held or exercised by one person or group to control or dominate others (Pettit, 2013, 
p. 39)  
 
Power dynamics that underpin laws, rules, organisational structures, policies and procedure that 
contribute to negotiating relationships - (Pettit, 2013, p. 39) 
 
The socialised norms, discourses and cultural practices that are part of our everyday lives (Pettit, 
2013, p. 39) 
 
When power is used to manage and to bring about cooperation as part of a strategy to increase 
power (Hardy et al., 1998) 
 
When cooperation is achieved through dependency where conditioning and power combine, to 





Power over - the control of the relationship, and the ability of the dominant actor to influence the 
activities and beliefs of the weak (Gaventa, 2006) 
 
Power to: the capacity to exert power (Gaventa, 2006) 
 
Power with: The building of consensus among actors with diverse interests, and developing 
collaborative strategies that strengthen the groups as a collective (Gaventa, 2006) 
 
Power within: a person’s sense of the sense of confidence, dignity, and self-awareness (Gaventa, 
2006) 
 
Sources of power 
 
Access to resources, means; culture, language, social networks, location; access to information, 
knowledge and technology; perceived ‘moral authority’; physical attributes or social identity 
(Pettit, 2013, p. 39) 
 
Weapons of the 
weak 
Consenting to the power adapting while exercising capacity to resist and even dominate (Scott, 
1985) 
 
Table 3: Summary of the key elements of literature on power and their interpretations in this thesis (Source: author) 
 
The discussion so far in this chapter concurs with Olekalns and Smith’s (2009, p. 358) suggestion 
that the combination of power relations and trust is important in influencing how relationships are 
negotiated. The next section turns to explain the overarching conceptual framework for this thesis. 
3.5 Conceptual framework 
 
This research aims to explain the contradictions in the nature and processes of development 
interventions through IVS, by analysing how relationships are negotiated between IVCO host 
country offices and the stakeholders in IVS programmes. In doing so, it analyses how relationships 
are negotiated between IVCO host country offices and the multiple and diverse IVS stakeholders 
(Chapter 2). The stakeholders include international donor agencies, the government, public and 
private sector institutions in the host country, international and national partner organisations, 
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consultants, contractors and representatives of beneficiary groups, as well as their own IVCO head 
office and the volunteers. 
 
The literature on boundary organisations (Chapter 2, section 2.6) suggests that HCOs straddle 
different ‘social worlds’ that are inclined to function according to different sets of rules, but where 
boundaries are never clear. At the same time, the literature on MNCs indicated that the behaviours 
and decision-making processes of subsidiaries of multinational corporations may not always be 
aligned to the parent organisations’ values and policies since they can be influenced by ‘embedded’ 
social attachments (Chapter 2, section 2.5) or by stakeholders who try to shape its behaviour 
according to their own interests. This implies that inter-organisational relationships affect the intra-
organisational relationships between IVCO head offices and their HCOs. Extracting information 
from Figure 3, I was able to develop Figure 4 to show HCOs as boundary managers, and the 
overlapping organisational boundaries that HCOs have to bridge in their day to day work with their 
diverse stakeholders. 
 
Figure 4: Showing HCOs as boundary managers and their different IVS stakeholders (Source: author) 
 
The diagram is developed simply to represent the diversity of key stakeholders but does not attach 
relative importance or organisational priority to any particular relationship. Furthermore, 
HCO 
IVCO 


















relationships that may exist between the different stakeholders are not shown, in order to maintain 
the focus of the research on HCOs. As outlined in Chapter 1, three categories of key stakeholders 
were identified during the fieldwork and provide the main focus of the data analysis, based on the 
patterns of interaction, and the level at which these relationships are negotiated:    
i) The international volunteers,  
ii) Their IVCO head offices, and  
iii) The other stakeholders such as partner organisations, government and international 
funding agencies.  
 
HCOs negotiate relationships with stakeholders in different contextual settings, and across different 
boundaries, where there is an asymmetry of knowledge between individuals and organisations and 
diverse perspectives on the type and quality of knowledge that is useful to them. In addition, the 
inter-relationship between forms of trust and power relations presents a number of potential 
solutions to negotiated relationships, each of which may emerge in real life situations. The 
analytical framework for this research has, therefore, been further developed to capture the 
interplay between the different sets of concepts relating to trust and power as key influential 
elements that constrain or support the flow of knowledge, and hence, shape the behaviours of 
people and organisations in the negotiation of relationships.  
 
The complexity of the inter-relationships between HCOs and their IVS stakeholders (shown as 
areas of overlapping organisational boundaries in Figure 4 above) is magnified in Figure 5 below to 
illustrate how the negotiation of relationships relies on different types of trust and power relations 









Figure 5: Represents a magnification of the HCO/stakeholder boundary overlap (from Figure 4) and the factors that 
influence negotiation of relationships (Source: author) 
 
Figure 5 shows the importance and interdependence of trust and power relations and the way they 
impact, and are impacted by knowledge sharing in the relationship between HCOs and their IVS 
stakeholders. The organisational boundary is shown as permeable, rather than solid, to denote 
flexibility within the relationship. The diagram is intended to show the dynamic nature of 
relationships with the mechanisms (influential elements) that influence the way these relationships 
are negotiated and its potential to move in favour or against the HCO or the other stakeholders. The 
direction of the movements is only used as a figurative way of showing that the interplay between 
these elements is dynamic, rather than static. No significance is implied in the colour or size of the 
influential elements, although trust can be created or eroded and the distribution of power can 
change, thus any change in trust and power can affect the nature of the relationship and hence, how 





This chapter has shown the importance of trust and power relations in situations in which 
organisations have to negotiate relationships with multiple stakeholders. It has demonstrated that 
achieving consistency between policy and practice in development work is a complex task and 
requires negotiating relationships with multiple, intra- and inter-organisational actors.  
 
HCOs negotiate relationships at multiple levels, and with multiple partners of diverse national and 
international backgrounds. How relationships are negotiated between the HCO and the diverse IVS 
stakeholders shape the justification, design, and terms and conditions of IVS programmes, and 
characterise the expectations of the actors about their roles within projects. Negotiating 
relationships can help build on long term cooperation, but they also generate risk, ambiguity and 
the potential for one actor to exploit the other for personal gain (Olekalns and Smith, 2009, p. 347). 
The literature on negotiation shows that although historical factors, cultural norms, and language 
are influential factors in negotiating relationships, reciprocity in knowledge sharing and 
information exchange is considered key in negotiating relationships. However, revealing 
information is risky because although it may facilitate goal achievement, it can also expose an actor 
to opportunistic behaviour by the other actors. This chapter has also shown how trust and power 
relations shape the expectations and behaviours of people and organisations. Zucker’s 
categorisation of institutional, characteristic-based and process-based trust is used in this thesis to 
examine trust among the diverse actors and situations where relationships between the HCOs and 
the IVS stakeholders are negotiated. 
 
Finally, this chapter has shown that power is a feature of interdependence in negotiating 
relationships. Dependency creates spaces for the exercise of power in both positive and negative 
ways. Power can be attributed to a particular or highly desired resource which could be tangible, 
such as funding, number of employees, or equipment, or intangible such as knowledge. Power over 
desired resources can facilitate power to influence within relationships in different ways; for 
example, donors’ power over funding allows them the freedom to influence the choice of 
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development projects and partners; on the other hand, local knowledge can give apparently weaker 
partners the power to influence their position within a relationship by withholding necessary 
information. In the context of development, donor countries are criticised for the imposition of 
rigid structures that are based on Western assumptions and serve to maintain the supremacy of the 
philosophies and values of the countries of the global North, while creating dependency in the 
countries of the global South. This view is reflected in the literature that sees donor organisations 
and practices exercising power through tangible and intangible forms of interaction
 
that undermine 
the established traditional and informal processes in poor countries. The relational characteristic of 
power (section 3.4) suggests that an individual or group in an organisation may be dominant in 
their local setting but marginalised in a national context or the parent organisation’s hierarchy. 
While working as an IVCO subsidiary, HCOs also have to manage power relations within their 
own organisations and other stakeholders.  
 
The combination of embeddedness in the local environment and exposure to a foreign 
organisational culture implies potential conflicts between HCOs, their head offices, and other IVS 
actors which can impact on levels of knowledge sharing, and subsequently the types of trust and 
power relations. This view concurs with Fowler’s (2000) observation that tensions and challenges 
in INGOs organisations are more pronounced in the outer boundaries of the organisation where 
direct interactions take place, rather than at its central head office (Fowler, 2000, p. 52). Based on 
the findings and discussions in this chapter, the analytical framework was developed to address the 
research question in this thesis. The next chapter sets out the methodology behind the research, 
how fieldwork was undertaken, and how data was collected to answer the research question. It 
illustrates precisely which relations are explored, between the HCOs and i) The international 
volunteers ii) Their IVCO head office, and iii) The other stakeholders such as partner organisations, 








The theoretical basis and the conceptual framework for this study that was presented in previous 
chapters supported the methodological design of this research. Section 4.2 sets out the justification 
for the choice of the research strategy and methods to answer them. Section 4.3 presents the 
inductive/abductive logic (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Schwandt, 1997; Ritchie et al., 2003; Potter, 
2013) and social constructivist nature (Laws et al., 2003; Bryman, 2004; Jupp, 2006) of the 
methodology from a theoretical perspective. Section 4.4 describes the scope of the study and the 
processes leading to the choice of Malawi as the field of study and the five IVCOs as cases of focus 
in this research. Section 4.5 presents a brief description of the country context in Malawi. Section 
4.6 sets out how the approach from section 4.3 was put into practice and describes the process of 
data collection. Section 4.7 explains how the analysis of data from the research proceeded as a 
progressive process of knowledge construction. Section 4.8 describes the challenges, dilemmas and 
ethical considerations during data collection. It also provides details of how concerns with regards 
to validity and reliability were addressed in conducting the field research, with particular emphasis 
on issues related to my personal position as IVS researcher and PhD student. Section 4.9 concludes 
by reflecting on the main elements of the methodological design of this research and summarises 
the common concerns and criticisms about the rigour of qualitative research. 
 
4.2 Background and justification 
 
An important consideration in developing the research methodology was to focus on a specific 
setting where Northern IVCOs operate and where their HCOs interact with the beneficiary groups, 
partner organisations, and international volunteers, as well as their parent organisation. My 
research was not concerned with numeric analysis but with meanings and interpretations of social 
phenomena and the context in which they occur (Schwandt, 1997; Laws et al., 2003; Jupp, 2006). 
A qualitative approach seeks to understand the world through interaction, empathy and 
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interpretation of the social world by learning about the social and physical spaces where the 
participants are located: their accounts of their past and present knowledge, experiences, and 
perspectives (Ritchie et al., 2003; Jupp, 2006). Therefore, a qualitative methodology was the most 
appropriate way for me to examine how relationships between the HCOs and their stakeholders are 
negotiated.  Underpinning my research strategy and choice of methods were a social constructivist 
ontology, and an epistemology based on participation, to further facilitate the exploration of how 
the relationships between the HCOs and their stakeholders relate to the aims and processes of 
development interventions through IVS. Achieving the objectives of my research necessitated that I 
develop an understanding of social issues in their real-life context, thus a case study research 
(Keddie, 2006; Schwandt, 1997; Yin, 2003) was the most suitable approach to use. This approach 
was further refined to encompass a multiple-case study research method (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles 
et al., 2014). The theoretical basis informing the choice of a multiple-case study approach is 
discussed in-depth in sub-sections 4.3.1. 
 
4.3 Research approach 
 
This research is about the complexities of interactions between multiple stakeholders, in a specific 
context, that engage the services of international volunteers to achieve developmental goals. 
Consequently, the methodological approach was chosen in such a way as to allow as impartial as 
possible and in-depth interrogation of data from diverse sources.  
 
Having recognised qualitative research as the overall approach for data collection, my choice of 
methods was subject to addressing the ontological and epistemological concerns related to the 
overarching research question that my study was aiming to answer. Ontological concerns query the 
“nature of the world”, its components and the way they interact with and relate to each other 
(Potter, 2013, p. 79). A positivist ontology regards the world as objectively ‘out there’, observable, 
and completely independent from the role of human interpretation (Laws et al., 2003; Potter, 2013). 
However, a social constructivist ontology posits that “social reality is not a fixed phenomenon” 
(Jupp, 2006, pp. 202–203); and that social ‘realities’ emerge through social interactions where 
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environmental dynamics always present opportunities for the construction of new and different 
ways of perceiving and interpreting the social world (Laws et al., 2003; Bryman, 2004). Thus, the 
social constructivist ontology most closely reflects the multiplicity of perspectives that this research 
aims to explore, potentially allowing a better understanding of the different ways through which 
reality can be experienced by the participants.  
 
The concept of epistemology is concerned with the “nature of knowledge” (Potter, 2013, p. 79) and 
“what is or should be regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline” (Jupp, 2006, pp. 202–203). 
Building on the social constructivist ontology, it followed that a constructivist epistemology rather 
than positivist would better serve the aims of this research.  A social constructivist epistemology 
relates to how ‘knowledge is constructed’ through how people associate meanings to issues rather 
than a ‘true’ knowledge to be discovered (Potter, 2013, pp. 79–80). It implies that knowledge is not 
a single entity but can exist in various forms, depending on the perspective of the participant who 
constructed the knowledge. 
 
Drawing conclusions from a particular data set can be inductive, deductive or abductive (Schwandt, 
1997; Potter, 2013). The distinction is related to whether the intended aim of the research is to 
derive theory from the data collection and analysis (inductive), to test a pre-existing theory 
(deductive) or to deliberately look for and puzzle out reasons for anomalies, inconsistencies, and 
incongruities in what has been examined (abductive) (Ritchie et al., 2003; Potter 2013; Miles & 
Huberman 1994). My research aimed to question the interactions between HCOs and their IVS 
stakeholders, as well as to challenge any assumptions that I may have had before engaging in the 
fieldwork. In this sense, my analysis of data followed a combined inductive/abductive reasoning by 
“looking for patterns and association derived from observations” (Ritchie et al. 2003, p.14) within 
the case study.  
 
Finally, I had to reflect on my own role and points of view and how they may have influenced the 
collection and analysis of data. Reflexivity involves the recognition of the partiality of the 
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researcher in the research process and that “a focus on how does who I am, who I have been, who I 
think I am, and how I feel affect data collection and analysis” (Pillow, 2003, p. 176). Some authors 
suggest that listening and writing with reflexivity help position the researcher and facilitate 
awareness of how one’s personal history can influence the research process and hence result in 
more “accurate,” or more “valid” research (Ball, 1990; Altheide and Johnson, 1998). Other 
scholars argue that while reflexivity is essential in the endeavour to attain objectivity and 
neutrality, such aspirations are never fully achievable (Snape and Spencer, 2003, p. 20). Velasco 
(2013, p. 75) suggests that assuming a position of full neutrality by both the researcher and the 
informant “could limit the degree of understanding that could be achieved by reducing the richness 
of information that can arise from multiple perspectives and from the interaction between the 
investigator and people involved in the phenomena”. Sub-section 4.7.1 of this chapter presents a 
more in-depth discussion on the ways in which reflexivity, and my position as the researcher, were 
addressed in this study.   
 
4.3.1 Case study research 
Case study research is a strategy for undertaking social inquiry (Schwandt, 1997, p. 13)  with its 
‘defining feature’ being the “multiplicity of perspectives which are rooted in a specific context” 
(Lewis, 2003, p. 52). Yin (2003, p. 1) argues that a case study approach in academic research is 
more suited to ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. Stake (1995) asserts that the primary concern of  case 
study research is to generate knowledge of a specific phenomenon, and its strength lies in allowing 
the researcher the flexibility to use a variety of  data collection methods and “to compare within 
cases and across cases for research validity” (Dooley, 2002, p. 338). Different types of qualitative 
methods can be used to collect both naturally occurring and generated data. Ritchie (2003, p. 34) 
suggests that naturally occurring data  illuminate “behaviours and interactions (whether acted, 
spoken, or written) [that] need to be understood in the real world” while generated data “involves 
reconstruction, and require re-processing and re-telling of attitudes, beliefs, behaviour or other 




Yin (2003, p. 13) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not evident”. I chose Yin’s definition of a case study for this research because 
generating knowledge through social inquiry by asking ‘how’ questions from multiple participants 
in a specific context are what this study aims to achieve. Thus, I considered a case study approach 
as the most suitable way to optimise, capture and generate knowledge, and to ask: “What is 
happening here?” My objective in this research was to study human relationships, and the factors 
that influence those relationships, between the HCOs and their diverse and multiple stakeholders, 
in different levels and contexts. However, a case study approach that involved in-depth 
investigation of a single unit of analysis (an HCO) would limit the likelihood of developing a 
generalizable theory in this research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles et al., 2014). Miles et al. (2014, p. 
67) note that generalizability of data from multiple cases is possible, providing data is “from 
several settings studied together, systematically contrasted yet contextually grounded.” They argue 
that  a multiple-case study adds confidence to findings because looking at processes and outcomes 
across similar and dissimilar cases, helps develop understating of how, where and why things 
happen or continue to happen, to what extent they are influenced by local conditions, and hence 
lead to more robust explanations (Miles et al., 2014). 
 
A multiple-case study approach closely matched the aim of my research which was to use HCOs of 
a number of different IVCOs as the units of analysis, and examine their relationships with their 
stakeholders at the same time, using a single country as the contextual background. Furthermore, a 
cross-case approach compels researchers to look deeper into issues using multiple perspectives, 
thus increases accuracy and reliability of the data as well as the probability of capturing unexpected 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 17–20). Section 4.7 of this chapter describes how cross-case 
approach was used to analyse the data accumulated for this research, and to determine underlying 





Despite its strengths as a qualitative research method, the case study approach is also open to 
criticism due to the subjective nature of the relationship between the researcher and the informants. 
Consequently, case study research is also concerned with methodological rigour and quality of the 
research, defined by demonstrations of the inter-related concepts of validity and reliability in the 
generated data (Thomas, 1998; Dooley, 2002; Yin, 2003; Jupp, 2006; Tsang, 2014). Validity often 
refers to bias introduced by the researcher as well as the research informants, and is used to criticise 
case study research by raising questions with regards to the objectivity of the inquirer (Schwandt, 
1997; Ritchie, et al., 2003; Yin, 2003; Mac Lean, 2013; Silverman, 2013). Schwandt (1997, p. 9) 
identifies three types of biases that can emerge in qualitative research: i) through choice or 
overreliance on key informants, events or statements; ii) the presence of the researcher and iii)  the 
effects of the site on the respondent and the researcher.  In this research, I addressed the 
requirements for validity and neutrality by minimising the three types of bias by i) choice of a wide 
range of informants that could add different perspectives, ii) choice of country and organisations of 
which I had little or no previous experience
18
 and iii) choice of locations where the participants felt 
comfortable and free to express themselves.  
 
Yin (2003, pp. 34–37) defines reliability as  “Demonstrating that the operations of a study - such as 
the data collection procedures - can be repeated and with the same results…. by ensuring that if a 
later investigator followed the same procedures and using the same (author’s italics) case study, 
would arrive at the same findings and conclusions”. Since evidence in a case study may be derived 
from multiple sources, mechanisms for ensuring reliability involve  procedures for database 
management and record-keeping in ways that ensure the presence of clear linkages between the 
research questions, the collected data and the conclusions (Schwandt, 1997; Dooley, 2002; Yin, 
2003; Silverman, 2013). To address any concerns of reliability, I produced a case-study protocol 
(see section 4.4 of this chapter) and developed questions for each category of participants (see 
section 4.6.2). Interviews were recorded and later transcribed with details of the time, date and 
                                                     
18
 Although I had previous experience of working with VSO, I had no experience of working with VSO in Malawi. 
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location of the interview and the name and title of the participants. An electronic version of the 
database was created to complement the hard copies of the data. 
 
Another way of establishing reliability and validity in qualitative research is through triangulation. 
Jupp (2006, p. 99) offers a simple explanation of triangulation as “The observation of the research 
issue from (at least) two different points…because the multiple sources of evidence essentially 
provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon”. Thomas (1998, pp. 330–1) views 
triangulation as the complementarity of two approaches: “different methods of investigation: 
(analysing archive records, grey literature, media, as well as published literature & interviews) 
and19 getting evidence from several sources (interviewing individuals, checking reports from 
several agencies)”. My approach to triangulation was guided by Thomas’s description: the 
assimilation of data from different sources (literature, websites, media, IVS actors and 
stakeholders), and using different methods (document review, interviews and non-participatory 
observations) to compare data and validate findings from the case studies. Further details on the 
methods for data collection and analysis are provided in sections 4.6 and 4.7.  
4.4 Scope of the study 
 
The scope of this research was driven by the centrality of its focus of the on the HCOs and their 
relationships with their key stakeholders. Consequently, in determining the type and specifications 
criteria for sample selection, it was important that I disassociate background factors in IVS that 
centred on volunteers, but were neither relevant to, nor associated with, the role of HCOs. This was 
in line with Miles and Huberman’s (1989) caveat for maintaining the integrity of cross-case study 
in a contextually grounded manner to strengthen the generalizability of findings. Having decided to 
use a single country as the contextual background, my approach to arriving at a sampling strategy 
was to ensure that the relationships between the HCOs and their stakeholders should be similarly 
characterised. This involved defining specific criteria for a) the type of IVS placement and b) the 
type of IVCO organisation that I wanted to study.  
                                                     
19
 Author’s italics  
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Given the diversity of the definitions and interpretations of international volunteering (Chapter 2, 
section 2.7), I looked at types of IVS where the duration of placement allowed for meaningful 
relationships to develop between the HCOs, the volunteers, and the stakeholders in the host 
country. I also ensured that the IVCOs descriptions of the administrative and support processes for 
the volunteers before and during their stay in the host country were not only development related, 
but were similar. For example, I rejected those where volunteers had to pay for their own flights or 
other elements of their placement. The list below shows the criteria used for the type of IVS service 
examined this research: 
 Placements of one to two years, with the possibility to extend 
 Aiming to provide skills and experience not available locally to the partner organisations 
 Recruitment and placing of qualified and committed professionals, who also possess 
intercultural skills, mobility and flexibility 
 Recruitment to specific placements by working alongside a counterpart or a team of people 
within a partner organisation 
 Integration into local structures, involving living and working alongside partners and 
colleagues in comparable conditions 
 Receiving a monthly living allowance (plus other benefits), which is in line with that of 
local professionals working in the development/charity sector of the country in which they 
are placed. 
Once the scope of IVS criteria was determined, it helped narrow down the choice of organisations 
that use international volunteers. I then constructed the sampling criteria for IVCO organisations 
based on the ‘most-similar’ units (Gerring, 2007, pp. 131–134) in which the context (the country) is 
the same (Miles et al., 2014). Thus, I eliminated volunteer sending organisation whose aims, and 
strategies might have added extra variables to the relationships between the HCOs, the volunteers 
or other IVS stakeholders, for example, those involved in faith-based or humanitarian work. Thus 
organisations providing the following types of volunteering were excluded: 
 Short term placement (less than six months) 
 Faith-based volunteering 
 Gap year and adventure volunteering 
 Organisations that require advance payment to send volunteers abroad 
 Humanitarian and emergency relief (such as the Red Cross, World Vision) 
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 Organisations that only provide specialist technical expertise (such as engineers and 
medical professionals) rather than generalised and flexible proficiency  
 INGOs that do not work through international volunteers (such as Oxfam and BRAC but 
may, nevertheless, engage volunteers in capacities other than those outlined above) 
 Organisations with less than 20 years’ history of operation, which operate in less than three 
countries 
 
Having determined that a case study approach was the most suitable method of inquiry, it was 
necessary to define “What is this a case of? (authors’ italics)” (Ragin and Becker, 1992). My early 
model for the research was constructed on the bases of choosing one IVCO as the case study and 
exploring the research question in two different countries, in different continents, where the IVCO 
had active operations. The geographical choice for the case study and its components were 
designed to permit interrogation of two HCOs from the same organisation, but different contextual 
settings, thus protecting the research from unknown variables or sudden shifts in the nature of the 
organisational context (Yin, 2003, p. 45).  
 
However, this model attracted challenges through its focus on a single organisation and whether the 
data collection and analysis could be generalizable to other IVCOs, or that this research may have 
been viewed more as a critical evaluation of one particular part of an organisation rather than the 
sector. I subsequently revised the research design to look at five IVCOs in a single country context 
using a cross-case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles et al., 2014). The decision behind the 
choice of cross-case study approach was based on a variety of reasons. Firstly the diversity of 
organisational forms showed that no two IVCOs were identical and therefore, it would not have 
been possible to collect all the required data from a single IVCO to support this thesis. Secondly, 
more cases are needed when the external conditions are more complex, and a greater degree of 
certainty is required (Yin, 2003, pp. 49–51). This applies to IVCO host country offices, based on 
discussions presented in Chapters 2 and 3.   
 
Table 4 below shows the country profiles that assisted the selection process by revealing 
characteristics of interest in the research. Eliminating Upper and Lower Middle Income (LMI) 
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countries narrowed the focus on the Low Income (LI) countries that are considered more urgently 
in need of developmental aid.  
Country WB* 
category 
Poverty headcount ratio % of 
population@ 
CPIA # Dev. 
Assistance 
as % GNI 
Cambodia LI 17.7 (12) 3.4  5.6 
Ethiopia LI 84 (06) 3.7 8.1 
Malawi LI 50.7 (10) 3.5 31.5 
Mozambique LI 54.7 (08) 3.4  14.9 
Nepal LI 25.2 (10) 3. 4.5 
Rwanda LI 44.9 (10) 4.2  14.6 
Sierra Leone LI 52.9 (11) 3.3 9.8 
South Sudan LI 50.6 (09) 2.1 13.4 
Tanzania LI 28.2 (11) 3.8 7.9 
Uganda LI 19.5 (12) 3.7 7.0 
Zimbabwe LI 72.3 (11) 3.1  6.5 
Table 4: Country profile data
20
 showing Low-Income countries in need of development aid (Source: author) 
* LI = Low-Income country  
@ The figures in brackets indicate the year the data was obtained 
# Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (1=Low to 6=High): Rating of countries against a set of 16 criteria 
grouped in four clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public 
sector management and institutions. 
 
 
The next step was to identify countries in which at least three IVCOs were operating following 
Yin’s (2003, p. 26) assertion that “each case study and unit of analysis either should be similar to 
those previously studied by others or should innovate in clear, operationally defined ways”. I was 
then able to identify those countries that fitted both of the criteria of being LI-rated according to the 
World Bank Indicator system (World Bank, 2016), as well as having at least three IVCOs operating 
in the country. Table 5 shows the final choice of countries that met the double criteria: 
Country Challenges 
Worldwide 
AVID GIZ Progressio Peace  
Corps 
Goal UNV CUSO  Total 
Cambodia √ √ √  √  √  5 
Ethiopia √  √   √  √ 4 
Malawi √  √ √ √ √ √  6 
Nepal √ √ √   √   5 
Rwanda √  √  √  √  3 
Sierra Leone √  √   √  √ 4 
Tanzania √ √ √  √  √ √ 7 
Uganda √  √  √ √ √  5 
Table 5: Country profile of IVCO s operating in the shortlisted countries
21
 (Source: author) 
                                                     
20
 Data from the World Bank on (World Bank, 2016) and UNDP from (UNDP, 2016)   
21
 Information obtained from the websites of the organisations on 28/01/2016 
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In addition to theoretical considerations, the choice of the case study was underpinned by 
pragmatic decision-making based on the presence of personal and professional contacts able to 
assist with the logistics of in-country fieldwork in the time available. I chose Malawi because of the 
availability of personal contacts that could facilitate introductions to the various HCOs and partner 
organisations. Furthermore, there were no other considerations such as language barriers (other 
than at the community level), the possibility of violent conflict or natural disasters. The choice of 
organisations within a specific geographical space cannot be considered independently of the 
context in which they are situated. In Malawi, heavy reliance on international aid reflected low 
levels of economic development, poor infrastructure and undependable public sector institutions
22
. 
Consequently, relationships between the HCOs and IVS stakeholders were likely to be restricted to 
a relatively small network of actors at the national level, and the opportunities for choice of 
programmes tended to be limited to a narrow band located just above that of emergency relief.  
 
A multitude of IVCOs work in Malawi, each of which might have conformed to the criteria stated 
above, for example, the Japanese Development Agency, and others from in and Sweden. The 
IVCOs shown in Table 4 were identified through a web-based survey of IVCOs working in Malawi 
that matched the criteria established in the scope of the research and illustrated the diversity of 
IVCOs’ organisational forms. However, Challenges Worldwide and GOAL declined to participate 
in this research. Consequently, my final choice of IVCOs as focus cases in this study was narrowed 
down to the United Nations Volunteers (UNV), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Voluntary Services Overseas International (VSO), The Peace Corps, and 
Progressio (Appendix 1 A-E). 
4.5 Malawi: The country context 
 
Malawi, is a landlocked country in South Central Africa, over 118,000 km
2 
 with an estimated 
population of about 18 million (The World Bank, 2018), with Lilongwe as its capital. Formerly 
known as Nyasaland, it was renamed Malawi on gaining independence from British rule in 1964. 
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 As shown in the previous sub-section 
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Under a new constitution, Malawi became a republic and, since a referendum in 1993, it has been a 
multi-party democracy (Ross, 2013; UNDP in Malawi, 2015; The World Bank, 2017). 
However, in reality, the political leaders in Malawi are seen to govern in a style that reproduces  
“colonial forms of authority” where political expression is mediated by powerful patrons through 
whom the people can access the means and resources for daily survival (Gaynor, 2010, p. 805). 
 
Since independence in1964, Malawi has increasingly become a donor-dependent country and 
supported by foreign aid which is largely channelled outside of the government system and through 
INGOs (Adhikari, 2016a; Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). Over 80 per cent of Malawians live 
in rural areas (Government of Malawi, 2017, p. xviii) and 71 per cent live on less than $1.9USD a 
day (UNCTAD, 2017, p. 3). The Malawi government has difficulties in balancing its efforts to 
restore fiscal discipline with its aims to effectively respond to Malawi’s food security needs, in 
addition to building and expanding the economy, improving education, health care, environmental 
protection, and becoming financially independent. The country still faces a number of challenges 
including: insufficient energy generation and supply; high transportation costs; inadequate skilled 
human resource; inadequate financial resources; narrow export base; inadequate diversification; 
high illiteracy levels; high population growth; overdependence on rain-fed agriculture and HIV and 
AIDS pandemic (UNDP in Malawi, 2015; The World Bank, 2017).  
 
Malawi is heavily reliant on foreign aid and receives more aid per capita than other low-income 
countries, including those in sub-Sharan Africa (Gabay, 2011; Dionne et al., 2013; Adhikari, 
2016a; Khomba and Trew, 2017). Dionne et al. (2013, p. 13) report that all of Malawi's 28 districts 
are engaged in projects supported by international aid received from 31 different donors, and 
largely focused on health, education, economic management, infrastructure and services, water and 
sanitation, and agriculture. The main bilateral donors to Malawi include the US, UK, Germany, and 
Norway and, more recently, China and India. The primary multilateral donors to Malawi are the 
European Union, the Global Fund, the African Development Bank, and World Bank (Dionne et al., 
2013, p. 15). Although volunteering through faith-based organisations continues to remain active in 
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Malawi, the number of large and small secular international volunteer sending organisations has 
also proliferated in Malawi in line with the expansion of INGOs’ activity in the country. Data 
before and during preparation for this research showed that the range of volunteer sending agencies 
in Malawi varies from large IVCOs from Europe, the United States, Asia and Australia, to small 
independent charities being operated by individuals or small groups from different parts of the 
world.    
 
The relationship between the Malawi government and the international donor community has been 
a turbulent one (Dionne et al., 2013; Baker Tilly, 2014; Gabay, 2014). Some authors observe that 
the emphasis placed by donors on participation of the poor in policy formulation processes and 
demand for accountability from the government, has promoted the growth of a significant number 
of civil society organisations that have subsequently “made a significant contribution to 
representing the voice of the poor in policy decisions” (James and Malunga, 2006, p. iii). On the 
other hand, Gabay (2014, p. 384)  observes that despite the government of Malawi’s use of the 
state’s influence to undermine the interests of its opposition, Malawian leaders receive positive 
public perception by the international community, and are noted more for making policy statements 
(Gabay, 2014).  
 
In December 2000, the IMF  stopped aid disbursements to Malawi due to corruption concerns, and 
many individual donors followed suit, resulting in an almost 80% drop in Malawi's development 
budget (Dionne et al., 2013; Baker Tilly, 2014). Following the reinstatement of funding to the 
Government in 2005, and an impressive period of economic growth until 2009, the donors, yet 
again, froze aid to the country in response to financial mismanagement by the Mutharika 
administration (Baker Tilly, 2014). Subsequent to a period of relative economic stability, a report 
commissioned by DFID in 2013, exposed an incident that came to be known as the "Cashgate", a 
financial scandal involving looting, theft and corruption that happened at the seat of Government of 
Malawi (Baker Tilly, 2014; Kondowe et al., 2014; Anders, 2015; Patel et al., 2015). In October 
2013, the African Development Bank, the IMF, several European countries, and the US indefinitely 
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froze $150 million in direct budgetary support in response to “Cashgate,” citing a lack of trust in 
the government’s financial management system and civil service. Most of the frozen donor funds - 
which accounted for 40% of the budget - have since been channelled through NGOs (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2017).  
 
Recent reports on Malawi show that “corruption levels remain high with Transparency 
International ranking Malawi at 122/180 economies in 2017” (The World Bank, 2018), and that 
“donor funding remains constrained by governance concerns since the 2013 Cashgate scandal” 
(IMF, 2018). The outcomes of the factors related to Malawi Government’s political economy are 
significant in this research because of their impact, not only on the power dynamics and access to 
resources, among the stakeholders but also due to the way they affect trust and values in 
partnership relations. During field research for this thesis, there were continuing reports of further 
and current financial misappropriations (see Box1). The outcomes of the factors related to Malawi 
Government’s political economy are significant in this research because of their impact, not only 
on the power dynamics and access to resources among the stakeholders but also due to the way 













Examples from Malawian newspaper reports on financial irregularities identified during the 8 week period 
between April – June, 2016, as well as other relevant articles reflecting their impact on domestic and 
international relations: 
Daily Times, May 5, 2016: Kw2 billion (£2,170,400 approx.) donated by the United States to fight HIV/Aids 
was stolen at the Ministry of Health. 
Sunday Times, May 8, 2016: Kw100 billion (£108,519,000 approx.) borrowed from an Indian Bank for the 
Green Belt Initiative had disappeared. 
The Business Times, May 11, 2016: Kw293 million (£318,000) stolen by public officers at the Malawi 
Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Sunday Times, May 8, 2016: Teachers Union challenge the Government over issues including payment of 
salary arears, including those who were omitted on the payroll, outstanding salary adjustments for teachers 
who were promoted to higher grades since 2013. 
Malawi News, May 28 – June 3 2016: Joint Press Release by eight international aid agencies (including 
Oxfam, Actionaid, and Save the Children), registering their protest against the Government of Malawi’s 
intention to introduce payment for health services in public health facilities. 
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According to Adhikari (2016a, p. 11), subcontracting of projects and programmes by donor 
agencies is claimed to be in response to weaknesses in the capacity of the Malawian Government to 
deliver effectiveness and efficiency. However, the outsourcing of development programmes has 
created challenges for the government of Malawi that have resulted in “an internal brain drain, aid 
patronage, and competition amongst the agencies involved” (Adhikari, 2016b, p. 4).  
 
Given the discourse on negotiation, trust, and power, the issues related to Malawi Government’s 
relationships with the international donor community and aid agencies are significant in this 
research and were used as the basis for choosing Malawi as the host country.  
4.6 Research methods  
 
A number of different methods were available, which I used for triangulation purposes to examine 
the chosen case studies, including fieldwork, semi-structured interviews (SSIs), observation, and 
document analysis. The methods for recording data included audio-recording of interviews, field 
notes and collection of documents. The flexibility of the case study approach allows for the use of 
all methods within the data-collection process and comparison within and across cases for research 
validity (Dooley, 2002, p. 338). The specific approach to explore the HCOs’ relationships with 
each of the categories of stakeholders is summarised in Table 6 below and is followed by an 
explanation for the choice of each method. 
Category of stakeholder Method/Fieldwork 
Observation SSIs Document 
The international volunteers  
 
X X X 
IVCO head office representative 
 
X X X 
The stakeholders in the institutional landscape of 
development in the host country 
 
X X X 
Table 6: Methods of data collection from each stakeholder category (Source: author) 
Experiments, surveys, histories, analysis of archival records or economic trends are among the 
variety of options available to a researcher (Yin, 2003, p. 2). Each is a different way of collecting 
and analysing empirical evidence, but the most important condition for differentiating among the 
various research strategies is to identify the type of research question being asked (Yin, 2003, p. 7). 
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This research is about human relationships as viewed and interpreted through the perspectives of 
specific interviewees. Since my research was seeking to answer a ‘how’ question, it was possible to 
discount all the methods listed above (experiments, survey questionnaires, histories, and economic 
analysis) – except for archived records or document analysis. Alternative methods such as 
ethnographic charting, oral histories and construction of genealogies were also eliminated due to 
lack of relevance to this thesis.  
 
4.6.1 Fieldwork  
Fieldwork refers to being present in the place or setting where the research takes place and 
undertaking all the activities necessary for data collection (Schwandt, 1997; Silverman, 2013). Face 
to face interactions, when carried out sensitively, can help manage expectations, reduce confusion 
or anxiety among the participants (Laws et al., 2003, p. 94). Consequently, fieldwork was the most 
appropriate strategy for my research, as it involved meeting with key individuals and institutions in 
their everyday situations, building relationships and confidence, and making the process of data 
collection simpler and more comfortable for them.   
 
I considered using focus groups because interaction in focus groups “can produce invaluable data 
on how people think about an issue, their own explanations and understandings” (Laws et al., 2003, 
p. 300). However, after some consideration, I decided against using focus groups as a method 
because I felt that more in-depth and sensitive information could be obtained from interviewees if 
they were approached individually. While researching Malawi and before departure for fieldwork, I 
was introduced to the Scotland Malawi Partnership (SMP), and their sister organisation, Malawi 
Scotland Partnership (MSaP), which proved to be invaluable support for this research. The 
Scotland Malawi Partnership (SMP) is “the national civil society network coordinating, supporting 
and representing the people-to-people links between our two nations. We represent a community 
of 109,000 Scots with active links to Malawi” (SMP, 2019). MaSP is a “Malawian-owned and 
Malawian-led network which exists to support and develop Malawi’s many civil society links with 
Scotland, thereby enhancing the cooperation between Malawi and Scotland Government on the one 
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hand and the North and South on the other” (MaSP, 2019). Through the offices of MaSP in 
Lilongwe, Malawi, I was provided with office space, and administrative support as well as a crucial 
formal introduction to key personnel in the host country offices of IVCOs, and other key IVS 
actors in public and the private sector in Malawi. These introductions which took place within the 
first week of my arrival included contact with relevant personnel in ministries, umbrella 
organisations, NGOs, INGOs and donor agencies associated with IVS and opened the doors for 
many more.  Furthermore, I was invited to attend a series of bi-annual MaSP ‘Strand Meetings’ 
involving coordination of effort among some organisations reporting on new and current projects 
under the key headings of education, health, environment, civil society and sustainable economic 
development.  
 
My fieldwork was extended to Germany when, after visiting the host country offices of GIZ, I 
received an invitation to visit and interview key personnel at GIZ head office in Bonn, Germany. 
This was followed by a further invitation to attend and participate in the IVCO International Forum 
Conference in October 2016, where I was able to meet and interview personnel from other IVCO 
head offices relevant to this study.  However, not all IVCOs were as cooperative, and I experienced 
challenges in accessing staff and information from some IVCOs. Resistance to share information 
was experienced from one IVCO head office and another at HCO level. The potential significance 
of the diversity of responses from IVCOs towards this study was captured as observations (see 
section 4.6.3) in the data collection and analysis, and presented in the analytical Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
where appropriate.  
 
4.6.2 Interviews  
Interviews can provide insight and evidence in favour or against a particular matter, access to 
historical information relevant to the situation and help identify other relevant sources of evidence 
(Yin, 2003, p. 90). Consequently, key informant interviewing was also one of the methods I chose, 
reflecting the rationale regarding the suitability of informant interviews for ‘how’ research 
questions (Thomas, 1998; Dooley, 2002; Yin, 2003). Semi-structured interviews (SSIs) are 
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described as ‘conversation with a purpose’ intended to capture generated data (Webb and Webb, 
1932; Ritchie, 2003; Yin, 2003). SSIs involve talking to people to gain insight into their 
perspectives while relying on the power of language to reveal how individuals construct their 
meanings (Legard et al., 2003). Yin (2003, p. 90) cautions that while the interviewer should adhere 
closely to the line of inquiry, asking the questions should be put forward in a ‘friendly’, ‘non-
threatening’ and open-ended way (Yin, 2003, p. 90).  
 
I tailored my interview guides to three groups: i) IVCO head office and HCO staff, the staff of 
donor agencies, government and partner organisations (Appendix 6), ii) representatives of 
beneficiary groups (Appendix 7) and iii) international volunteers (Appendix 8). On the occasions 
when it became possible to interview a member of IVCO head office staff, I used a separate 
interview guide containing a small number of additional questions. Appendix 6 shows the 
additional questions used for HCOs’ staff.  I differentiated partner organisations’ employees from 
beneficiary groups through their involvement in the delivery and implementation of programmes 
rather than being the recipients of the services. Partner organisations included staff members of 
Malawian ministries, local government, public institutions, and umbrella organisations, as well as 
consultants and employees of INGOs who work with volunteers from the case study IVCOs. For 
the IVCO and partner organisation employee interviews, I used open-ended questions, addressing 
issues of definition, relationships, communications, outcomes or satisfaction. The interviews also 
addressed how the role of international volunteers was understood and interpreted by the 
interviewees, and how these interpretations shaped their expectations of IVS and its outcomes. 
Follow-up questions were inspired by a number of other relevant studies (Fowler, 1997; 
Brinkerhoff, 2002; Burns et al., 2015; Lough and Carter-Black, 2015).  
 
In the approach to the beneficiary interviews, I adapted the guide and the questionnaire for those 
who receive the services of international volunteers. These interviews also focused on perceptions 
and expectations of the role of HCOs and other actors in the specific programme that they were 
involved with, and the nature and quality of interactions between the different stakeholders. In 
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formulating the interview guide for volunteers, I used the same pattern as that for the partner 
interviews but with emphasis on relationships with the HCOs’ staff and other host country 
colleagues that supported or constrained their activities (Appendices 5 -8). All interviews were 
audio-recorded with the formal consent of the participants. Table 7 shows the number of 
interviewees in each stakeholder category and their positions in their respective organisations or 
groups.  
 
Organisation Position Number Total 
IVCO HQ x 5 International programme coordinator 1 5 






Partner organisation - 1 per IVCO Senior officer  





Beneficiary group - 1 per IVCO Senior person 








International volunteers - 2 per IVCO Linked to the project 2 10 
TOTAL 45 
Table 7: The numbers and categories of interviewees (Source: author) 
* Counterparts to volunteers are likely to be either at the organisation or beneficiary group level, but not both.  
 
During the fieldwork, interviewing members of beneficiary groups in three different geographical 
locations presented a challenge as I did not speak the language of the participants. I, therefore, had 
to consider the possibility of engaging interpreters or assistants. An interpreter’s role would be to 
simply but precisely translate my questions, and the participants response to those question, while a 
research assistant might play a more active role by asking their own questions and perhaps leading 
the interview, providing they understand the purpose of the research (Laws et al., 2003, p. 256). 
This distinction is important because often concepts do not translate directly from one language to 
another so knowing how questions are understood in the local language is critical to the success of 
the interview (Laws et al., 2003, p. 256). I, therefore, opted for engaging research assistants rather 
than interpreters. Lewis (2003, p. 65) considers the matching of researcher and participants on key 
socio-demographic criteria as useful to the process of data collection since cultural insight or 
experience can “enhance the researcher’s understanding of participants accounts, of the language 
they use and of nuances and sub-texts.” On the other hand, social or cultural proximity may lead to 
a lack of depth or clarification on issues being pursued by the researcher due to assumptions based 
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on shared experiences, or the participants may consider it unnecessary to give full accounts, relying 
on the interviewer to draw on their own background (Lewis, 2003, p. 66). Furthermore, it is also 
recognised that informants can be susceptible to personal prejudices, poor recollection or 
inaccurate articulation of issues; therefore, it is necessary to corroborate with data from other 
sources.  
 
In balancing the pros and cons of engaging research assistants or interpreters, I had to also reflect 
on the implications of my own presence during the interviews. While appreciating that sometimes 
people are more likely to talk more freely to an outsider, I recognised that being a white, Western 
visitor to Malawi potentially situated me in a position of power imbalance with the interviewees, as 
well as the research assistants. Such a situation might not have encouraged open dialogue and 
participants, including the research assistants, might have felt it necessary to modify their 
behaviour, and responses, in my presence. To achieve optimum consistency, it was therefore 
important that I select and train individuals who could reliably conduct the interviews as closely 
aligned to the intended aims. Through contacts with the Centre for Social Research at the 
University of Malawi, I was introduced to a number of students from each of the three locations, 
whom I interviewed and selected three candidates. I provided each candidate with a copy of the 
Research Terms of Reference (Appendix 11) and blank consent forms (Appendix 5), which I 
explained to them in the context of training for research, allowing for questions and answers during 
and after each session. I then gave them copies of the questionnaire, as an interview guide for SSIs 
that they were responsible for, which we then rehearsed several times, using academic colleagues 
as substitute participants. I ensured that research assistants were compensated for their travel costs 
and a small subsistence allowance, plus a nominal fee for the transcription of any audio recordings. 
The performance of two of the research assistants was exceptional as their interest in the research 
prompted some deeper and valid questions. On balance, I found the results of interviews carried out 
by the research assistants to be satisfactory, especially as the level of sensitivity of the questions 




4.6.3 Observation  
Observation activities focus on the collection of naturally occurring data through the observation of 
events, behaviours, norms and verbal and non-verbal interactions between people being studied as 
well as with relevant ‘visitors’ such as the volunteers and representatives from partner 
organisations (Ritchie, 2003; Schwandt, 1997; Yin, 2003). Systematic observation involves the 
researcher taking part in the daily routine of a social setting and recording observations and 
experiences and is useful when the study requires cross-checking different participants’ account of 
what is happening (Coffey, 2006; Silverman, 2013). Observation may not provide insight into 
people’s motivation for doing things, but it can deliver a record of  “what people do, as distinct 
from what they say they do” (Laws et al., 2003, p. 305). In this research, I used observation as an 
informal method: no interview situation was entered into specifically for observation purposes. 
Direct observations proved helpful as I was able to not only hear about relationships and 
interactions among people who work alongside each other in their everyday work, but to observe 
their behaviours towards each other and those external to their own working environment. My 
observations also included types and quality of non-verbal communication such as posters, 
calendars, noticeboards and their contents, and speed and quality of response to e-mails, telephone 
calls, visitors and appointment. The setting of the offices, and what information they imparted 
about their occupants, as well as the availability and access to resources for the staff to do their 
work were included in observations.  I recorded observations from meetings with specific 
participants in a ‘Contact Summary Form’ (Appendix 9), and noted general observations in a 
personal diary that I kept during the fieldwork. These were archived for reference and used during 
data analysis to critically assess participant responses.   
 
Attending the MaSP Strand Meetings soon after my arrival in Malawi provided me with a much-
valued insight into the context and mechanics of development in Malawi. Both, the Strand 
meetings and the IVCO Forum Conference in Bonn gave me an appreciation of who the key 
players in IVS are on a global scale, and what the relationships and power balances among 
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development agencies might look like. I recorded my observations after each contact and daily and 
they formed a valuable part of my data analysis.  
 
4.6.4 Document review 
My final research method was document analysis; a form of collecting data aimed at investigating 
any historical events and experiences which may be reflected in the current context (Yin, 2003; 
Wharton, 2006). Having conducted a comprehensive literature review, I felt it important to use a 
variety of sources of information to construct a broader understanding of the historical, social, 
political, and economic factors relevant to this research. O’Laughlin (1998, p. 112) notes that it is 
easier to spot assumptions and incomplete arguments from interviewees if something about the 
context, region and specific circumstances of those being interviewed is already known. My 
document review included examining grey material such as policy-orientated reports prepared for 
and by governmental and non-governmental agencies (O’Laughlin, 1998, p. 111) to access 
information about the IVCOs, HCOs and other IVS stakeholders. Reading about the aims and 
strategies of each of the IVCOs under examination, using reports, web-based and hard copy 
material before departure, provided a rich contextual background for my understanding during this 
research. During fieldwork in Malawi, I also relied on national daily newspapers to keep myself 
informed and updated on relevant issues. Where possible, subject to authorisation and accessibility, 
I collected other types of documents in Malawi such as organisational charts for HCOs, minutes of 
meetings, workshops or seminars, placement descriptions for international volunteers, Memoranda 
of Understanding (MOU) between HCOs and partner organisations related to IVS, brochures, 
programme descriptions and regional development programmes from regional or local government 
authorities in Malawi. 
 
It is important to contextualise grey material itself; such documents must be treated in the same 
way as other key informants in an investigative process (O’Laughlin, 1998, p. 118). Political issues 
can shape the language of a report; the background of authors can mould a document’s findings; 
the conclusions may be affected by limitations in a product’s term of reference (O’Laughlin, 1998, 
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p. 121). To address these potential pitfalls, any document that I reviewed as a background context 
for the IVCOs, or other IVS actors in this research, I only used when I could find a link with direct 
relevance to the research. The approach I took during analysis was to report the content and the 
context in which it was written or presented, allowing the information to be interpreted in a 
meaningful way to answer the central research question. 
 
4.6.5 Field notes and data transcription  
The use of research diaries and incorporating data transcription into the data collection process is 
recognised as an important part of ensuring rigour in a qualitative study (Ritchie et al., 2003; Braun 
and Clarke, 2006; Silverman, 2013). Indeed, Braun and Clarke (2006) consider the process of 
transcription a useful way for the researcher to become familiarised with the data. Others argue it 
should be seen as a critical part of the data collection and analysis where meanings are constructed, 
rather than a mechanical creation of the record of a conversation (Lapadat and Lindsay, 1999; Bird, 
2005), while Jupp (2006) emphasises the importance of standardization to maintain consistency in 
the final products. In this research, in almost all cases I transcribed the audio-recordings myself, 
except the few that were carried out in local language by the research assistants and a small number 
that were contracted to a professional transcriber in light of time constraints.  
 
There are a variety of different practices that can be grouped as research diaries. I used daily field 
reports, which, like field notes, are records of observations made in a particular setting. I found 
these two processes useful, as they informed and shaped my fieldwork as it progressed. 
Importantly, it was on the basis of these processes, as well as additional literature review, that I 
decided to incorporate the concept of boundary organisations in the theoretical framework. 
4.7 Data analysis 
 
Data analysis is “a process of taking things apart and putting them together again…[and] linking 
the material from respondents with the original questions” (Laws et al., 2003, p. 381). Data analysis 
is not a linear process but an iterative one, involving unpacking the collected data to examine, 
104 
 
categorise, review, test, and recombine evidence to address the initial proposition of the study (Yin, 
2003). The power of qualitative data is in the concepts and innate meanings which emerge as 
themes in the data sets (Laws et al., 2003, p. 377).  
 
The challenge in multiple-case research is to manage the volume of data in a way that achieves a 
balance between focusing on the research objective and the rich empirical evidence that supports 
the theory (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 29). On the other hand, a cross-case approach to the analysis of 
data not only narrows down the particular situations in which data occur but also helps to identify 
how the different conditions may be related. Thus it increases the potential for generalizability to 
other contexts (Miles et al., 2014). A number of approaches are available for cross-case analysis, of 
which I found a case-orientated approach (Ragin, 1987) most appropriate for this research because 
it involves considering the case as a single unit but looking for similarities, differences, causes and 
effects  within the case, and only then looking at a limited level of comparative study.  
 
Using HCOs as the unit of analysis, I looked for patterns (convergences, divergences, causes and 
effects) in their intra- and inter-organisational relationships, with the three categories of 
stakeholders, within the data. I examined data from each HCO to noted underlying similarities, 
associations and differences in the way they negotiated relationships within and outside their parent 
organisations. The diverse and richly detailed organisational and behavioural profiles were then 
compared with outcomes of the relationships, first within a single unit (HCO), and then compared 
across cases to form more general explanations  (Miles et al., 2014). Thus the initial set of 
analytical elements consisted of cross-sectional labels and categories (Spencer et al., 2003, p. 203) 
applied across the entire data set to facilitate searching and saving portions of data which were 
refined throughout the processes of analysis to reflect emerging pattern or clustering of data. 
During the analysis, attention was also paid to non-cross-sectional data (Spencer et al., 2003, p. 
203) which involves looking out for specific themes which might have needed a different type of 
conceptualisation. This approach allowed me to disaggregate relevant data for detailed scrutiny of 
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particular elements, before reconstructing them into a new shape and order in the context in which 
they occurred (Denzin, 2001).  
 
The methodology I employed for data collection involved the use of stories and perspectives of 
individual participants to attempt at recreating a snapshot of the situation, while also using different 
methods to triangulate and balance the responses. Adopting a case orientated approach (Ragin, 
1987) to cross-case analysis of data, I used MAXQDA12 software to facilitate the capture of 
emerging themes, concepts or categories within the data (Dooley, 2002; Ritchie et al., 2003; 
Spencer et al., 2003; Yin, 2003; Braun and Clarke, 2006). I examined each transcription, document, 
observation and field notes, including my own opinions in accordance with the principles of 
thematic analysis. Thematic analysis involves the researcher looking for, and identifying, patterns 
and trends within the data, check what data fits this pattern; where and why are there exceptions; 
and if there are any gaps where expected information should be, what might be the reasons and 
whether data can be collected to fill the gap (Laws et al., 2003, p. 283). However, it was important 
to take a flexible approach to data analysis in order to avoid overlooking the presence of 
unanticipated themes or patterns of behaviour.   
 
Choice of criteria and themes and concepts in data analysis is reliant on the intuition and personal 
judgment of the researcher rather than on technical systems and procedures (Dooley, 2002; Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). Consequently, the iterative process of data analysis also includes reflective 
practice by the researcher and the constant need to revisit the original data for new clues, check 
assumptions and identify underlying factors as new insights emerge from the analytical processes 
(Spencer et al., 2003, p. 213). The next sub-section describes the process by which I considered 
reflexivity in the analysis of data.  
 
4.7.1 Reflexivity and my position as the researcher 
In considering my own role in this research, I had to confront the pros and cons of my personal and 
professional background. My past knowledge and experiences provided me with diverse 
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perspectives that not only led me to the original idea for this research, but maintained, and further 
developed its focus. My research is solidly founded on my own experience and insights gained as a 
professional in international corporate management, and a development practitioner, working as 
and with volunteers and HCOs’ staff. In addition, my personal history as a migrant has helped me 
develop culturally transferable interpersonal skills. Thus I was able to find similarities, and create 
empathy and understanding, with diverse participants during my fieldwork, and be considered as 
committed to the interests of the project, having the knowledge and legitimacy to lead the research. 
In this way, my experiences resulted in a rich, complex understanding of the varied mix of 
participants that I interacted with and, at the same time, deepened my understanding of my own 
life, and my own experiences to heighten my comprehension of theirs. Consequently, I produced a 
unique critical reflection on the characteristics, contribution and recognition of members of HCO 
staff, their networks of key individuals in partner organisations, beneficiary groups, volunteers, and 
in some cases, senior staff at IVCO head offices.    
 
My identity as a sympathetic outsider, the critical line taken in my research towards ideas of 
development, my prior experience as a volunteer and genuine interest in IVS helped to locate the 
research closer to HCO staff and volunteers who are more focused on IVS and might have felt 
excluded from the research focused on development issues. During the fieldwork in Malawi, I was 
perceived as someone with a background in development, as well as conversant with the goals and 
challenges of organisational administration and management, and therefore, sympathetic to the 
concerns of the interviewees with regards to both the organisational, and the development aspects 
of IVS. Both of these positions were genuine, and my research benefited from the enthusiasm and 
support of all the participants and their diverse perspectives.  
 
To ensure maximum self-critical and reflectivity, I kept a diary and index of academic and grey 
literature which I revisited throughout the research, during fieldwork and data collection and 
analysis. This was to make certain that facts had not been distorted through time and lapses of 
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memory and retained the integrity of the research as well as serving as tools for the triangulation of 
findings.  
 
In presenting results of data analysis against the main themes of the theoretical framework, I have 
used the following formatting tools to bring the written text closer to the spoken words of the 
interviewees: 
 Where an interviewee has intentionally emphasised a word or phrase by a change in the 
tone of speech, this is shown in bold italic typeset. 
 
 IVCO host country offices in Malawi are conversationally referred to by the name of the 
organisation. To protect the anonymity of the respondents and maintain neutrality in 
reporting the findings, references to IVCO host country offices are presented as [HCO]. 
However, the international body of the IVCOs are coded IVCOs1 - 5 to preserve 
anonymity 
Table 8 below shows the coding system used in this research to protect the anonymity of 
participants: 
Code Interviewee 
MW A senior staff member of a Malawian government or public institution. 
HCO A senior staff member of an HCO 
PTNR A colleague who could be a consultant, contractor, or Malawian colleague in a 
partner organisation, working with an international volunteer 
HQ A senior staff member working at IVCO head office 
VOL International Volunteer 
BG Member of a beneficiary group 
CPRT Formally appointed Malawian counter-part working with the volunteer 
Table 8: Coding system for interviewees (Source: author) 
4.8 Challenges, dilemmas and ethical considerations  
 
Several challenges were faced during the process of this research. The most significant was 
balancing my knowledge of management in international organisations and experiences of 
international volunteering with the necessary objectivity required to conduct this study. My initial 
default position was to identify points of weakness and inefficiencies in the IVS processes and 
examine how they could be transformed into meaningful outcomes for the intended beneficiaries of 
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IVS, by capitalising on the strengths and potentials of international volunteering. On the other 
hand, this default position steered my thought processes through the range and volume of literature 
that I reviewed, which eventually led to the formulation of the research question. It is, therefore,  
relevant to acknowledge that my personal and professional experiences enabled me to question the 
absence of reference to the role of HCOs in the literature that addresses the historical background, 
the multi-level and multi-stakeholder dimensions, and the challenges of volunteer management in 
IVS processes.  
 
In spite of IVCOs’ awareness of the challenges of decentralised governance in international 
organisations, I experienced difficulties in gaining access to key personnel and information related 
to the host country offices of some of the IVCOs during data collection for this research. This 
resonated with a similar situation experienced by Porter (2003, p. 132) who found that their 
research focus “at the ‘coal face’ with local NGOs and their field workers disconcerted – possibly 
even alienated – some of the northern NGOs.” It was further reinforced by comments from an 
IVCO 2016 Forum participant who alluded to the presence of numerous internal reports and 
suggested that IVCOs are aware of these tensions but prefer to keep these matters in-house, to 
avoid alarming donors with issues that may be construed as organisational weaknesses.  
 
The interview processes and approach to IVCOs, their HCOs, public sector institutions and partner 
organisations which might have been daunting on arrival in Malawi were quickly overcome with 
support from the National Coordinator and staff of the MaSP who provided contact details for 
many of the senior HCO staff as well as initiating my first contact in some cases. Their facilitation 
ensured that I gained access to high-level personnel in different organisations and enhanced my 
credibility as a professional researcher, which would probably have been more difficult had I 
approached the same people personally. Nevertheless, due to the last-minute cancellation, I was 
unable to interview HCO participants from the Peace Corps, although due to programme overlaps 
with other IVCOs, it was possible to interview the staff of partner organisations, volunteers, 
Malawian counterparts and beneficiaries participating in Peace Corps IVS programmes. There was 
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also the possibility that my research could strike a sensitive chord for the interviewees on a 
personal level, given the seniority of their roles, or they may be concerned that views expressed by 
them might be interpreted differently by audiences outside their own organisation. 
 
Ethical considerations are paramount in the conduct of this research as it involves the collection of 
data from people and organisations. The principles of impartiality and respect are recognised in the 
literature as well as endorsed by the university and national ethical guidelines for conducting 
human research. These principles matched my own moral values, which are shaped by my life 
experience and cultural upbringing. Consequently, in the interest of safeguarding these principles, I 
adopted a range of measures such as consent forms, approval certificates and confidentiality and 
anonymity agreement (Clayton, 2013, p. 511). I prepared a protocol for the research, detailing the 
methods, nature of the information being sought, the number, and types of participants, for each 
type of data collection activity and included an assessment of the types of issues that may arise. 
The protocol was submitted to the OU Ethics Committee for approval, together with forms for 
obtaining consent and obtained approval before travel to Malawi (approval number: 
HREC/2015/2085/Barzegar/1). I also secured authorisation to conduct social research in Malawi 
(Appendix 10) before travel from Professor Chinsinga, Director at the Centre for Social Research, 
Chancellor College, the University of Malawi in Zomba. The necessary steps for ensuring 
anonymity and confidentiality were designed into the research schedule. I prepared a one-page 
Terms of Reference (TOR), document (Appendix 11) as a hand out to give to each participant 
which I could also use as the basis for introduction before each interview. I developed an Informed 
Consent Form (Appendix 5) to explain the intended purpose, form, and content of each interview 
and the rights of each participant, from whom a signed consent form was obtained upon agreement 
to participate. 
 
On the positive side, my observations showed all interviewees were relaxed and comfortable during 
and after the interviews, and many encouraged me to return or join them in other professional or 
social activities that extended the opportunities for making new contacts, as well as further 
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observations and follow up questions. The meeting with GIZ in Bonn and attending the IVCO 
Forum conference also confirmed that the same enthusiasm for participating, and interest in the 




In this chapter, I have provided a detailed discussion of the methodology and methods, as well as 
the steps that I have taken to ensure the validity and reliability of my study. Having outlined the 
epistemological basis, the methodological approach, the methods and the research strategy I have 
used to carry out this research. Through my selection of the participants, I have tried to create a 
balanced picture of the organisations, the people associated with them, and the work that they carry 
out. Thus the research was able to access data from people with strong opinions, as well as others 
who do not hold strong opinions but carry assumptions about IVS policies and practices. I have 
demonstrated how triangulation in the data analysis and presentation has assured a balance of 
responses and a thorough assessment of the themes and research questions. 
 
Some of the challenges and opportunities of researching IVS have been discussed in this chapter, 
including time constraints and challenges in accessing key personnel and information in some 
organisations. Some of the ethical dilemmas highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of 
researching a white European in an African country, as well as using research assistants to help 
overcome language barriers were also presented, centring on the importance of the construction of 
trust and listening skills.  
 
Overall, the methods used and the processes of fieldwork, and data analysis, from conceptualisation 
through to implementation, were critical to the successful completion of the research. In the 







Negotiating the Relationships with the Volunteers through 
the Project Cycle 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on the relationships between HCOs and the volunteers and how these 
relationships impact on the day to day work of the staff of the HCOs as well as the volunteers. 
Although volunteers are not the focus of this thesis, they are key stakeholders of IVS and how 
HCOs relate to them is of crucial importance. Since the focus of this section is to explore the 
factors that shape the relationships between the HCOs and the volunteers in Malawi, it takes a 
bird’s eye view of the HCOs’ relationships with other stakeholders (such as partner organisations 
and beneficiary groups) which are analysed in-depth in Chapter 7.   
 
This chapter argues that the negotiation of the relationships between the HCO staff and the 
volunteers is affected by the diversity of perspectives on volunteering, whether the organisational 
focus of the IVCO is on development or volunteer placement, and the volunteers’ contrasting 
expectations of the professional, personal and administrative support that HCOs can provide. It 
shows that the relationships between the HCOs and the volunteers are informed by institutional and 
characteristic-based types of trust and shaped by unequal power over resources and power to 
influence, all of which contribute to what and how information is exchanged between the HCOs, 
the volunteers and their co-workers in partner organisations. Figure 6 below is reproduced from 
Chapter 1 (figure 1), to illustrate the way this chapter follows the key steps involved in typical 
processes of setting up an IVS placement. In doing so, it examines the types of trust, power 
relations and knowledge sharing that shape the relationships between the HCOs with, and around 
the volunteers. The chapter takes its starting point by examining how HCOs mediate the conflicting 
perceptions, and stakeholder understandings, of volunteering (Chapter 2, section 2.7) at the initial 
stages of IVS. It then turns to focus on the justification and planning of a volunteer placement, 
agreeing the terms and conditions with partner organisations and formulating the job description 
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for the volunteer recruitment process. It then moves on to examine how HCOs negotiate the 
relationships with the volunteers during the placement and concludes with a brief look at the 


















Figure 6: A generalised representation of the typical processes involved in setting up an IVS placement (Source: author) 
 
This chapter shows that the combined effects of experiences and accumulation of realised or 
unrealised expectations build upon existing beliefs and understandings of volunteering among 
individual actors, creating some perspectives of international volunteers that necessitate 
reconciliation. Geographical distance limits opportunities for process-based trust to develop before 
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the start of an IVS placement; hence there is an over-reliance on institutional and characteristic-
based types of trust that impacts on knowledge sharing between HCOs and the volunteers. 
Expectations of IVS are also promoted through IVCO descriptions of the role of the HCOs, with 
the intention of establishing credibility and a sense that they are trustworthy and reliable by 
drawing on institutional and characteristic-based trust in existing and potential IVS stakeholders, 
including volunteers. Consequently, how closely the expectations built on information exchange 
before the placement match the realities on the ground, shape the relationships between the HCOs 
and the volunteers. An HCO’s ability to manage the volunteers’ expectations in a realistic way 
facilitates positive relationships, process-based trust-building and cooperative behaviours, while 
disparities between the volunteers’ expectations and experiences on the ground diminish 
institutional and characteristic-based trust and are likely to lead to conflict in the relationships 
between the HCOs and the volunteers. 
 
HCOs have to mediate the interdependence in their relationships with the volunteers because 
volunteers have sets of complementary powers over different types of resources and powers to 
influence the aims and processes of IVS. Since the literature on international volunteering does not 
offer specific insight into the management of geographically and culturally diverse volunteers 
(Chapter 2, section 2.7), this chapter draws on relevant literature on boundary organisation 
(Chapter 2, section 2.6) to explore the challenges that HCOs face in the management and 
coordination of international volunteers. It also examines the gaps in the discussions by looking at 
how the formal (organisational structures, policies and procedures) and informal (relationships and 
behaviours) organisational drivers for managing volunteers influence the types of trust and power 
relations in the way HCOs work with the international volunteers, and their consequences on the 
relationships of the volunteers with the people that they work with.  
 
Section 5.2 looks at the context of volunteering in Malawi. It shows that the proliferation of how 
international volunteers are described, as well as the growth in the number of qualified and skilled 
Malawian professionals, has affected the way the volunteers, and the people with whom they 
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interact daily, perceive the role of IVS in development. Ambiguities in terminology mean that the 
relationships between the HCOs, the volunteers and their co-workers are founded on institutional 
and characteristic-based types of trust, and assumptions of power over resources and power to 
influence, that build upon existing beliefs and understandings of volunteering among individual 
actors.  
 
Section 5.3 argues that the relationship between the HCOs’ staff and the volunteers is influenced 
by the way the primary organisational focus of the IVCO is declared by head office and enacted by 
the HCO. It looks at how IVCOs’ organisational focus affects the approach HCOs take to assess 
potential IVS placement opportunities, and examines how HCOs negotiate the relationships in the 
project-orientated investigations that lead to the formulation and offer of an IVS placement to an 
international volunteer. Finally, this section looks specifically at the way the job descriptions and 
the terms and conditions of IVS placements are formulated and described, compared to the realities 
of the roles on the ground.  
 
Section 5.4 shows that the relationships between HCOs’ staff and the volunteers during their 
placements are influenced by the ability of the HCOs to provide volunteers with professional 
support and oversee their health and welfare. The section looks at how, as boundary managers, 
HCOs negotiate the relationships that involve power over resources, and power to influence, in 
providing the professional and personal support that the volunteers expect. It then examines how 
power relations affect, and are affected by different types of trust and how knowledge is shared 
between the HCOs and the volunteers. 
 
Section 5.5 turns to look at the part review and placement closure processes play in the 
relationships between the HCOs, and their relevance to volunteer retention as a positive indicator 
of effective volunteer management. It reveals a link between successful volunteer management in 
an IVS context, with HCOs’ having the necessary power over resources and administrative skills to 
deliver their mandate. The absence of the means to adequately oversee and review IVS activities 
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can lead to volunteers complaining, working independently or leaving; all of which have serious 
implications for the HCO and the project in which the volunteers are working.  
 
Section 5.6 summarises the findings and concludes the chapter by reflecting on the roles of trust 
and power in the relationship between the HCO staff and the volunteers. 
5.2 Negotiating the diverse perspectives of international volunteering in 
Malawi  
 
This section shows that contradictory perceptions of volunteering between the HCOs, the 
volunteers and the Malawian stakeholders who are associated with placing international volunteers, 
can sometimes lead to tensions and mistrust between HCOs and volunteers. HCOs are faced with 
having to mediate conflicting perceptions of volunteering with the volunteers as well as the 
Malawian stakeholders. Moreover, some of the staff of the HCO may, themselves be sensitive to 
these contradictory perspectives.  
 
The terminology applied to development volunteering has expanded in the past decades from its 
original association with ‘charity’ and ‘need’, and towards ‘technical assistance’ and ‘professional 
support’, in response to the changing landscape of development assistance (Chapter 2, section 2.3). 
However, volunteering is recognised as an “expression of natural and social solidarity of man….in 
both traditional and modern societies” (Beigbeder, 1991, p. 104) and is how the institutional value 
of volunteering continues to be perceived in Malawi:  
“In Malawi, it is widely known that volunteerism is the foundation and glue that keeps the 
traditional societies together. The local name for volunteerism in Malawi is 
Kudzipereka23…[as an] expression of people’s voluntary engagement in community 
activities.” (UNV, 2016a) 
 
                                                     
23
 Translated as: commitment, dedicate, surrender, dedication, devotion, sincerity, consecration 
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As an example, since HIV/AIDS remains at epidemic levels in Malawi (UNAIDS, 2017), 
Malawian volunteers
24
 are commonly encouraged to take part in HIV/AIDS prevention 
programmes within or close to their own communities, particularly in rural and remote areas (HCO 
3, PTNR 6, CPRT7, 8) and are sometimes ‘rewarded’ by T-shirts and traditional cloth (HCO 3):  
“When we ask [local Malawian volunteers] what motivates you to be a volunteer, some of 
them say when I bring change in my community, everybody recognises me as a valuable 
person; if I go to church and there isn’t any seat they find a seat for me ….You find that 
those people are the real change agents because they are convinced from inside out.” 
(HCO 3) 
 
However, when some of the Malawian volunteers were offered as little as 50 Kw
25
 as a gesture of 
goodwill for travelling outside of their communities, it caused grievance among others who did not 
receive the same (CPRT 8). The reaction to international volunteering is therefore not surprising; 
there are suggestions that the meaning of the term ‘international volunteer’ is increasingly 
undervalued by IVS stakeholders, including the volunteers themselves: 
“For our volunteers, the term ‘volunteerism’ [means] you work, and you get nothing…So 
our [local volunteering] programmes have not been successful, because….after a month 
the [volunteers] will say…“How do we sustain our lives?.... We need food; we need 
accommodation; we need soap.”….. But I don’t know how these [international volunteers] 
are being supported…. to stay here for one year [sic]? Who is supporting them with 
accommodation, food, everything?” (CPRT 8) 
 
“[If a qualified person] is called a volunteer, but [receives] other benefits, like what our 
[international] counterparts are getting as volunteers…[it] could be even [equal to] the 
salary [that some Malawians] are getting.” (CPRT 7) 
 
What the above quotations show is that in a country where 50 Kw can make a difference to whether 
a person can eat or not, the Malawians’ mistrust in the application of volunteer terminology is not 
only directed at individual volunteers but at the organisations or institutions that support the 
                                                     
24
 The Malawian home-country volunteers described here function outside of the IVCO structures and organisations 
25
 Currency exchange rate  at the time of field research: £1 = 921.5 MKw, therefore 50Kw is the equivalent of a fraction of 1p 
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international volunteers. Participants perceive IVS as contradictory to the characteristics of 
volunteering in the sense that is locally applied to Malawians. It suggests that international 
volunteers are perceived as privileged because they receive allowances, equating to salaries that are 
denied to Malawian volunteers.  
 
Many Malawians working alongside volunteers are baffled by conflicting perspectives of 
‘volunteers’ and ‘volunteering’:  
 “What’s the role of [an international] volunteer? The question is, is it just to contribute, 
or to get something out of it? ‘Who benefits most?’ is the question at the end of the day for 
me… is it that they’re getting more out of you than you are getting from them?” (PTNR 3) 
 
“There is lack of information. People don’t know how to….do [IVS] volunteering work in 
Malawi… How someone can be a volunteer [sic]? What is involved? When….in UK, you 
say ‘I’m a volunteer’, what does it entail? What does it mean to be a volunteer in Africa?” 
(PTNR 6) 
 
The above statements demonstrate the confusion that co-workers feel in trying to understand the 
underlying principles of IVS. Despite using the term volunteer, participant (PTNR 6) is making a 
distinction between what is understood as volunteering in Malawi and the type of volunteering - 
IVS - that foreign volunteers do. 
“Volunteers [that] are living in the village; they are volunteers! But there are volunteers 
[who] are like: ‘Hey, let’s go to Africa and improve my CV’.” (PTNR 1) 
 
“[Some of our volunteers] are very highly qualified; some [are] doctors [and] retired 
professors… [who wish to] go and experience; go and ‘give’.” (HQ 5) 
 
The descriptions above illustrate that international volunteers are driven by different motivations 
and expectations of their IVS placement. This makes the basis for forming both professional and 
personal trusting relationships more problematic since it makes the understanding of the 
volunteers’ expectations of their IVS role and the subsequent formulation of a satisfactory response 
to their demands more difficult.  
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“[The word volunteer] is a loaded word. It suggests something which is incorrect; it’s not 
the truth. UN’s definition of volunteering is reflective of the community that you live in 
[and] support, not for financial reasons…..[But in IVS] people come for different 
reasons….so motivations of people joining [IVCO] are very, very complicated.” (HCO 4) 
 
Interviews with volunteers confirmed the diversity of motivation among them, for example, some 
considered the opportunity as an opening into a career in international development (VOL 2, 4, 6, 
9, 12, 16); some were exercising a career break before deciding what to do next (VOL 5, 13, 15, 
18); others - mainly older, or more experienced volunteers - wanted to share their skills and 
knowledge in a useful way (VOL 3, 11, 14), while a few had made IVS a form of ‘career’ spanning 
several years’ service in different countries (VOL1, 7, 8, 10). The diversity of motivations of 
volunteers add to the complexities of formal and informal relationships that HCOs have to 
negotiate, not only in their own relationships with the volunteers but also between volunteers and 
the IVS stakeholders since actors are unable to ‘read’ each other’s motives.  
“[Volunteers come] for different reasons…Those that are too altruistic are not concerned 
about their own welfare… people with strong faith, [who] feel that they’ve been 
‘called’….I’ve seen situations, where people have wanted to develop their particular 
experience in a context that has, may be limited laws and regulations.” (HCO 4) 
 
“Some [volunteers] understand what they should ask or how they have to behave…But 
then there is another group that behaves like secondary school students….[Then you find] 
staff also complaining: “What do the volunteers want?”” (HCO 8) 
 
These complexities point to the challenges that HCOs face in negotiating their relationships with 
the volunteers and concur with Olekalns and Smith’s (2009, p. 347) observation that it is not 
always possible to recognise the goals and intentions of the other actors. Uncertainty has 
implications on forms of trust and power relations in relationships and shapes how actors share 
knowledge and information with each other (Butler, 1999). When one party has considerably more 
information than the other, it becomes difficult to analyse the potentials for optimising 
opportunities and minimising risk within the relationship (Koeszegi, 2004). However, opportunities 
for building trust between HCOs and the volunteers are limited by geographical distance and 
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potentially cultural mismatch which is difficult to assess before the volunteers' arrival in the host 
country. 
“One issue that we see…[is when] we get somebody who may have gone through the 
interview and the screening process excellently, but then they get there, and they are not 
ready, they are not able to perform that role because probably [they had] different 
expectations.” (HQ 5) 
“I’m based [in the office], and I get to hear all the comments [from the HCO staff] in 
Chichewa26, [like]… “This [volunteer] is coming from Uganda; what is he running away 
from?  Why did he want to come here?”….or “these [volunteers] are acting like they want 
salaries.”” (VOL 17) 
 
Assumptions based on cultural norms, past personal experiences and demographic characteristics 
such as age, gender, race and ethnic origin also shape the expectations of both the HCO staff and 
the volunteers of each other. They are increasingly pertinent given the growing trend which has 
extended the historic North-South volunteering practice of IVS also to include engaging national 
volunteers and South-South volunteering
27
.  
“Volunteers come from different countries and backgrounds; what works for [one] doesn’t 
work for the other….because they have different expectations … [So] how I communicate 
to a UK volunteer is different to how I communicate to an African volunteer…which is a 
challenge.” (HCO 6) 
 
 “The other problem currently is that we do have East African volunteers…To them, it’s 
not volunteering; it’s a job….The low paying jobs go to those [volunteers] who aren’t good 
enough…. [Because we don’t pay high allowances] we get low, poor skilled [volunteers] 
and that has an effect on the work.” (HCO 8) 
The two statements above illustrate tensions between HCO staff and volunteers from the global 
South that necessitate specific considerations in IVS policy-making. The challenges are recognised 
in the literature on MNCs (Chapter 2, section 2.5) where discrepancies in parent/subsidiary 
                                                     
26
 Chichewa is the main language of Malawi  
27
 The exception being UNV which has advocated South-South volunteering from inception 
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relations can be linked to physical and cultural distance, and levels and types of trust in 
relationships which are discussed in further detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Perceptions of volunteering can either strengthen or undermine institutional trust in volunteers or 
the aims of IVS, depending on the description of the role and the remuneration package. The 
dilemma is noticeably apparent in the quotations below:  
“[As a volunteer, the way] you are handled…and treated by the partner, and the 
perception around your volunteering is quite different. [But when it is called ‘Development 
Worker’] ….you are a professional; the concept of volunteering doesn’t come out …As a 
volunteer, the partner….first looks at you as a volunteer then looks at your skills.” (VOL 
8) 
 
“We pay our volunteers … [a low amount] a month. But…[other IVCOs] pay [their 
volunteers] a thousand dollars a month…. Now, what does that mean?  It means the 
quality of our volunteers is not good enough… So the best [volunteers] will go for the high 
paying volunteer jobs.”  (HCO 8) 
 
The use of the phrase ‘high paying volunteer jobs’ by participant HCO 8 reinforces the perceived 
blurring of the boundary between volunteering and employment; the participant also implies that 
there is an association between the level of volunteer allowances with volunteers’ skills and 
expertise (‘quality’ in the above statement).  
 
This section has shown that contradictory perceptions of volunteering between the HCOs, the 
volunteers and the Malawian stakeholders who are associated with placing international volunteers, 
can sometimes lead to tensions among the stakeholders. This can generate disappointment and 
mistrust between the HCO staff and the volunteers which the HCOs are not always able to 
reconcile. In delivering their mandate of placing volunteers, HCOs are faced with having to 





5.3 Negotiating, formulating and planning for volunteer placements 
 
This section argues that the relationship between the HCOs’ staff and the volunteers is influenced 
by congruity between the way the primary organisational focus of the IVCO is stated by head 
office and enacted by the HCO. This section links Impey and Overton’s (2014)  terminology of 
supply-driven and demand-driven IVS placements, to whether the approach HCOs take to the 
identification, justification and incorporation of IVS placements in development interventions is 
development-focused or placement-focused.  
 
Differences in the approach to IVS placements shape the way HCOs as boundary managers 
conceptualise their relationships with the volunteers. They influence HCOs’ methodology for 
project-orientated information gathering and whether it includes the participation of stakeholders, 
evaluation of resources, logistics and context of the placement, as well as information sharing 
through formal partnerships agreements and volunteer job descriptions. The symmetry of 
information is a critical element in promoting trust-building and cooperation (Koeszegi, 2004) and 
more equitable power to influence in negotiating relationships (Brinkerhoff, 2002). What and how 
information is being shared between the HCO and the volunteer's shapes their expectations of each 
other (and the partner organisation) during the recruitment process and is crucial in providing the 
basis of the relationships after the arrival of the volunteer and during the placement.  
 
5.3.1 Negotiating the focus for IVS  
While all IVCOs in this study describe themselves as development organisations, the approach of 
some HCOs to IVS placements is focused on the delivering the long term aims of strategic 
development programmes (development-focused), while others approach development intervention 
as a means of finding opportunities for IVS placements (placement-focused). The history of the 
IVCOs studied in this research (Chapter 6, section 6.2) and the description of the work of their 
HCOs show significant differences in the approach that HCOs take to developing IVS placements. 
IVCOs 2 and 4 were set up with the primary aim of providing technical assistance in international 
development as their organisational imperative from the start (Chapter 6, section 6.2.1), but their 
122 
 
function was established, or later incorporated, within international development agencies to whom 
they are accountable (Appendix 1 A-E). Thus IVS is one of a variety of mechanisms available to 
their HCOs for delivering development goals, as illustrated by the quote below from a senior HCO 
staff member of IVCO2:  
“The in-country office decides which structure & instruments to use to deliver the 
objectives… The costs arising for the volunteers’ activities are paid out from the project 
portfolio. Therefore volunteers can only be engaged if their role fits within a commissioned 
project.” (HCO 2) 
 
IVCO2’s promotional literature for Malawi illustrates a comprehensive range of programmes, the 
resources on which the IVCO can draw upon, and its history of working with the Government of 
Malawi and its institutions. They describe IVCO2’s activities in development terms that reflect its 
approach to sustainability and effectiveness in bringing about political, economic and social change 
in Malawi. This suggests not only institutional trust, but process-based trust between the HCO and 
the public and private institutions in Malawi and the IVCO’s potential power to influence 
development strategies in the country, and is illustrated in the statement below from an IVCO2 
volunteer: 
“The strategy [is] run by the Malawian Government… and our programme works very 
closely with the Ministry of Finance [where]…we have three national staff sitting actually 
in the Ministry…and then we have a space at the district [where] me and another 
colleague are working…to support the implementation of the strategy at district level… 
[This is] nice because it gives us the possibility too[sic]. If you have an idea, you can try [it 
and see]” (VOL3) 
 
The origins of IVCOs 1, 3 and 5, however, were rooted in the value-based concepts of ‘giving’, 
‘help’ and ‘charity’ which are associated with volunteering (Ch. 6, section 6.2.2). Irrespective of 
sources of funding, these IVCOs remain operationally independent and continue to depend 
exclusively on facilitating international volunteer placements in development projects. The 
implication is that for these IVCOs, and their HCOs, volunteer placements are a matter of 
organisational survival. Thus, as boundary managers, balancing the imperative to recruit 
international volunteers with delivering development goals becomes a challenge. A significant 
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indicator of the challenges that the staff of these HCOs face in balancing their conflicting priorities 
is linked to the approach they need to take to IVS placements. The examples below, first from a 
senior HCO staff member followed by one from a volunteer, illustrate:  
 
“We are very busy developing proposals so that we increase the number of [volunteers].”  
(HCO 10) 
 
“The office operates like its survival depends on just bringing people in and putting them 
there.” (VOL 12) 
Here, the focus is not on development or volunteers, but on increasing the number of IVS 
placements, for which there is an implied sense of urgency. Developing proposals is the means for 
HCOs (as well as all other NGOs, INGOs and aid agencies) to pursue funding, particularly in 
response to the growing trend for restricted fund disbursement by donors (Chapter 2, section 6.2). 
This can tip the HCOs’ balance of priorities from a development focus to reliance on numbers of 
IVS placements and reflects the dilemma faced by all NGOs in balancing their development 
mandates with the imperatives for organisational survival. The different ways in which the five 
IVCOs and their HCOs mitigate this dilemma is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6.  
 
The example below shows that an HCO’s relationship with volunteers is not only influenced by 
intra-organisational relationships of the HCO with their IVCO head office, but also by inter-
organisational relationships with donors and potentially other stakeholders, the implications of 
which are subject to detailed analysis in Chapter 7. 
“The very nature of accepting a grant and implementing it required changes in basic 
things like information, ways of working….There’s lots for us to work on [sic], to be more 
efficient and effective [and], as a grant management organisation, to be more reflective of 
our organisational values. How does [the organisation] balance working with 
volunteers…. with taking a more business approach to working? The definition there 
suggests that it’s hard-edged and uncaring.” (HCO 4) 
 
Impey and Overton (2014, p. 212) argue that IVCOs are mostly driven by ‘supply-side factors’ 
related to the availability, aspirations and capabilities of the volunteers and the concerns of funding 
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agencies, relying primarily on identifying needs as an opening for providing resources. They 
suggest that a demand-driven approach would recognise the partner’s expertise, strengths and 
opportunities, how they work, what their values are and the expectations that shape their 
relationships with the volunteers (Impey and Overton, 2014, p. 212). Placement-focused IVS roles 
appear supply-driven in the sense that they are created to plug skill gaps in disparate projects, 
loosely based on head offices’ thematic strategies such as poverty reduction, health and education. 
A placement-focused approach is more likely to lead to role conflict and uncertainty of priorities 
for HCOs in their function as boundary managers with mandates to act as agents of development 
while simultaneously facilitating volunteer services as a primary organisational objective. This 
ambiguity can have a negative impact on the potential for building process-based trust and 
cooperation between HCOs’ staff and the volunteers. The example below is from a volunteer 
working with IVCO 3:  
 
“I know quite a number of volunteers who have come here, and they’ve ended up going 
back before their contract ends because of being disappointed… and they don’t know 
what’s wrong with the office…the office most of the time are not taking care of what the 
volunteers are complaining about...I think there is a problem with the organisational 
management at the HCO office.” (VOL9) 
 
Development-focused IVS roles are closer to demand-driven scenarios because they are 
complementary to an inclusive set of mechanisms aimed at delivering the strategic goals of specific 
development programmes identified in collaboration with the host country partner. During visits to 
HCO offices of IVCO2, it was possible to observe direct collaboration between HCO staff and 
volunteers from different rural locations, in person as well as by telephone or e-mail, and is 
illustrated by the statement from a volunteer from IVCO2: 
“It was a good chance to really, really work together. [The HCO] was developing the 
database, so my national colleague [from the HCO] came a lot there to support 
implementation, and I could, like, support using it or solving questions, or problems [at the 




A focus on development goals lessens the pressure on HCOs to justify the case for IVS as the 
principal instrument of intervention and minimises role ambiguity for HCO staff. It emphasises 
knowledge sharing between the HCO and the partner organisation, the agreement of long term 
goals involving targeted recruitment of volunteers with specific skills that build on the partner 
organisation’s existing expertise, strengths and opportunities. In this way, it signals the HCO’s 
tolerance for sharing power and willingness to adapt to the needs of the partner rather than solely 
relying on contractual procedures (Brinkerhoff, 2002). Thus, this approach supports collaborative 
behaviours that help build process-based trust.  
 
The terms ‘development-focused’ and placement-focused’ that I have introduced in this chapter, 
and refer to throughout the rest of the thesis, emerged as concepts during data analysis and through 
observing working practices. I noticed differences between organisations that talked about 
volunteers and others that talked about development where volunteers were one instrument in a 
multi-level, multi-actor approach to development. This was found to be related to the IVCOs’ 
organisational histories, which is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6, Section 6.2. The term 
placement-focus is not intended to understate the development goals, and the sincerity, of IVCOs 
that fall into this category in wishing to achieve these goals, but to demonstrate that their approach 
does not support the delivery of the desired objectives consistently. This can be  illustrated by the 
example below, of a programme described by the volunteer below, was being implemented through 
(placement-focused) IVCO3 and had development-based characteristics, but it was distinguishable 
from other programmes in the HCO by the dominance of one stakeholder’s (the institutional donor) 
ability to influence the management of the intervention, including IVS: 
“The log-frame was done by both the [HCO] and the [institutional donor].… [The donor 
organised] the workshop…where the volunteers, the partners at the District level,…and a 
few community members who were from the [pilot] project [attended]…[They] got ideas 
from us and took it for finalization..” (VOL 9)  
 
This respondent is describing a participatory approach that allows stakeholders power to influence 
decision-making and information sharing. This was demonstrated by observing two separate 
workshops organised jointly by the donor organisation and the HCO to prepare a proposal for an 
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extension request for the project. Over forty members of beneficiary communities attended the first 
workshop and facilitated by the volunteer and two counter-parts at District level to collect 
information for the second workshop held in Lilongwe. In addition to the lead programme manager 
from the donor organisation, the attendees of the second workshop included at least two senior 
officers from three different District Councils, the Assistant National Coordinator from a civil 
society umbrella organisation, and four key members of HCO staff as well as the volunteer. 
Interviews with the HCO staff members involved in this project (HCO 5), the volunteer (VOL 9) 
the volunteer’s counterpart (CPRT 3), representatives of the partner organisation (PTNR 6) and the 
beneficiary group (BG 4, 11, 12, 13, 14) showed satisfaction with the progress of the project.  
“Based on the lessons we get, and the financial benefits they offer, we think in the near 
future, we shall have something to be proud of.” (BG 4) 
 
“The impact is so great. It is commonly said that “chaphunzilidwa si chiiwalidwa” (what 
has been learnt is never forgotten). As such, the lessons, the financial help will always help 
improve our families even to the future.” (BG 11) 
 
It was observed that any concerns with regards to the continuity of, and improvements to the 
project were being addressed through a participatory workshop organised by the donor and the 
HCO programme manager, where multiple stakeholders, including those mentioned above, were in 
attendance, and detailed action plan was produced for extending the timescale of the project. The 
above example demonstrates that consistency between theory and practice of IVS is achievable 
through a focus on strategic development in which volunteers are part of a demand-driven, multi-
level and multi-actor approach to development interventions that has clear objectives, roles, 
responsibilities and accountabilities. However, when IVS roles are placement-focused, the 
approach to development intervention becomes a disorderly and fragmented mix of projects that 
are reliant on the availability of, and access to, opportunities and resources that may not be in the 
power of the HCOs to influence, or have route maps to achieve their strategic aims. A placement –
focus to IVS steers the HCOs towards what I would call ‘the farming of projects’ in an 
opportunistic way in order to meet their head offices’ thematic strategies for placing volunteers. 
Farming projects in this way means that the relationships between the HCOs and their stakeholders 
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are more likely to be situation-dependent, with a higher possibility of goal ambiguity and 
conflicting priorities, which may ultimately undervalue the contribution of IVS to the wider 
project.   
 
5.3.2 Negotiating relationships in investigative groundwork for IVS placements  
HCOs navigate the course of international volunteer engagements in the host country through 
formal and informal relations with multiple stakeholders with diverse interests. This section looks 
at the activities involved in identifying and formulating IVS placements while the relationships 
between the HCOs and the partner organisations are the subject of detailed analysis in Chapter 7.   
 
The impression created on IVCO websites and promotional material is that HCO staff have the 
necessary levels of local knowledge, professional expertise, resources, and networks to identify and 
select development programmes which are aligned to the visions and strategies of the IVCO and 
the host country.  For example: “Our local offices are there to support you throughout your 
placement.” (VSO International, 2017), and “Peace Corps staff will make sure you build the 
technical skills needed—from agriculture to education to community development—to undertake 
project sector activities, report progress, and be productive in your community” (Peace Corps, 
2016c). The statements below from two participants represent typical practice across the HCOs 
studied in this research in a manner that suggests equal and satisfactory participation of the HCO 
and the partner organisation in the formulation of the terms and conditions of the placements:  
“When we put in an international volunteer it is for specific technical skills…. [The design 
and negotiation of volunteer placements are done] at the same time [as] when we are 
developing the project].” (HCO 9) 
 
“We draw the Terms of Reference together [with the HCO], and we are represented in the 
[interview] panel.” (MW 1) 
 
The above statements imply either the foundations or pre-existence of process-based trust and 
equality in power to influence the negotiation of relationships between the HCO and the Malawian 
partner organisation, resulting in agreed terms and conditions of an IVS placement that is presented 
128 
 
to the volunteer. However, examining evidence from volunteer interviews indicates a diversity of 
volunteers’ experiences between the stated terms and conditions and the realities on the ground. 
The examples from the volunteers below, first from a development-focused (IVCO 2) followed by 
a placement-focused (IVCO5) illustrate:   
“[My expectation of the role] was very well [matched]…Everything was all there…..And in 
the District….they actually had an office place and a desk [for me]…. I was very positively 
surprised because I expected it to be a lot more difficult. ….Also, I feel very much attached 
to the team here.” (VOL 3) 
 
“There was no job, no counterpart, and no resources. While I wasn’t expecting a fully 
formed plan and detailed list of activities, I was expecting to have some broad 
goals/objectives; a loose but clear structure with access to support, resources, a how-to 
guidance to working within the local context… [But] there was no background 
information, no clear goals or strategies; no information or process for accessing 
resources.” (VOL 18) 
 
The above examples show how the adequacy of investigative groundwork before volunteers’ 
arrival can make a difference to a positive experience for the volunteers. Most international 
volunteers are largely reliant on the HCOs to provide them with accurate and realistic information 
which they can use to make decisions about undertaking the placement. This implies not only 
asymmetry of knowledge between the HCOs and the volunteers but the expectation that there has 
been adequate groundwork, which steers the volunteers to place institutional trust in the IVCO 
through information on their websites, as well as the characteristic-based trust on HCOs, based on 
their link with IVCO organisation. However, the above examples contradict the portrayal of HCOs 
on some IVCO websites by showing that they do not always have the necessary levels of local 
knowledge, professional expertise, resources, and networks to support their volunteers.   
“[The senior staff member at the HCO] was just never going to acknowledge it. When we 
talked about the [problem with my] visa, he just said: “There’s nothing we can do, we’ve 
applied for it”. And when I tried to talk about the motorbike, he said: “Oh, you just don’t 
worry about the [IVCO] policy….we’ll just change that.” When I tried to talk about the 
fact that the [the places where I was supposed to work] weren’t built, he said: “Oh well, 





Among issues reported by volunteers, were obstructions associated with logistics of the placement, 
for example when a volunteer on a one-year placement arrived in July and found in October that 
she could not start her placement until the following March (VOL 5). Another source of frustration 
was inadequacy of resources to do the job, for instance, a volunteer was placed in a remote, rural 
location an hour’s bicycle ride from the main road, with no electricity and no internet access, yet 
expected to be available at short notice and respond to HCO’s requests or alerts (VOL 18). Others 
complained of miscalculation of the context, for example: 
“The [participants] from the Health Centres [who] come to the District Hospital for the 
teaching session, get 20,000 Kw allowance; if they come three or four times a month, it’s 
80,000… almost a monthly salary…But the [participants from the District Hospital] don’t 
get this same allowance, and they are in the same room… my colleagues told me yesterday 
that “It will not work.”” (VOL 1) 
 
On the other hand, positive volunteer experiences and relationships with HCO staff are seen to 
have a direct connection with the experience on the ground that match the volunteers’ expectations 
and imply the potential for building process-based trust:  
“What I’m doing…really makes sense; I’ve seen a lot of placements where I think, ‘Why is 
this created?’ But I really like my job, and I think I can be very lucky that such a placement 
exists. When I started talking to the district, [I found out that], there had been an appraisal 
mission…for three days – and [my programme manager] had been part of it last year.” 
(VOL 2) 
 
Despite small instances of overlap, there was a discernible difference between staff/volunteer 
relationships of development focused and placement-focused IVCOs. Out of four HCO staff 
members and eight volunteers interviewed from IVCOs 2 and 4, only one case (VOL 1) was 
experiencing unforeseen contextual issues which presented a challenge to the volunteer, but this 
had no impact on the relationship between the volunteer and the staff. The concerns of the 
volunteer were evaluated after discussions with partners, and the decision was made to end the 
placement at the end of the volunteer’s posting (HCO 1, PTNR 1). In contrast, out of five HCO 
staff members and nine volunteers interviewed from IVCOs 3 and 5 (placement-focused), all 
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expressed conflicts and frustration in the relationships between staff and the volunteers, although 
one HCO staff member acknowledged that problems existed but did not provide a personal 
experience of them. An exception was the volunteer attached to IVCO1 (also placement-focused) 
who was content with the placement and had a good relationship with the HCO programme 
manager. However, this volunteer was the only person engaged in IVS in Malawi through IVCO1, 
so it is not possible to generalise this volunteer’s experience.  
 
The challenges for the HCOs, as boundary managers, are linked to prioritising the collection and 
use of different kinds of information required by their diverse stakeholders. For example, they need 
to present details of the social and environmental conditions, and available resources of the IVS 
placement in a manner that appeals to potential volunteers abroad but paints a realistic picture of 
the situations on the ground. On the other hand,  in competing for project funding (Chapter 2, 
sections 2.3 and 2.4), they have to satisfy potential donors that they have the necessary capacity 
and resources to facilitate the development work, without exposing any organisational weaknesses 
– for example, challenges in volunteer recruitment.  Thus the conflicting priorities drive them to 
exercise flexibility in allowing certain accountabilities to dominate over others (Lewis, 2014), 
meaning that HCOs can position themselves as the gatekeepers of information between the 
stakeholders (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013). Therefore HCOs can selectively share information to 
satisfy their donors in order to safeguard their main activities (Ebrahim, 2002, 2005), and 
understate the information shared with volunteers in a way that raises the volunteers’ expectations 
of the role, but does not match reality and might lead to their disappointment and frustration on 
arrival or during the placement.   
  
However, this asymmetry of information can backfire if the HCO does not have the necessary 
power over resources, capacity or clarity of mandate to identify and analyse the factors that 
contribute to the success of placement and balance their priorities accordingly. If the expectations 
of volunteers are not met on arrival at their placement, it leads not only to the erosion of trust and 
potential conflict between HCO staff and the volunteers, but it has consequences for the IVS and 
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the wider development project. One example relates to a large scale, a 3-year project which IVCO 
3 was contracted to implement, but without having the necessary technical knowledge of resources. 
The project was more than one year behind schedule at the time of the fieldwork due to poor 
project planning and coordination by the HCO and also was struggling to deal with serious quality 
control issues related to building constructions. This meant that some volunteers arrived for their 
placements, only to find that they had nothing to do for many months, some of whom became 
impatient and left. Consequently, several elements of the project had to be cancelled due to 
volunteers’ early departures as a result of their frustration with the situation. 
  
5.3.3 Negotiating job descriptions   
As boundary managers, HCOs can be envisioned as straddling the different ‘worlds’ between 
Malawi and the volunteer in his/her home country. The job descriptions and partnership documents 
(MOUs) that set out the terms and conditions of the IVS placement represent boundary objects 
(Chapter 3, section 3.2.4). Study of job descriptions, MOU documents and IVCO website pages 
show significant variation in the content and levels of details about terms and conditions of IVS 
placements that are shared with different stakeholders. The importance of understanding the role 
and responsibilities of the HCOs in their capacity as an organisational unit within IVCO structures 
is discussed in Chapter 6. However, the example below illustrates a typical explanation of their 
involvement in these activities:  
“When we agree on a volunteer placement [with the partner organisation], we draw up a 
job description, and we take it from there with [IVCO head office].” (HCO 9) 
 
Although variations are to be expected, they are revealing in the context of the different 
relationships that HCOs have to negotiate and the approach that each HCO takes in negotiating 
these relationships. For example, Appendices 12 and 13 show standard, but anonymised, 
Cooperation Agreement documents between IVCO2 and a partner organisation, and a job 
description document respectively. These documents show that the information contained is 
consistent in providing a similar depth of information for both parties that include background 
information of the project, as well as an overview of objective, tasks and responsibilities of the key 
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actors and reporting structures during the IVS placement. Participant responses show positive 
volunteer experiences concerning their role as set out in their job descriptions as exemplified in the 
following statement: 
“[The job description] was very well [matched]…Everything was all there…..And in the 
District….they actually had an office place and a desk [for me]…. I was very positively 
surprised because I expected it to be a lot more difficult. ….Also, I feel very much attached 
to the team here.” (VOL 3) 
 
Equally, clarity was found in the responses given by participants from partner organisations: 
  
“[The volunteer] assists the way we organise ourselves in [the programme]. So they have 
expertise from wherever they’ve been working, and their learning is integrated with ours. 
But they make sure that we are at the forefront of running the show, so they just come with 
the backroom support”. (MW 5) 
The examples above suggest a collaborative approach to IVS negotiations that is facilitated by the 
extent and accuracy of knowledge sharing in a manner that strengthens the existing institutional 
trust and the building of process-based trust between the HCO, the partner organisation and the 
volunteers. The example below from a partner organisation illustrates:  
“When [the HCO] came to the district we gave them some statistics…then they present 
to…the District Executive Committee… a meeting which is conducted monthly. We ask 
them questions; they justify their project, then they are allocated….[a] Traditional 
Authority [that]…. in terms of [their] output, we think it will fit with this location.” (MW 
5) 
 
The participants above prioritise their focus on development objectives and show that the HCO and 
the partner organisation negotiate their relationship through dialogue and knowledge sharing 
processes that recognise and respect the expertise of different actors. This empowers the key actors 
to exercise their influence within the relationship, which, in turn, facilitates the building of process-
based trust. Consequently, the added value of the placement is recognised in a meaningful way 




“We worked [for] two months, 13 hours per day and on the weekends [sic]. But it was nice 
because it was a team. It was not me working, but it was at least three other people who 
were also there a lot, including my boss [at the HCO and] my counterpart here. So it 
created a nice [feeling]; made you get to know each other. Also, because you try to reach 
something together and you [succeed]; it was good.” (VOL 3) 
 
In contrast, Appendices 14 and 15 show the equivalent standard documents used by IVCO3 which 
contain different types and extent of information shared and agreed between the HCO and the 
partner organisation, and the HCO and the volunteer. The content and emphasis of the IVCO3 
Partnership Agreement are very different from those in the IVCO2 Cooperation Agreement in the 
previous example. Crucially, the objectives of the programme appear as a brief appendix at the end 
of the Partnership Agreement, and there is a reference to an appended project proposal document. 
The impression created by the document is that the HCO is informing, rather than agreeing with, 
the partner of the imminent start of a project and the arrival of a volunteer to which they are 
required to agree. The language of the document shows an imbalance of power in the relationship 
between the HCO and the partner organisation as the terms and conditions of the agreement appear 
one-sided and do not demonstrate prior dialogue or participation by the partner organisation. The 
consequences surface when the volunteer arrives: 
“We were alerted before we came…that our partners would come to pick us [up and take 
us to the location, but] my partner was not there to pick me [sic]. So, after one week in 
Lilongwe, I was put on public transport, with my suitcase…. And told that some volunteer 
whom I had never met…would meet me in Blantyre ….which is a long distance from here.” 
(VOL 9) 
“According to the contract, the expectation [of the partner organisation] was that… [the 
HCO] would give them the funds…to manage…But it’s us who are managing the funds.  So 
I felt a bit of hostility….they just really didn’t seem to want to work with me…..and I didn’t 
really know what to do with them.” (VOL 12) 
 
Although the issues range from minor or personal, to serious or professional concerns, they 
individually or cumulatively impact on the relationships between HCO staff, the volunteers, and 




In this case, it is difficult for either the partner or the volunteer to develop a full picture of what is 
and is not, included in the terms and conditions of an IVS placement since they are not always 
incorporated in a single document, and it is not clear whether the documents are shared, or who 
they are shared with. For example, Appendix 15 shows that the first paragraph in the Placement 
Outline of the Job Description document sets out the following disclaimer: “[IVCO3] relies on 
information received from external sources and circumstances can change. Placement Outlines 
should be seen merely as a guide. [IVCO3] does not accept any liability in the event that any 
information is inaccurate.”  Moreover, volunteers are also often directed to IVCO websites or 
limited access pages on the IVCOs intranet for certain types of general policy-related information 
which may not be up to date. Page 2 of the Outline Cover also states “these documents are 
somewhat out of date and thus do not reflect the type of work envisaged here”, after advising the 
volunteers to consult certain documents.  Language can be used in job descriptions to give the 
volunteers the impression of power to influence development projects through IVS, often utilising 
institutional and characteristic-based trust founded on the IVCO’s reputation: 
“I could argue that [the job description] is quite accurate in that it was quite vaguely 
written… It did feel a copy-and-paste sort of thing…it has turned out that I have to 
do…work, which I really didn’t want to do; that’s why I left my old job to try and 
avoid.”(VOL 16) 
 
Missing or incorrect information and misleading or ambiguity in the language of formal contracts 
open the potential for misinterpretation and adverse consequences. They can create an impression 
of a role that may not be true or accurate but can influence the volunteer, who has placed 
institutional and characteristic-based trust in the HCO, to accept and commit to a placement. 
Although to a certain extent, this can apply to any job-description, the consequences for volunteers 




“If you’re going to volunteer to come here, you need to have made an informed 
decision…because there’s nothing worse than you feeling in some way that you’ve been 
cheated, or you didn’t know what you were getting yourself in for.” (HCO 4) 
 
“When I was initially preparing for my volunteering…. everything I knew and learnt about 
[the IVCO] it was so ok [sic].  When I came here, I was shocked because they didn’t seem 
to operate within [IVCO] kind of, what is it?  Is it values or what?” (VOL 12) 
 
This section has examined how the organisational focus of IVCOs, the investigative groundwork 
for IVS placements, and the way that job descriptions can be formulated in advance of the 
volunteers’ acceptance of a role, set the expectations on which the relationships are negotiated 
between HCOs and the volunteers. The next section looks at how relationships between HCOs and 
the volunteers are negotiated during the IVS placement. 
 
5.4 Negotiating the relationship with volunteers during their placement 
 
This section argues that the negotiation of relationships between HCOs’ staff and the volunteers 
during their placement is influenced by the ability of the HCO to provide volunteers with 
professional support, oversee their health and welfare, and resolve conflicts that may arise within 
the relationship. The status of the volunteers in the host country presents conflicting priorities for 
HCOs as boundary managers. On the one hand, the volunteers are professed technical experts with 
the power to access resources and networks that are not usually available to the partner 
organisations, and sometimes not even to the staff of the HCOs.  On the other hand, they are 
dependent on the HCO for professional support and personal welfare. The language of 
development used in the descriptions of HCOs on IVCO websites and promotional material 
associates their activities with sustainable development, empowerment of local people and 
organisations, change-making, supporting the poor and marginalised, and value creation. These 
descriptions are augmented by portrayals of the role of the HCOs as fully integrated and aligned 
units within the IVCOs and in possession of skills and resources to actively support the volunteers 
in the use of their existing knowledge and skills while overseeing matters related to their health, 
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security and social welfare during the placement. Thus, as boundary managers, HCOs have to fulfil 
many different roles, not only as development agents, but also the implied roles of facilitator, 
instructor, mentor, and even in loco parentis, all of which require complex and sometimes 
conflicting sets of professional and interpersonal skills. However, the way head offices describe 
HCOs does not always correspond to how the HCOs perceive and experience their role and shows 
the challenges they face in reconciling their different mandates: 
“One of [the challenges of managing volunteers] is managing expectations….in terms of 
what they’re expected to know…to get used to their lifestyle in the context of where they 
are, especially those who are based in the rural communities…because that’s not what they 
expected.  We try to …provide some information… but still, you can imagine someone who 
has never been to Africa… thinking about nice homes.” (HCO 5) 
 
The section draws attention to interdependence in the relationships between the HCOs and the 
volunteers and the significance of HCOs’ ability to manage the implications of power and trust 
within their interdependent relationship with the volunteers. HCO-volunteer relationships create 
challenges between the HCOs and the volunteers because each has power over tangible (for 
example, funds, equipment, transportation) or intangible (such as technical knowledge or cultural 
insight) resources, and power to influence ( for instance through access to local networks or 
international donors) that the other desires or needs. The next two sub-sections analyse how the 
relationships between HCOs and the volunteers are influenced first by the professional and then by 
the personal support that the volunteers expect and what the HCOs can provide.  
 
5.4.1 Negotiating professional support  
The literature on volunteer management and coordination reveals that although volunteers do not 
want to be managed in the same way as employed staff, they expect their work to be organised 
(Paull, 2000, p. 22). Grossman and Furano (1999, p. 217) observe that “No matter how well-
intentioned volunteers are, unless there is an infrastructure in place to support and direct their 
efforts, they will remain at best ineffective or, worse, become disenchanted and withdraw, 
potentially damaging recipients of services in the process”. Consequently, when the management 
and coordination of volunteers conflict with other organisational objectives that HCOs have to 
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deliver, the ability of the HCOs to influence policy change at IVCO organisational level becomes 
critical:  
“If [only] we had changed [as we have been asking head office] and [could] just give [the 
volunteers] something substantial and say: “Here is your money, go buy…cooking 
utensils, mosquito net, and curtains.” … [But the HCO] has to procure all those things, 
and give it to them [as well as] ….provide training and orientation… [when] staff have to 
focus on the donors.” (HCO 8) 
 
The above example points to two separate issues within this HCO: firstly, it demonstrates the 
frustration of staff as their concerns were not being heard by head office; and secondly, a lack of 
role clarity among the staff, both of which are examined in further detail in Chapter 6. However, 
there is also an underlying suggestion that there are some things that volunteers should be able to 
do for themselves. Meijs and Ten Hoorn (2008, p. 48) observe that the level of acceptance of 
administrators of volunteers by the volunteers influences the performance of administrators and 
may lead to administrator behaviours such as “walking on eggshells” or hostile attitudes.    
“Some [volunteers] are not self-starters; they will need to be nurtured and shown how to 
do things.  [But] with the project, you are not here to be learning things… there’s no time 
for learning.  So if you bring in a volunteer and it requires one year to learn [sic], then 
you’re in trouble.” (HCO 5) 
 
“There are issues of volunteer management, looking after them and their expectations … 
The level of what we are expected to deal with can get too much. (HCO 9)   
The statements above suggest that in this HCO, staff either do not have the power over required 
resources or capacity to address the concerns of the volunteers, or they lack role clarity or face 
conflicting priorities which they are unable to influence through organisational channels. One 
volunteer observed: 
“[HCO] staff that are directly supporting us are Malawians…[but] they’re not medical, 
they’re just kind of programming staff. I think that’s the problem: they’re running things 
that they know what should be done: “I can’t give you any recommendations; I know 
nothing about the medical field.”” (VOL 5) 
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In contrast, the senior HCO staff of IVCOs 2 and 4 (development-focused) are experienced 
professionals in their field, for example, the programme manager for health systems strengthening 
at IVCO2 was a highly qualified medic with more than twenty years’ experience in developing 
countries in Asia and Africa (HCO1). Furthermore, the contractual arrangements for heads of 
programmes in IVCO2 are for a minimum of four years (HCO1, 2) which, crucially, allows time 
for developing contextual insights as well as creating and maintaining a network of contacts that 
promote process-based trust and collaborative relationships. Also, since IVS is one of a variety of 
mechanisms available to their HCOs for delivering development goals, it means that volunteers 
have access to specialist personnel and resources in the same programme. 
 
“[The HCO staff] really did good research before placing [a volunteer]. And since their 
structure is having three [Malawian] National Advisors on the national level [in the 
programme], they know what’s going on in Malawi.” (VOL2) 
The data paint a picture of significant numbers of volunteers from the placement-focused IVCO3 (5 
out of 6 participating volunteers) and IVCO5 (3 out of 3 participating volunteers) arriving at their 
placements with expectations of administrative structures, resources, and support networks at their 
place of work only to find their expectations dashed by the absence or inadequacies of the 
prevailing systems. However, scrutiny of the Partnership Agreement document from IVCO3 
(Appendix 14) suggests that there is no expectation by the HCO of providing professional support 
to the volunteer after arrival at his/her placement location.  Sections 3.1.2g-i of the document states 
that:  
“In all matters relating to the work of the project, the volunteer will report directly to [the 
partner organisation]. Only in the event of a breakdown in communications between the 
volunteer and the above should [IVCO3] Programme Office staff have any cause to 
intervene.”  
It is therefore not surprising that five out of six volunteers interviewed from IVCO3, complained of 




“We’ve been having some challenges of communication [with the HCO], because … you 
expect the office to be doing a follow-up or may be making a call, but….the office is quiet. 
Sometimes you feel…the office doesn’t exist… Quite a number of volunteers have… ended 
up going back before their contract ends because of being disappointed.” (VOL 9) 
 
Other examples from IVCOs 3 and 5  included failures of the HCOs to conduct in-country training 
for volunteers (VOL9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17), to hold project assessment and volunteer performance 
reviews (VOL9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18), to deliver an approved and promised grant (VOL 10), to 
facilitate access to networks and other sources of project-related information (VOLs 5, 11, 15, 16, 
17,18), and to respond to volunteer concerns (all participant volunteers from IVCOs 3 and 5), 
which resulted in some volunteers’ early departure. Not only does the departure of volunteers 
signify a breakdown of trust, but it questions the type of volunteer support that is referred to when 
IVCO websites describe the work of their HCOs.  
 
Undertaking an IVS placement represents acceptance of risk (Blomqvist, 1997; Rousseau et al., 
1998; Wu and Laws, 2003) by the volunteers based upon positive expectations of institutional trust 
in the rubrics of IVS, and characteristic-based trust in the IVCO for the accuracy and integrity of 
information. As geographically distant outsiders, volunteers have no option but to rely on a 
combination of institutional trust and a form of characteristic-based trust ‘by proxy’ that reflects the 
HCO’s association with the IVCO, until they arrive in the host country and opportunities arise to 
build process-based trust. This characteristic-based trust ‘by proxy’ implies assumptions by 
volunteers that, as subsidiaries of IVCOs, HCOs are ‘trusted’ to have the required contextual 
knowledge, administrative tools and processes, management skills and organisational capacity to 
deliver the terms and conditions of the job description and IVS placements. When the expectations 
of the volunteers match the realities on the ground, it becomes a source of motivation and 
encouragement that helps build process-trust between the staff and the volunteers, and empowers 
the volunteers to participate and contribute to the wider programme, as the example below from a 




“I would never have imagined that [HCO would]allow all this influence from a[volunteer], 
because me and the other[volunteer] gave [our programme manager] feedback, and she 
was very open and said: “Okay, if that’s the situation at the district; well, then we need to 
change our whole agenda for the planning workshop”…. so she’s really open to get us 
moving.” (VOL 2) 
 
Communication is a primary contributor to trust-building, yet the logistics of IVS means that trust 
between HCOs and volunteers can, initially, only be characteristic and institutionally based since 
process-based trust can only develop through sharing knowledge and experiences. If the 
environmental settings do not support and facilitate effective communication, process-based trust is 
unlikely to develop, and the expectations that formed the foundation of characteristic-based and 
institutional trust may deteriorate.  
5.4.2 Negotiating personal support  
Issues such as personal safety, accommodation, food and nutrition, health and hygiene, 
transportation, utility services, access to professional networks, ability to respond to urgent matters 
arising back home are all included in the remit of HCO responsibility as well as their other 
functions. They are part of the ‘softer’, but no less important factors such as language competency, 
knowledge of local protocol, and even companionship during the placement which HCOs have to 
provide to ensure the security and welfare of foreign volunteers.  
“The work of the Programme Managers has changed but….the management of volunteers 
remained the same….the pastoral support [for volunteers]… and some of the care facilities 
like…baby-sitting, [is] no longer there… So we [have] had volunteers complaining but 
staff also complaining: “What do the volunteers want? Because we have to attend to the 
donors, but the [volunteers] also want to be cared for.” (HCO 8) 
 
The above statement illustrates the vulnerability felt by the volunteers, their dependence on the 
HCO for personal welfare and their inability to influence conditions in their environment. At the 
same time, it highlights the frustration of HCO staff when they are unable to provide the services 
that they would like to, and meet the expectations of the volunteers. The challenges associated with 
managing volunteers create tensions between the volunteers and the HCO staff and influence the 
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behaviour of the different actors depending on the degree of perceived or real risks and 
uncertainties:  
“[The volunteers] did a basket survey but…. [The office staff] weren’t going to share the 
findings… [Eventually] they agreed to share, but only with the volunteers who….were part 
of the survey…. There’s this idea of information silos; the more you hold that no-one else 
knows the more power you seem to have.” (VOL 16) 
 
The comment below from a staff member of the HCO shows how they experienced the above 
scenario: 
“In Malawi, food is really expensive, and the amount [of volunteers’ allowance] doesn’t 
go very far, especially in the far and rural areas. But when we raise this [with head office], 
we are told no, that is what it is, and you have to follow the policy.” (HCO 9) 
 
No such issues were reported in interviews with participants from development-focused IVCOs 2 
and 4. Volunteer allowances and benefits (such as transportation, housing allowance and regular 
communications) made the volunteers independent and empowered to manage their basic needs 
while being assured of support when needed. I was able to observe the speed and efficiency of the 
staff of HCO from IVCO2 in responding to a potential safety incident involving a volunteer’s 
partner in the first few months of their arrival. The situation was resolved quickly and effectively, 
reassuring the volunteer and the partner who both subsequently stayed for the full duration of the 
placement. 
 
HCOs face challenges that are related to ‘managing’ power relations and generating trust in their 
relationship with the volunteers. In the context of home-country volunteering, Hager & Brundy 
(2004, pp. 9–11) note that “managers of volunteers are often less paid than and receive less 
professional training of their field, [and] while practices in volunteer management have been 
promoted, there has been little research into the adoption of these practices in the non-profit 
sector.”  While recognising that the field of volunteer management is relatively new and sparse, 
less considered are the dilemmas that are relevant to IVS as a distinct form of volunteering with 
unique characteristics. This sub-section shows that managing international volunteers requires 
specific resources and skills that are different from home-country volunteering. Chapter 6 examines 
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the diversity of approach to staff training and development among IVCOs and the challenges 
associated with justifying the inclusion of funding for ‘soft administration requirements’ such as 
training, conference attendance, and incidental expenses within donor project proposals and that 
affect the day to day work of both, the HCO staff and the volunteers:  
“The staff here look quite tired; quite not [committed]; quite confused about volunteers. 
They have the attitude they can leave if they want to.” (VOL 17) 
 
5.5 Volunteer retention, evaluation and placement closure 
This section looks at how conflict is negotiated in the relationship between the HCOs and its 
relevance to volunteer retention as a positive indicator of effective volunteer management. Looking 
at HCOs as boundary managers, this section examines how success or failure of the HCOs to 
manage the power relations in their relationships with the volunteers during IVS placements 
impacts on the types of trust and how knowledge is shared between them and the volunteers.  
 
The literature on volunteer management reveals that volunteer retention is a goal for IVCOs, as 
well as an indication of the success of their IVS programmes (Hager and Brudney, 2004, p. 19). 
Managing the volunteers’ expectations, influencing them to remain in spite of the disappointments 
and challenges, or to replace them with minimum harm to the project, is problematic for HCOs.  
Since the previous sections have shown that the majority of volunteers who expressed 
dissatisfaction with HCOs in this research worked with placement-focused IVCOs, it could be 
assumed that the challenges of volunteer retention are more pronounced in IVCOs 1, 3 and 5. The 
following statements are from two senior HCO staff of IVCO3: 
“What we are expected to deal with can get too much. But then [the volunteers] complain 
to the office or to Head office or they just leave and say “I’ve had enough, I’m going.”.” 
(HCO 9) 
 
“[Looking after volunteers] it’s like having ten babies from different mothers but [who] 




On the other hand, the quote below is a representative example of the perspective of nearly all of 
the volunteers from the same IVCO:   
“I’ve heard from the staff [about] internal reviews [that] we’ve got to have it blah blah 
blah.  How do you even know…[who] should [be doing the review?]… I’ve been here for 
nine months; if I’d been reviewed [the HCO staff would know how I] feel about this.” 
(VOL17) 
 
The quote suggests the inability of the HCO staff to recognise or acknowledge the issues of 
concern to volunteers and point to weaknesses in the evaluation processes during the IVS 
placement: 
“The [volunteers] are supposed to [have reviews during their placement] but…I don’t 
know if the programme managers are doing it. [An exit review is] a MUST, but…nobody 
follows up. Even the country director doesn’t see it…. There was a gap in [volunteer] 
satisfaction levels and [head office] suggested that we should…have a [staff response 
monitoring system], but it is not [working]” (HCO6) 
The participant is describing a breakdown of trust and ineffective exchange of information to 
support the relationship between the HCO staff and volunteers that may have implications for IVS 
but remain unresolved. 
 
Volunteers who become frustrated with their placements can complain to the HCO or the head 
office (VOL 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18) leave early (VOL 11, 12, 17) or find alternative means of 
occupying themselves (VOL 10, 15, 18) in ways that significantly affect the aims and processes of 
IVS and the wider development project by creating a gap in the structure of the wider project. The 
examples below illustrate:  
 
“I did a lot of things that weren’t part of the project, but it kept me busy…but after five 
months of doing nothing….I just felt that things would never have worked. That was sad, 
and I do feel that I never completed what I set out to do, and that’s been hard for me.” 
(VOL 11) 
 
“I managed to start up a training [sic] for juveniles…[Then]somebody who had many 
contacts in England….asked me to write a [five year] project proposal and [financed the] 
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first two years. So I’ve been using that money for implementing… [my own] project.” 
(VOL 10) 
 
The quote from VOL 10 shows that volunteers can embark on individual projects, outside of the 
mandate of the HCO while continuing to remain and work in Malawi, supported by the HCO, and 
under the continued assumptions to be volunteering in accordance with the justification for which 
their work permits were granted by the Government of Malawi. This makes them potential loose 
cannons and creates problems related to legitimacy and accountability of the volunteer which was 
expressed by the co-workers of participant VOL 10 above, through deep concerns with regards to 
the continuation of the project after the imminent departure of volunteer (CPRT 1and 6). However, 
the HCO was unable to intervene after the volunteer’s departure as it had no involvement in the 
design and implementation of the project or its future potential. Of the nine volunteer participants 
interviewed from placement-focused IVCO3 and IVCO5, three left before completing their 
placements; four occupied themselves with activities outside the scope of their job descriptions. In 
contrast, of the eight volunteers who participated from development-focused IVCOs 2 and 4, there 
was just one case when, following a formal review of an IVS position, the volunteer was reassigned 
to a different project due to emerging political sensitivities in her original placement (VOL13).  
 
A volunteer’s early departure from a placement to return home also has a serious consequence for 
HCOs as well as the other IVS stakeholders. The implications are not only a gap in resources that 
might delay or stall the project but potential financial losses to the sponsor (who may or may not be 
the IVCO). Costs associated with IVS relate to flights, contracted arrangements with regards to 
volunteers’ stipend, expenses and accommodation, as well as logistical considerations around 
organising travel, insurance, and cargo costs. 
“[In the] project there was enough money for six volunteers….two left within the first six 
months, another two left before the end of the first year, so in fact, only two finished [their 
placement]….and the money came from [institutional donor].” (VOL 11) 
 
The number of returned volunteers is used by some IVCOs as a performance measure for HCOs 
(van Eekelen et al., 2012)  and signifies the importance of careful management of the relationship 
145 
 
between the HCOs and the volunteers. Volunteers’ ability to leave early or access opportunities 
outside of their placement description suggests that either HCOs do not have the power to influence 
the volunteers’ decision, or that they choose not to, despite the potential increased risk of adverse 
consequences. This demonstrates the interdependence of HCOs and volunteers because, while the 
volunteers continue to rely on the resources provided by the HCO (allowance, accommodation, 
health insurance, flights and transportation), the disclosure of a ‘failed’ IVS placement would be 
potentially damaging to the reputation of the HCO and the IVCO. On the other hand, HCOs can 
claim the credit by associating themselves with positive outcomes from a volunteer’s independent 
activity, even though they may have had no involvement in the project: 
“In my Exit-interview, I am going to be asked [if I would repeat this experience] and I will 
probably say yes. But that would be for very different reasons that the [HCO] will submit 
in its report. The [HCO] will report that as a tick in the box, earning them credit for how 
well they managed my placement, but wouldn’t be true.” (VOL 18) 
 
The ability of HCO to be selective in what, how and with whom they share information reinforces 
their role as gatekeepers of information in projects that use IVS. However, weaknesses in the 
ability of the (largely placement-focused) HCOs to adequately manage volunteer retention, and the 
challenges that they face, do not appear to impact on the institutional and process-based trust 
placed on the HCOs by the other IVS stakeholders: 
“Maybe it’s a donor problem... Donors don’t actually ask… what [is happening in] the 




This concurs with the critique of some authors in the development management literature who 
consider that there is not enough emphasis by donor agencies on the significance of indirect 
outcomes and failures within internal management of INGOs, to inform decision-making 
procedures that could support more positive development outcomes (Mawdsley, et al., 2005; 
Choudry and Kapoor, 2013; Gulrajani, 2014). Moreover, when the underlying reasons and 
consequences of the volunteers’ behaviours and actions in IVS, and the project in which it is 
146 
 
incorporated go unquestioned and are tolerated, it resembles a ‘moral hazard’ or risk (Guston, 
1999, p. 93) in the relationships between the HCO and  those stakeholders to whom the HCO is 
accountable (donors, IVCO head office, partner organisations and beneficiaries).  
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows that the negotiation of the relationship between the HCO staff and the 
volunteers is affected by the diversity of perspectives of volunteering, role conflict and uncertainty 
of priorities among HCOs’ staff, and the contrasting expectations of the professional, personal and 
administrative support that HCOs can provide within IVS processes.  
 
This chapter showed that the association of the concept and values of volunteering with ‘charity’ 
and ‘help’ sometimes work against the aims and processes of IVS, sometimes leading to suspicion 
of the motives of the volunteer who undertakes IVS roles. Asymmetry of knowledge about 
contextual factors in Malawi on the one hand, and the volunteer motivations and backgrounds on 
the other, increase perceptions of risk and shapes the behaviours of HCOs staff, the volunteers and 
their co-workers in their relationships with each other. This makes building process-based trust 
difficult when the actors’ expectations are not based on knowledge obtained through prior 
experience of interactions, but on institutional and characteristic-based assumptions.  
 
Irrespective of how they describe themselves and the role of their host country offices, IVCOs 
differ in their organisational focus and whether the focus is on development strategies that can use 
volunteers (demand-driven/development-focused), or placing volunteers in development roles 
(supply-driven/placement-focused). However, there is sometimes a discrepancy between how 
IVCO head offices state their organisational focus and the role of the HCO, and how HCOs 
actually work, particularly when the organisational survival of not only the HCO but ultimately the 
IVCO, depends on the ability to facilitate volunteer placements. This draws attention to an 
important point in the literature on NGO management (Chapter 2, section 2.4) and the dilemma 
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faced by NGOs in balancing their development mandates with the imperatives for organisational 
survival.  
 
Geographical distance before placement prohibits HCO’s staff and volunteers from day to day 
interactions that support the building of process-based trust. Thus both the integrity and extent of 
information exchange is critical in building expectations of institutional and characteristic-based 
trust. The uncertainty of role and conflicting priorities in placement-focused IVCOs and 
programmes affect how HCO staff approach the assessment of potential IVS placement 
opportunities in development projects. This chapter underlines the role of HCOs as boundary 
managers and their ability to act as gatekeepers of information, allowing them to prioritise what 
and how information is shared, and with whom, in the processes of identification, investigation and 
formulation of IVS placements. Asymmetry of knowledge can become problematic if the processes 
of information exchange through web-based descriptions, partnership agreements and job 
description documents are less than adequate to meet the expectations of the volunteers. It can 
potentially diminish institutional and characteristic-based trust between the HCO and the 
volunteers, and make it harder to build process-based trust during the placement from a weakened 
foundation.   
 
Negotiating the necessary balance of power in the relationships with the volunteers, in ways that 
positively contribute to IVS, falls within the mandate of the HCOs as boundary managers. The 
effectiveness of managing the power relations with the volunteers depends on whether HCOs have 
clarity of role and organisational priorities, power over resources and power to influence factors 
within and outside of their organisation. Inability to meet the expectations of volunteers in 
providing the type and extent of support they feel they need, diminishes the potential for building 
process-based trust and reinforces assumptions based on stereotypes that strain the relationships 
between the HCO staff and the volunteers. It reduces the volunteers’ institutional trust in the IVCO 
and their characteristic-based trust in the HCO. Disappointment or frustration with their placements 
can drive volunteers to take actions with possible unintended outcomes that may, or may not, be 
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perceived in a favourable light by the other IVS stakeholders. This has potential consequences for 
HCOs as questions may be raised concerning not only the accountability, transparency and 
sustainability of the volunteers’ work, but also the attribution of any positive or negative outcomes 
of the independent work of the volunteers to the HCO. However, this does not appear to impact on 
the institutional and process-based trust placed on the HCOs by the other IVS stakeholders. Thus it 
resembles a moral hazard (Guston, 1999, p. 93) in the relationships between the HCO and those 
stakeholders to whom the HCO is accountable (donors, IVCO head office, partner organisations 
and beneficiaries). 
 
Next, Chapter 6 will turn to examine the HCOs’ relationships with their head office, followed by 
examining the HCOs’ relationships with their partner organisations and beneficiary groups in the 















HCOs’ Relationships with Head Office 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter looks at the way IVCO formal and informal structures and procedures support or 
constrain relationships between HCOs and their head offices. It argues that discrepancies exist 
between how the role of HCOs is described by the IVCOs, and how it is experienced and enacted 
by the HCOs. These discrepancies are related to the original aim of IVCO organisations when they 
were established, as well as current and historical changes to power relations within IVCO 
organisations in response to external and internal influences. The ability of an IVCO to respond to 
emerging global trends is directed by the types of information that it considers important for it to 
continue functioning and how external information is interpreted into internal policies and 
procedures. The chapter makes a distinction between development-focused and placement-focused 
IVCOs with the former having evolved to be more adaptable to change and a more positive 
relationship between the HCO and their head offices, whereas the latter has struggled to respond to 
changes that have added complexity to historical power relations and diminished institutional trust.  
 
Organisational structures and the language used to convey the policies, as well as opportunities and 
spaces available for knowledge sharing, participation in democratic processes, and the way 
management makes and enacts decisions affecting its own staff influence the day to day operations 
of the HCOs. However, as boundary managers, HCOs also have to negotiate relationships with 
other actors outside the IVCO. Consequently, the incorporation of HCOs into the IVCOs’ overall 
strategy is not always as seamless as it is portrayed. Power over resources, power to influence and 
generation of process-based trust between the head offices and HCOs affects the levels of 
alignment between HCOs and IVCO head office. The extent to which IVCOs’ demonstrate their 
espoused principles and values to their own staff is reflected, not only in fair remuneration 
packages and the quantity of the provision of resources to HCOs, but to transparency and 
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mechanisms for resource allocations within the wider organisation, and IVCOs' commitment to 
staff training and development. 
 
Section 6.2 looks at how an HCO negotiates relationships within the IVCO is shaped by the history 
of the parent organisation, the types of trust and power relations that existed when the IVCO was 
first set up, and how and why they changed over the years. Global trends in fund disbursement, 
donor imperative for professionalism and an evidence-based approach to development, as well as 
improvements in education, health and infrastructure in developing countries necessitated IVCOs 
to reassess their strategies to IVS. While some IVCOs have demonstrated ability and capacity to 
evolve in alignment with emerging trends in international development, to remain or become 
development focused IVCOs, others have found this a challenge or unnecessary. 
 
Section 6.3 sets out how institutional and process-based trust and power relations shape the way 
IVCOs’ formal organisational policies and procedures are enacted at HCO level, and how they 
affect the way relationships are negotiated between HCOs and their head office. It argues that 
unlike the way they are portrayed on IVCO websites, HCOs are not continuous extensions of IVCO 
head offices. Organisational structures and the language used to convey the policies, as well as 
opportunities and spaces available for knowledge sharing, participation in democratic processes, 
and the way management makes and enacts decisions affecting its own staff influence the day to 
day operations of the HCOs. However, HCOs are also entrenched in professional and social 
networks that include other actors inside and outside the IVCO. Consequently, the incorporation of 
HCOs into the IVCOs’ overall strategy is not always as seamless as it is portrayed. This section 
draws parallels between NGO management literature and Multinational Corporation (MNC) 
literature and the literature on boundary organisations. 
 
Section 6.4 uses the expression ‘Walk the Talk’ employed by Brunt and McCourt (2012), to look at 
the extent to which IVCOs’ espoused principles and values are reflected in the relationship between 
head offices and HCOs. This section argues that the perceived value of the resources and support 
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promised or made available to HCOs’ staff by their parent organisation is related not only to the 
quantity of the provisions but to transparency and mechanisms for resource allocations within the 
wider organisation. This section offers empirical evidence that power over resources and 
generation of process-based trust between the head offices and HCOs reflect the leadership style 
and human resource management strategies and practices which are critical in the achievement of 
developmental goals (Edwards and Fowler, 2002; Reiche, 2007). Levels of IVCO commitment to 
staff training and development and fair remuneration packages are contrasted with staff (and 
volunteer) turnovers, pointing to underlying causes of poor morale among HCO staff as they adopt 
informal coping mechanisms to address the resource and administrative constraints that they face.   
Section 6.5 concludes by reflecting on a summary of the discussions in this chapter.  
6.2 A historical perspective on the relationships between HCOs and their 
head offices 
 
Although the IVCOs in this study were established at around the same time, and for similar 
reasons, they have evolved in different ways. Furthermore, irrespective of the high levels of 
government funding (Table 1, page 14) which the IVCOs in this study receive, no evidence was 
found during the fieldwork to suggest political interference at the level of HCOs’ operations that 
might impact the relationship between the IVCO head office and the HCOs.  
This section argues that the original aim of IVCO organisations when they were established, as 
well as external influences, not only affect organisational structures and strategies of IVCOs, but 
the way relationships are negotiated between HCOs and their head offices. It shows that the ability 
of the IVCO to respond to emerging global trends is directed by the types of external and internal 
information that it considers important for it to continue functioning, how the information is used 
and for what purpose.  This section examines the implications of these historical influences on the 
role of the HCO in the institutional landscape of development in Malawi. By distinguishing 
between IVCOs that are development-focused and those that are placement-focused, this section 
looks at the historical significance of the organisational focus of the case study IVCOs in shaping 
their characteristics of the current relationships of HCOs with their parent organisation. 
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6.2.1 Development-focused IVCOs  
The histories of IVCO4 and IVCO2 show that they were established as development-focused 
IVCOs from the start, with the primary aim of providing technical assistance in international 
development as their organisational imperative (HQ 1, 5, 2, 4), rather than the value-based concepts 
of  ‘giving’, ‘help’ and ‘charity’ which are associated with volunteering. The IVCO2 website 
describes its origin as a Development Service Organisation which seconded professionally 
experienced and socially committed specialist [volunteers], in response to requests from the 
organisations in partner countries, to work on the ground and provide support through expert 
advice, financing relatively small programmes and supporting local experts. The resolution that led 
to the establishment of IVCO4 recognises that voluntary service can make a substantial 
contribution to development assistance by providing trained workforce providing such services are 
well-planned and directed, and the volunteers have the technical and personal qualifications 
required for the development of the recipient countries. The emphasis in both IVCOs was on 
providing the services of “mature technical people who are not bureaucrats” (HQ 5) with 
volunteers as one of the “instruments of intervention” and performance indicators that facilitate 
accountability and attribution of impact in technical assistance can be linked to tangible and 
measurable outcomes at the programme design stage (Appendices 12, 13 and HQ 2, 4, HCO 2). 
Thus the HCOs’ basis for IVS was, and continues to be, justified as complementary to an inclusive 
set of mechanisms aimed at delivering the strategic goals of specific development programmes 
identified in collaboration with the host country. A participant from IVCO2 explained, using the 
example of a programme in the Malawian health sector:  
“[In my programme proposal] I follow the indicator[s]…that are in line… with the 
partner[‘s aims]…[and] against which I can place my [volunteer]. I will write Terms of 
Reference very specifically, that the outcome of this person….results in goal achievement 
of this indicator…. Because I have to report what percentage I have achieved…[in order 
to] continue [the] programme or…the placing [of] a volunteer.” (HCO 1) 
 
The formal structures and accountabilities that link IVCO4 and IVCO2 with their institutional 
donors steer them towards being outward- facing organisations (reacting to and adapting to events 
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and opportunities in the outside environment) (Anheier, 2005; Lewis, 2014, pp. 146–7). They also 
add a level of credibility and characteristic-based trust of the IVCOs by other IVS stakeholders that 
further strengthen the institutional trust within and outside the countries of their head offices. 
Within the reporting structure of IVCO4 system, the Programme Officer for the country works 
within the broader mandates of a sister agency, to which it is accountable, to provide “volunteers 
and volunteer solutions to accelerate, to deliver on [sister agency’s] programmes” (HQ 5). The 
history of IVCO2 shows that since inception, it has operated under the umbrella of its government 
ministry for international aid and cooperation, through which its work is commissioned, and to 
whom it remains “absolutely accountable” (HQ3), in line with its government’s policy on 
international development: 
“[The ministry] issues the commissions with specified objectives and performance 
indicators, but the in-country office decides which structure & instruments to use to deliver 
the objectives for example, through local NGOs; or a team led by an international leader; 
or engaging a national expert; or volunteers.” (HCO 2) 
 
IVCO4 and IVCO2’s focus on development relies on organisational perspectives that are sensitised 
to changes in external dynamics at global and national levels, as well as responsive strategic review 
processes that allow these IVCOs to proactively mitigate the impacts of emerging trends in the 
arena of development. The statements below from a head office staff of IVCO2 illustrates: 
 “In the ‘80s [our strategy] already changes [sic] because we saw that the needs of our 
partners are changing….Our partner countries developed themselves;… our partners cried 
for more professionalism and… technical expertise. And we jumped on that.” (HQ 2) 
 
A proactive approach to adapting to change requires systems and processes that not only allow the 
collection and analysis of external and internal information between head office and HCOs but 
organisational structures for the dissemination of information and feedback mechanisms that allow 
both parties to recognise and adapt to emerging trends in development. For example, through the 
IVCO4 Annual Country Scan exercise, each field provides a comprehensive report on the political 
and socio-economic context of the country as well as its related current and forecasted activities 
with other sister agencies and frameworks, which is then cross-referenced by the portfolio manager 
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at head office who offers recommendations for sharing of knowledge and experience with 
neighbouring countries (HQ1). 
 
The amount of information sharing is recognised in the literature on MNCs as a fundamental 
element of negotiating effectiveness and developing a climate of trust in decentralised 
parent/subsidiary relations (Butler, 1999; Lai et al., 2014). However, trust is only meaningful when 
the expectations of both predictability and goodwill are met (Hardy et al., 1998, p. 8). Hardy et al. 
(1998, p. 8) note that “predictability arises from shared meaning; while goodwill arises from the 
participation of all partners in the communication process whereby this shared meaning is created.” 
Therefore, trust can be considered as an open, informative process that connects diverse groups 
(Hardy et al., 1998, p. 8). Consequently, although information sharing in the above IVCOs may 
have had its origins in institutional trust within the IVCO’s organisational structure, it has 
developed into process-based trust over time as both HCO and head office meet each other’s 
expectations. Diallo and Thuillier (2005, p. 241) note that process-based trust grows through direct 
or indirect, personal and professional communication of each actor’s values, knowledge, honesty, 
reliability, loyalty and sense of fairness. Thus process-based trust provides the necessary 
foundation for non-opportunistic behaviour (Hardy et al., 1998), strengthens the alignment between 
HCO and head office and minimises divisions between policy and practice.  
 
One way to examine the consistency of shared meanings of decentralised organisations is to look 
for congruity between the stated strategy from head office and HCO practice on the ground. The 
example below from IVCO2 illustrates matching perspectives in policy and practice of IVS from 
head office, through the HCO and the field level:  
“For us, it’s a strategic thinking… to integrate [volunteers] with different actors working 
towards joint objectives and if you do that in a clever way, then you have added value.” 
(HQ 4) 
 
“In Malawi…..we look at all these [priority] areas and prepare a team who are 




“[The HCO] involved the community-level actors, the extension personnel from the 
ministries – even up to national level….. I was quite impressed by how extensively they 
involved people…trying to change the way that people construe food.” (VOL 7)  
 
The participants above demonstrate the effectiveness of knowledge sharing in achieving congruity 
of shared meanings and consistency of approach among employed staff at head office, HCO and 
volunteers at all levels IVCO2.  
 
6.2.2 IVS Placement-focused IVCOs  
In post-war Britain and the United States, the origins of IVCO1, IVCO3 and IVCO5, were rooted 
in providing voluntary service, rather than technical assistance, through the deployment of 
volunteers to poor countries. Websites for IVCOs 1, 3 and 5, as well as available literature on 
IVCOs 3 and 5, show that emphasis at the time of inception was placed on engaging volunteers, 
largely the post-war youths, to help the less developed nations to meet their needs, as well as 
promoting mutual understanding of both the volunteers and the service recipients, of the world 
outside their countries (Bird, 1998; Grubbs, 2009; Amin, 2014). Bird (1998, pp. 16–7) notes that 
the perspective of voluntary service in IVCO3 was on giving, or being of personal service, 
“because of being needed, and because of something given up…It is the opportunity to help that is 
centre stage, not what is given”.  
 
Bird’s (1998) suggestion on how the conflict between values at inception, and maintaining 
independence in spite of high levels of funding from the UK Government shaped the organisational 
characteristics of one of these IVCOs, can be equally applicable across the three IVCOs 1, 3 and 5. 
The centralised, top-down disbursement of funding by head offices - power over resources - meant 
that the original role of HCOs was to identify plug-in skill gaps in disparate projects, loosely based 
on head offices’ thematic strategies such as poverty reduction, health and education, as long as it 
involved engaging volunteers: 
“IVCO3 had DFID money, and they would present the budget to DFID that we want to 
place 1000 volunteers across the world. Then Malawi would be asked how many do you 
want [from] this one thousand. Malawi will say like, 50...based on the problem we’d 
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developed… [and] the volunteer placements that we’d developed….That is how it was.” 
(HCO 8)   
 
The statement above suggests the presence of institutional trust in the historical relationships that 
underpinned support for IVS through unrestricted funding, not only between IVCO3 and DFID but 
also between HCO and head office. Crucially, the participant’s description shows that funding was 
approved based on creating IVS placements as inputs into development programmes, but not 
necessarily on the contribution of IVS to the long term aims of those development interventions. 
The point was confirmed by another participant from IVCO3: 
 
“IVCO3 has always stopped at the outcome point…and never took that step further.” 
(HCO 4) 
 
The histories of IVCO1 and IVCO3 illustrate an enduring period of institutional trust between them 
and DFID that allowed the continuation of financial support from the DFID, through the 1960s and 
1970s, irrespective of outcomes. This implies a level of acceptance of the integrity and productivity 
of the work of the IVCOs that resembles a moral hazard (Chapter 3, section 3.2.4) representing the 
risk taken by DFID in its relationships with the IVCOs. An outcome of long-term Government 
support in the form of unrestricted funding, with little or no accountability, was that the recipient 
IVCOs never had to proactively market themselves to attract alternative sources of funding (Bird, 
1998, p. 114). Consequently, cultivating long term relationships with other international donors, 
and an appropriate organisational approach to collecting and disseminating external and internal 
information, was not necessarily a priority for IVCOs 1, 3 and 5 and they remained largely inward-
facing (focusing on the organisation’s own objectives, values and worldview as the main source of 
strategy) (Anheier, 2005; Lewis, 2014, pp. 146–7). This led to weaknesses in structures, policies 
and processes that might facilitate a proactive approach to growth and change.  





The change referred to is the global trend to move away from unrestricted funding by governments 
and their agencies. The move away from unrestricted funding severely impacted the long-
established institutional trust in the relationships that IVCOs1 and 3 had enjoyed with DFID (HCO 
10,4, 5, 8, 9), but less so on IVCO5 that has retained the full support of its government in providing 
unrestricted funding (HQ 6). One independent attendee at the IVCO Forum 2016 suggested that, 
for IVCO3, the change signified “a move from DFID giving a large sum of money and telling them 
“Go and do good things with it” to “Justify and show what you’re achieving, or there won’t be any 
money.” The point was confirmed by a participant: 
“The environment changed for IVCO3…. DFID [was asking] “Well, what’s your 
impact?”.…. [But IVCO3] was unable to answer the question of impact…So it really 
struggled, as an organisation…to articulate what IVCO3 achieved; even at an outcome 
level.” (HCO 4)  
 
The participant is describing how DFID’s strategy of reducing financial support in a relatively short 
period (Chapter 2, page 32) reflected the impact of changes in global trends in development 
management, and a breakdown of institutional trust in the IVCO as a result of its failure to respond 
to the requirements for accountability and evidence of technical achievement. This threatened the 
survival of IVCOs1 and 3and pushed them towards finding alternative sources of finance (10, 4, 8, 
9). However, donor imperative for professionalization demanded collection and analysis of factual 
information from the field – where the HCOs work - as a pre-requisite for funding projects, rather 
than a generalised description of activities from IVCO head offices. The impact on the role of 
HCOs was enormous:  
“We shifted…… from being an employment agency to more of a development agency…now 
that the idea of IVCO3 being a development organisation [is] coming in, [staff] need to go 
on to resource mobilisation to support our programmes… and getting more donors coming 
in to fund us.” (HCO 8) 
 
The use of the phrase ‘the idea of IVCO3 being a development organisation’ indicates a notable 
gap between how the role of HCOs is regarded by head office, and how it is perceived and 
experienced by the HCO. It suggests that being a development agency was still ‘an idea’ rather 
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than practice. Also, the word ‘shift’ reflects ambiguity with regards to who has or should have the 
power to instigate the effects of change within the organisation and how it should be done. It 
implies sudden movement rather than gradual transformation by choice or consent through 
participation in the processes that bring about change. While incremental change relies on 
collaborative approaches to data collection, and the construction of knowledge to help plan and 
prepare for meeting impending transition, unexpected change suggests a lack of prior knowledge 
and information, insufficient awareness of, and preparation to meet new challenges, a concern 
shared by several HCO staff members of IVCO3, one of whom observed:  
“[The impact of such a change in a short time on the HCO is that] it creates a new set of 
standards and …the requirement for skills and knowledge that an organisation may not 
have… Targeting new streams of income, classical institutional donors, that changes 
everything: how you work; how you articulate your work; and what is required. And 
whereas volunteering was the fundamental aspect of IVCO3, soon as you go into grant 
management, it becomes an element of what you do; becomes an input; technical input.” 
(HCO 4)  
 
Despite the changes in the balance of restricted and unrestricted funding, a significant number of 
IVCOs, including IVCO3, continue to receive substantial amounts of their funding from their own 
or other governments (Chapter 2, section 2.3). However, these funds may also be restricted to 
certain types of programmes only, for example, the International Citizen Service (ICS)
28
 
programme which is funded by DFID. The vacuum created by shortfalls in unrestricted-funding is 
also being filled by alternative sources of restricted financing through donor-supported projects and 
programmes negotiated locally in the host country through the HCOs (Chapter 2, section 2.3). The 
impact has increased HCOs’ power over resources and changed the characteristics of HCOs of 
IVCOs1 and 3 from being totally reliant on their parent organisations for funding, to a status 
equivalent to an independent NGO in the host country where they have multiple mandates linked to 
sources of finance and are accountable to all. Managing multiple accountabilities is problematic for 
                                                     
28
 International Citizen Service (ICS) provides overseas volunteer placements for 18-25 year olds and Team Leader placements for 23-
35 year olds. ICS is funded by the UK Government (ICS, 2019).  
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HCOs because they have to report in different and complex ways to a variety of different groups 
and interests.  
 
Direct access to donor funding has increased HCOs’ power over resources in IVCOs 1 and 3, 
leading to changes in the distribution of power relations between HCOs and the head offices as 
demonstrated in the contrasting statements below:   
“[An international donor] has said to us that they don’t want the money to go to [IVCO3]. 
They are going to pay us, and we decide what we contribute upwards!” (HCO 9) 
 
“We still report to [IVCO3] and [IVCO3] reports to DFID, but we also have donors that 
we have to account to… One of the major impacts [is that]…. programme managers 
[have] divided attention between volunteers and the donors.” (HCO 8) 
 
The number of different relationships that HCOs are required to negotiate underlines the similarity 
of their role to boundary managers in the literature.  
 
IVCO5, however, continues to receive unrestricted funding from its government for thematic areas 
of development using IVS. Consequently, IVCO5 has had the power to maintain and grow its 
presence worldwide since its inception in the 1960s, without the need to significantly revise its 
organisational governance structures and policies. This implies a high level of institutional trust 
both in its home country and abroad that may also be related to the foreign policy of its 
government: 
“[IVCO5] was a combination of the time that it was created...in our history … If it was just 
a development thing…..then probably your tendency is to not hold on to the model so 
much…. [but IVCO5’s] idea was young people going to serve, so that’s really stuck!” (HQ 
6) 
 
This description of IVCO5 implies a strategic decision taken against changing a formula that 
appears to have a historical significance and serves the IVCO’s purpose at the same time. The 
respondent further clarified that the organisational model has “three equally rated goals: 
development impacts…. cultural exchange, and …bringing the learning home from where [the 
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volunteers] are.” (HQ 6) However, participants reveal that the assumption that the three goals of 
IVCO5 are equally weighted was either never correct, or has changed over time to the detriment of 
the first two goals, or that IVCO5 is out of touch with the changes in what might be considered its 
client-base (VOL 5, 15, 18). One of the participants explained: 
“It took me a year and a half of my placement until I found something to do that I 
personally could feel was worthwhile…. But the Programme Office will report that as a 
tick in the box, earning them credit for how well they managed my placement. But that 
wouldn’t be true.” (VOL 18) 
 
Although the HCO of IVCO5 is less vulnerable to the types of external change that affected IVCOs 
1 and 3, it does not exclude it from other possible influences that might impact on the relationship 
between the HCOs and its head office: 
“[Head office] reach out to the desk-officer to find out something in the field. [But] they 
really don’t like us to go…I think there’s kind of a mentality of ‘shield the field’… [Some 
senior IVCO5 staff] are like the second or third highest-ranking official with 
the…embassy. I don’t really know what that means, but it does suggest power.” (HQ 6) 
 
This implies that the power of some HCOs of IVCO5 lies in sources which are outside the 
mandates of IVS, for example, the foreign policy of IVCO5’s home country, which allow IVCO5 
to continue to enjoy the institutional trust and support of its government without the requirement 
for external accountability or response to donor imperatives for aid-effectiveness. It also helps 
explain why IVCO5 continues to deliver “mixed achievements in its goal to help…African nations 
meet that their need for “trained manpower” (Amin, 2014, p. 321). 
 
This section has shown that the primary aim of IVC organisations at the point of inception, as well 
as external influences, not only affect organisational structures and strategies of IVCOs, but the 
way relationships are negotiated between HCOs and their head offices. IVCOs that originally 
started, and continued to evolve, as development organisations, created and used organisational 
structures for information exchange and feedback mechanisms that allowed both HCOs and head 
offices to recognise and adapt to external and internal trends. There is openness in sharing power 
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over resources and power to influence which and facilitates a climate of trust between the HCO and 
the head office. Information sharing that had its origins in intra-organisational institutional trust has 
subsequently developed into process-based trust over time as both the HCO and head office meet 
each other’s expectations. However, IVCOs that were set up to promote international volunteering 
as their focus were less prepared to respond to pressures from external changes. This was because 
originally, funding support for their work was grounded in institutional trust and value-based 
expectations of volunteering between the funders and the IVCOs, but not necessarily on the 
contribution of IVS to the long term aims of those development interventions. Thus information 
exchange and an outwardly-directed perspective on changes in international trends were not 
priorities for placement-focused IVCOs and did little to encourage the potential for institutional 
trust between the IVCO and their donors, and the HCO and the head office, to develop into 
process-based trust. Consequently, global pressures such as the demands of professionalization, the 
move towards restricted funding and an evidence-based approach to reporting had a sudden and 
severe impact on power relations (over both resources and to influence) between the IVCO and 
their donors and the HCOs; diminishing the levels of institutional trust and leading to a moral 
hazard in the relationships.   
 
The level of IVCOs’ organisational preparedness to meet external and internal challenges exposes 
the HCOs to vulnerabilities in responding to policy enactment. The next section looks at how 
IVCO organisational policies and procedures affect the way relationships are negotiated between 
HCOs and their head offices. 
6.3 HCO-head office relationships in negotiating policies and procedures 
 
This section argues that unlike the way they are portrayed on IVCO websites, HCOs are not 
continuous extensions of IVCO head offices. It uses data from interviews and grey literature to 
examine how the dynamics of power relations, institutional and process-based trust contribute to 
the ‘disconnect’ in the relationships between the case study IVCOs’ head offices and their HCOs, 
and how this disconnect impacts on the processes of IVS.  
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Divisions at the head office/HCO interface were outlined at the IVCO Forum, in October 2016 by a 
presenter who had, coincidentally, visited HCOs of several IVCOs in Malawi earlier that year and 
reported at becoming: "Very saddened by the level of ‘disconnect’ observed between the in-country 
offices and what [was] being discussed at IVCO forum levels."  Table 9 below is an extract of 
Table 1, showing the governance structures of the five IVCOs obtained from their official websites. 
It demonstrates their structural similarity to MNCs (Chapter 2, section 2.5) as a group of 
geographically disparate organisations including a head office and different subsidiaries (Ghoshal 
and Bartlett, 1990, p. 603), where the subsidiaries are “simultaneously embedded in the [MNC’s] 
corporate network and its external local market network” (Li, 2005, p. 78). Table 9 also shows that 
IVCOs operate decentralised (Chapter 2, section 2.5) management structures across international 
boundaries with significant decision-making authority at HCO level and differing levels of support 
provided through regional offices.  









 Executive Coordinator reports to the UNDP Executive 
Board. 
 Eight Portfolio Managers oversee a cluster of countries 
based on a geographical affinity. The Southern African 




offices and reports, 








 Independent agency within the executive branch of the US 
government.  
 The Director appointed by the US President 
 Country Director 
  American senior 
staff and other 







 Registered as a non-profit enterprise (GmbH) in Germany; 
 Main accountability to the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development  
 It has a Management, a Supervisory  and a Private Sector 
Advisory Board  
 Southern Africa is one of 6 sub-units in the Department 
overseeing activities in Africa 
 Country Director.  
 70% of in-
country staff are 
German/ 
 European. 








 International Board and Executive Board 
 The CEO heads a management team. 
 The Executive Director is based in ‘the regional hub for 
programming and recruitment across Southern Africa’ and 
includes Malawi 
Country Director 










 The CEO heads a management team. 
 A regional fund-raising department in South Africa 
 
Country Director 
and national staff 
 
Table 9: An extract from Table 1 showing the formal governance structures of the five case study IVCOs  
(Source: author) 
 
A review of IVCO websites to learn how each IVCO describes the processes of formulating their 
organisational strategies showed specific references to consultations with multi- and bilateral 
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stakeholders, the private sector, civil society and partners from cooperating countries, past annual 
reports and research documents. Organigrams are available online on the GIZ, and the Peace Corps 
websites and a descriptive version are available on the UNV website. Although VSO and 
Progressio websites
29
 present key members of their Trustee and Executive Boards, no further detail 
is provided to show IVCO organisational structures. Reference is made to a “hub for programming 
and recruitment across Southern Africa”, including Malawi, on the VSO website, where VSO’s 
Executive Director is based. Except for GIZ website, which contains frequent references to the 
work of their HCOs’ staff and ongoing staff development initiatives, IVCO official websites’ direct 
references to their HCOs are very limited. When HCOs are mentioned, the impression given is 
often that of an extension of the parent organisation providing support for volunteers in the host 
country (Chapter 5, section 5.3.2). 
 
More recently it has become possible to access some information about individual HCOs of IVCOs 
directly from their websites describing their range of thematic activities as well as a sample of 
projects typically including photographs and stories from volunteers. Lists of staff names and job 
titles of are sometimes present on some HCO websites (Peace Corps, 2016d; VSO Malawi, 2018) 
but it is not always possible to ascertain how current these lists are.  
 
The scarcity of reference to HCOs on IVCO websites is not entirely unexpected in light of the 
purpose of the websites which are likely to have been designed to appeal to target audiences such 
as international donor agencies, potential service recipient countries and people interested in 
volunteering in a foreign country. There may also be other explanations for the general absence of 
references to HCOs. For example, it may be a strategic decision to maintain an emphasis on the 
volunteers and volunteering as an organisational value; to signify the authority of head offices in 
strategic decision-making, or the operational autonomy of the HCOs, or it may just reflect a lack of 
sensitivity in acknowledging the involvement of HCOs. Whatever the underlying reasons may be, 
it conveys a presumption of institutional and characteristic-based trust, rather than recourse to 
                                                     
29
 The closure of Progressio took place in March 27, 2017. The information provided here was obtained from the website while it was 
still active, between January 2016 and March 2017.  
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process-based trust, between head offices and HCOs, that helps maintain IVCO head offices’ 
authority over strategic decision-making but understates the role and contribution of HCOs to IVS 
programmes.  
 
Integrating HCOs into the IVCOs’ overall strategy is not without challenges. Andersson and 
Forsgren (1996, p. 489) argue that a subsidiary’s behaviour is shaped not only by the different 
control mechanisms used by the head office to integrate the subsidiary within the parent 
organisation’s overall strategy but also by the professional and social networks inside and outside 
the organisation. Since the role of HCOs in decentralised IVCO organisations parallels that of 
MNC subsidiaries (Chapter 2, section 2.5) Andersson and Forsgren (1996, p. 489) argument is also 
applicable to HCOs, as illustrated by the example below: 
“The [One] challenge is my government sets all sorts of rules under which I have to 
work…..it means I have to determine my layer of cooperation in the ministry X [in 
Malawi].” (HCO 1) 
This statement from a participant from IVCO2 shows that although its head office, under the 
umbrella of its government, has power over the framework in which the HCO operates; the HCO 
has the power to manoeuvre within that framework, hence suggesting the presence of both 
institutional and process-based trust between HCO and head office. However, a statement from a 
participant from the HCO in IVCO3 implies a different relationship between the HCO and head 
office: 
“Our approach to delivering[IVCO3’s] objectives has become more opportunistic….we 
kind of put the [IVCO3’s organisational] strategy to the side a little bit and focused on 
areas that we were doing well in… to bring in restricted income.” (HCO 4) 
 
The contrasting statements among HCO participants underline the different organisational focus on 
development (IVCOs 2 and 4) versus placement (IVCOs 1, 3 and 5) outlined in the previous 
section. Unlike the previous participant from IVCO2 whose statement revealed the HCO’s power 
to manoeuvre within the framework of its mandate from head office, the above statement suggests 
that increase in power over resources (‘bringing in restricted income’) stimulated the HCO to 
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detach itself from working within IVCO3’s strategic framework. Moreover, it is not clear from the 
statement whether approval was required or sought through formal channels, to circumvent the 
official strategy. There is also an implied notion that ‘the areas where [the HCO] was doing well’ 
either did not fit within the organisational strategy or the HCO was unable to influence the strategy. 
This shows that the HCO has power over resources but lacks power to influence the integration of 
its organisational aims into the wider intra-organisational policies and strategies of the IVCO. Thus 
by partially, or entirely withholding information about its activities from head office, it can 
continue to do what it can ‘do well’. 
  
By definition, trust-building entails a process through which expectations are agreed and then 
repetitively realised over time, but it does not exclude other types of trust being present at the same 
time: 
 “[What holds me back are] the organisational policies which are sometimes rigid; [the 
head office] says: “We are working on that…” But the policies haven’t changed. [Then] if 
anything goes wrong, they will forget about the email communications, the Skype 
discussions, [and] say, “Let’s see what the policies are saying.” (HCO 10)  
 
“There’s [a]channel [for raising HCO concerns higher up the IVCO organisation] 
….because now we’re supposed to report to the regional office….but [staff] just don’t 
bother…. [because we] don’t know the people [at the regional office].” (HCO 6) 
 
The statements demonstrate IVCO head offices’ reliance on institutional trust in maintaining their 
authority over organisational policies and procedures. They concur with the literature on MNCs 
(Chapter 2, section 2.5) that while formal internal procedures governing accountabilities, effective 
communications and accuracy of information exchange are important, informal factors that 
contribute to trust-building such as reciprocal interactions and cultivating personal relations, can 
also influence behaviours in ways that procedures and contracts alone, cannot (Hardy et al., 1998; 
Robinson, et al., 2000; Mawdsley, et al., 2005). 
The absence of power to influence organisational processes, or when their concerns are not being 
addressed, frustrates HCOs’ staff and can lead to the erosion of institutional trust while restricting 
the construction of process-based trust, ultimately, leading to loss of trust completely:  
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“The [policies regarding the] management of volunteers [have] remained the same…but 
then the work of the Programme Managers has changed….that caused quite a number of 
confrontations between staff and volunteers, and staff and management, and staff and 
[head office] which, some of those conflicts led to staff deciding to leave; that this is a very 
difficult place to work.” (HCO 8) 
 
Hardy, et al. (1998, p. 10) caution that when organisations are constructed in ways that do not 
allow members ‘to test the truth, legitimacy, sincerity, or clarity of claims made on them’ by the 
structures of power, the results are likely to be lack of flexibility rather than shared learning, 
domination rather than authority, and manipulation rather than cooperation. This implies that the 
relationship between HCOs and IVCO head offices is linked to the spaces and opportunities for the 
former to not only participate in internal strategy and policy decision-making processes but to 
benefit from follow up actions and positive change as a result of their inputs. The divide between 
head office and HCO staff is more noticeable in IVCOs where spaces and opportunities within the 
organisation for interaction and participation of HCOs’ staff are limited. The following two 
quotations from IVCO3 represent contradictions between policy and practice where the 
understanding of the HCO staff that they have total autonomy for programmatic decisions, as long 
as they reflect IVCO3’s values and principles, is constrained by the organisation’s administrative 
procedures:  
“The direction is in terms of [a] process that reflects IVCO3’s values, principles, and the 
behaviour that we want to see, but ultimately decisions on what you want to work in, come 
from that process that’s undertaken locally.” (HCO 4)  
 
“The challenges [of working with head office] are the bureaucracy. There are so many 
layers. To get even a small thing, you have to go from this person to that person, all the 
way up.” (HCO 9) 
 
In this case, when asked if HCO’s staff have a voice in the organisation, the response from the 
same participant was:   
“No, we don’t. There’s nothing like that. There are policy communication meetings where 
we attend, and we are told what is changing and why. We just listen, and we can ask 




The absence of power to influence intra-organisational processes reflects rigidity in organisational 
systems that can lead to role uncertainty and conflict of priorities among the staff of HCOs. 
Unresolved role uncertainty and the ongoing conflict in priorities diminish institutional trust 
between HCOs and their head office and limit opportunities to generate or build upon process-
based trust and result in the frustration of staff who feel unable to do their work. The data paint a 
picture of the HCOs of IVCO1 and IVCO3 being caught between loyalty to head office, and 
organisational survival through increasing opportunities to access restricted income - increased 
power over resources - from international donors: 
“IVCO3 were saying: “We are a volunteer agency. So your priority should be the 
volunteers”. But at the same time there are projects that have to be managed; deadlines 
have to be met, [staff] have to manage the partners……. see what the community is doing; 
monitoring and evaluation, analysing the context of the village, and all those things that 
made quite a lot of work for the staff. [But] IVCO3 did not adjust the way the volunteers 
should be managed.” (HCO 8) 
 
It must be noted that the absence of opportunities for HCOs to contribute to organisational 
processes is not exclusive to individual IVCOs or even to particular levels within IVCOs internal 
structures. Indeed, they exist in all organisations and can continue to extend as organisations 
expand internationally (Fincham and Rhodes, 1994). Challenges are discernible in the relationships 
between HCOs and head offices of all of the five IVCOs through the defensive attitudes and 
behaviours of HCO staff, although they may be less visible, or more skilfully mitigated by some 
IVCOs than others. Participant descriptions of HCO attitudes included “a mentality of ‘shield the 
field’” (HQ6),” always a bit afraid [when the volunteers] openly talk about…the difficult sides of 
the programmes” (HQ 4), and “huge resistance [to] transparency [of information]” (VOL 16).  
 
Increased perception of risk reduces process-based trust in relationships and increases fears among 
actors that information shared might be used to disadvantage the owner of the information when 
relationships are being negotiated (Koeszegi, 2004; Olekalns and Smith, 2009). Perceived risk of 
failure, lack of clarity of roles, responsibilities, and the complexities of managing diverse personnel 
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can replace institutional or process-based trust with defensive strategies to minimise risk and 
maintain control of the situation. Staff of placement-focused HCOs were found to use a range of 
risk prevention tactics affecting information disclosure through noncompliance with agreed actions 
or with IVCO policy requirements, for examples, failure or refusal to conduct volunteer 
performance reviews (HCO 6, 8), inaccurate use, or omission of data in reports (HCO 6, 8, VOL 
16); use of assumptions instead of factual information (HCO 6, 10, VOL 5, 18); incorrect 
attribution of costs or benefits, and misrepresentation of financial data (HCO 6,10, 12). Two 
examples are provided below: 
“Nobody has responded [to the report from head-office]….There hasn’t been any 
reference to say,”….What are we doing about it?” Maybe, in the year, management will 
look into it.” (HCO 6) 
 
“The [HCO] staff didn’t seem to understand the issue…and in response to my complaints I 
was told to think creatively and work with the counterpart and the community to identify a 
project.”(VOL 18) 
 
Notably, the participants above demonstrate their awareness, yet acceptance of the weaknesses of 
organisational structures and processes that are designed to capture and respond to information 
exchange. Participants statements reveal that expectations of any follow-up action or changes 
resulting from the scrutiny of the content of the reports are low or perceived as non-existent in 
IVCOs1, 3 and 5 (HCO 6, 8, 9,10, VOL 5, 9,10,11, 12, 15,17, 18). This resonates with insights 
from the literature on boundary organisations (Chapter 2, section 2.6) in respect of the purpose of 
policies or procedures that apply to the production of information that is neither scrutinised for the 
integrity of the content nor subject to internal accountabilities. Thus, it resembles a ‘moral hazard’ 
(Guston, 1999, p. 93) in the relationships between the HCO and its head office to which the HCO is 
accountable. Pockets of information become tied to individuals or groups within the organisation as 
a means of power over knowledge. This attitude towards knowledge sharing was found to varying 




“There’s this idea of information silos [at the HCO]; the more you hold that no-one else 
knows, the more power you seem to have.” (VOL 16) 
Asymmetry of information reinforces role uncertainty, leads to suspicion and mistrust (Nierenberg, 
1987; Blomqvist, 1997; Butler, 1999) and has both operational and motivational consequences for 
the HCOs.  Staff find themselves struggling in roles that are ill-defined or for which they are not 
qualified, yet they feel unable to refuse for fear of risking their credibility or even their livelihood: 
“Sometimes you look, and you see they [the staff] also seem to be struggling; they don’t 
understand what their roles are.  So it’s been….. a struggle because you are working under 
someone who is not clear with their job description, leave alone yours.” (VOL 12) 
 
There are indications of lack of role clarity among HCO staff in IVCO3 and IVCO5 that illustrate 
the disconnect between head office and HCO and the failure of head office to recognise, 
acknowledge and address the new and changing demands on HCO functions:  
  
“[HCO] staff that are directly supporting us are Malawians, not [technically qualified] 
though…..they’re running things, and they don’t know what should be done: “I can’t give 
you any recommendations; I know nothing about the….field.”” (VOL 5) 
The literature on power in Chapter 3 (section 3.4) showed that in the presence of a dominant 
power, weak actors might either consent through lack of choice or because they feel it is in their 
interest; they may resist by engaging in opportunistic behaviour, or they may withdraw and leave. 
This was reflected in staff retention levels in IVCO3 where, in one programme sector alone, there 
had been three different heads of the programme in less than two years, and a further seven 
programme managers and three volunteers resigned their roles and left between January and 
August 2016.  
 
It is inevitable, therefore, that consequences of operational weaknesses at HCOs can emerge at the 
project implementation level, in ways that affect project aims from their original purpose, leading 
to delays and frustrations of partners and beneficiaries during programme delivery. The statement 
below is from a partner in a programme where three members of programme staff were new, one of 
whom, and three volunteers, left in less than a year.  
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“[The HCO], told us that the contractor will just construct this one for at least a month, 
but it took more than…. three months….[Then the bricks were not strong. [But]…To whom 
are you going to report?... We are supposed to start in September [2015] but….. the 
[equipment arrived] three weeks ago [16th April 2016]. We were told, the project must be 
three years, but we have spent one year already….without doing nothing [sic]…how are 
you going to implement the project?” (PTNR 5) 
 
The annual report (2015-16) for this IVCO, showed no impediments to programme delivery, and 
declared statistics that would have been astonishing achievements, even with unusually stable 
staffing, extraordinary project coordination efficiency, and rigidly controlled administrative 
processes. These findings corroborate van Eekelen’s (2012) report on the prevalence of heroic 
assumptions, incorrect attributions, and inflated statistics in some IVCO reports, and reaffirms that 
they continue to be used in practice.  
 
This highlights several issues of concern for this research. First, the omission of facts and 
erroneous reporting or attribution of data in official documents suggest that either the report 
submitted by the HCO was incorrect, or that it was not scrutinised by head office or both. All three 
possibilities reflect weaknesses in policies and procedures that undervalue the integrity of the 
information being shared and reciprocal feedback and constrain process-based trust-building 
between the HCO and head office. The second issue of concern is that problems that were reported 
in 2012 continued to exist in 2016.  HCOs may have incentives to withhold information that might 
expose their internal practices, or that may reveal issues that might suggest a level of failure 
(Lewis, 2014) since admitting failure may be perceived as potentially harmful to their status within 
the organisation and diminish institutional or characteristic-based trust with head office. This also 
reinforces critique of professionalization in the literature on development management (Chapter 2, 
section 2.3) where it is argued that the emphasis by aid agencies on reporting measurable data 
rather than on the evaluation of indirect or negative outcomes means that decision-making 
procedures are unable to support more positive or sustainable development outcomes (Mawdsley et 




The above data do not go uncontested. A participant from IVCO1 described how recently increased 
involvement through formal reporting procedures and follow up discussions to agree on actions, 
frequent visits from, and regular conversations with the regional line manager, had enhanced HCO 
staff’s ability to “feed into the strategy for the region” and “constant skype chats with colleagues 
in [head office]”. One successful outcome was a change in recruitment policy from head office, 
instigated by the participant, to include advertising volunteer vacancies in national newspapers in 
Malawi. The participant’s experience illustrates that process-based trust is more likely to develop 
when in-house formal and informal relationships encourage contributions from staff and 
volunteers. Furthermore, conformance to policies and procedures of both IVCO2 and IVCO4 are 
channelled through negotiated structures and agreements with an external overseeing authority – 
the institutional donor. A participant from IVCO2 explains:    
“Our main organisational objectives are negotiated with the Government ministry…and 
we have one main aim in all the system: that we have to provide technical assistance in the 
area of international development.” (HQ 2)  
 
The negotiation process, therefore, is embedded in the long-term relationships between the ministry 
that has the power over the negotiation agenda and the disbursement of funds, and IVCO2 that is 
expected to have resources and capacity to deliver the agreed objectives through its HCOs working 
alongside public and private sector partners and target beneficiaries in the host country: 
“[The Ministry] issues the commissions with specified objectives and performance 
indicators, but the in-country office decides which structure and [personnel] instruments to 
use to deliver the objectives, for example, through local NGOs; or a team led by an 
international leader engaging a national expert and volunteers.” (HCO 2)  
 
The continuity of the relationship allows the opportunity for process-based trust to develop at 
different levels of organisational structure and support knowledge sharing and collaborative 
behaviours among the staff of both HCO and head office, as exemplified by the participant below:  
“I enjoy being part of the [HCO] team….The position I am [is] purely technical, and when 
I see a risk, I should be able to read [the situation] and forward it to the right desk…..I like 




The consistency of approach between policy and practice of IVS illustrates the strength of both 
institutional and process-based trust between HCO and head office. For instance, the strategic aim 
of IVCO2 was described by senior personnel at the head office as “A multi-level and multi-actor 
approach” (HQ 4). At host country level, not only were the same terms used by the Country 
Director and programme management staff, but there is a recognition that “a single input would not 
work….[so at] project evaluation we… prepare a team who are professionals and who are in 
favour of the Malawi partner” (HCO 1). The consistency of implementation of the strategy was 
visible and active in practice with a team of HCO staff, including specialist Malawian advisors and 
volunteers, assigned to placements at different institutional levels such as in Malawian ministries, 
local government and community levels, according to their expertise and the objectives of the roles. 
The programmes’ designs include a comprehensive communication strategy consisting of regular 
and frequent reviews involving the entire team as well as stakeholder representatives. Interviews 
with HCO staff, senior Malawian officials and District officers, as well as volunteers, confirmed 
the multi-level and multi-actor team approach in diverse programmes such as Social Protection and 
Maternal Health. There were few, if any, signs of staff or volunteer dissatisfaction, and the overall 
impression was one of prevalent and growing process-based trust, as one volunteer described:  
“I feel very much attached to the team here. So it’s not like you are outside[r]. I feel here, 
most of the people are very content with their jobs.” (VOL 3) 
 
This view was reinforced by interviews with other volunteers, their counterparts and beneficiaries, 
and observations at project implementation level, that showed similar appreciation of the received 
support and opportunities for open dialogue among the multiple actors and stakeholders of IVCO2 
(PTNR 1, 2, CPRT 5, VOL 4, 2, 3, 14).  
 
This section has shown how internal organisational factors influence the processes of knowledge 
transfer, types of trust, and power relations in the way relationships are negotiated between HCOs 
and IVCO head offices, and how the impact on the HCOs day to day work. Internal processes that 
encourage contributions from staff and volunteers generate opportunities for building process-
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based trust at all levels of organisational structure, support knowledge sharing and promote 
collaborative behaviours among the staff of both HCO and head office. In contrast, maintaining 
central authority over organisational processes diminishes institutional trust between HCOs and 
their head office. The absence of power to influence intra-organisational processes steers HCOs 
staff to adopt strategies that minimise risk, with subsequent harm to the aims, processes and 
outcomes of IVS and the delivery of the development project.   
 
Although the formal structures, policies and procedures are instruments of maintaining control over 
organisational objectives, IVCOs are also recognised in the literature on NGO management as 
value-based organisations (Chapter 2, section 2.4) and are expected to be consistent in their 
approach towards their own staff, as they are towards their target beneficiaries. Section 6.3 
examines how the way IVCO organisational values and principles are enacted internally towards 
their staff affects the way relationship is negotiated between the HCOs and their head office.   
6.4 Walking the Talk 
 
How a development organisation behaves internally towards its staff should be consistent with its 
declared approach towards its external target beneficiaries; otherwise, inconsistencies can lead to 
tensions within the organisation (Kaplan, 2002). This section argues that the perceived value of the 
resources and support promised or made available to HCO staff by head office is related not only to 
the power of the head office over the resource allocations but also relies on the transparency and 
mechanisms for these allocations within the wider organisation. It starts by looking at general 
perspectives across all IVCOs and their HCOs, before differentiating practices between 
development-focused and placement focused IVCOs and the implications of these practices on the 
relationship between HCOs and their head offices.  
 
IVCO commitment to staff training and development and fair remunerations packages are seen by 
HCO staff as empowering and indicative of shared organisational values while the absence of 
parity in benefit packages and staff development activities are considered disempowering. In 
general, cultural differences are less pronounced between national and foreign employees, most of 
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whom have established careers in international development. Unsurprisingly then, remuneration 
packages play a crucial role in staff motivation and the way they perceive the commitment and 
loyalty of the parent organisation to them as individuals and as an organisational unit (HCO 5, 6, 
10, 8). There is a strong indication that not only low levels of remuneration impact on the 
livelihoods of HCO staff but reflect how they perceive the value of their relationship with the head 
office:  
“[IVCO3] could maximise staff and get the best of them, if they also [were] seen to care 
and give people a good package….Staff are unhappy…. We have had lots of staff leave; 
people are staying because they’ve got nowhere to go. People like me...” (HCO 6) 
 
The above statement supports Woolthuis et al.’s (2005, pp. 832–3) argument that although it is 
possible for trust and contractual agreement to be complementary and mutually enforceable, “a 
contract is not always effective in reaching good outcomes…. nor guarantee relationship success.”  
The quotation below is an example of the level of frustration among national staff, but also 
indicates their feelings of helplessness in being able to bring about positive change: 
“The [head] office…usually tell us: “We get this much [funding], but we also have so 
many people who get their salaries from the same pot, so this is how much we can afford to 
give you as Malawi”; basically…. the money that really trickles down to the developing 
countries… they reduce by 40 or 50 per cent.” (HCO 10) 
 
The above quotation reveals, firstly, that the staff feel they are not receiving the correct level of 
salary for the work that they do, but there is also the suggestion that lack of transparency in 
financial accounting is creating the impression that they are being ‘cheated’ out of a reasonable 
salary.  It suggests that the IVCO head office uses organisational policies and processes in a 
manner that undermines trust-generation and weaken the organisational commitment of HCO staff 
(Brinkerhoff, 2002).  
IVCOs’ increasing reliance on restricted incomes from donor-initiated programmes or projects, 
implies that staff and volunteers’ remuneration packages are components of project budget 
proposals. This is widely reported among participants from all IVCOs in this research (HQ 2, 4; 
HCO 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10), and one example is provided below:  
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“[All staff are funded by] the programme funds. Only the Country Director is [funded] 
from overheads. It’s one programme package from [programme] manager to [the 
volunteer].” (HQ 2) 
 
This does not, however, explain the underlying reasons for the vastly different remuneration 
packages received by staff and volunteers of development-focused HCOs and placement-focused 
HCOs, particularly as they often collaborate with several of the same INGOs or international aid 
agencies
30
. Staff satisfaction was seen to be related to salaries as the only dissatisfied participants 
were the HCO staff of placement-focused IVCOs 1 and 3
31
. While parity of remuneration packages 
between national and international staff is a symptom of customary practice in the wider 
development sector (Fowler, 1997) and not specific to IVCOs (HCO 10, 5), staff salary and benefit 
packages are matters of internal human resource policy and procedures for each IVCO 
organisation, consequently they directly affect the day to day functions of HCOs. 
 
Considerations of fairness in remuneration packages call for reflection on the points made in 
Chapter 4 (section 4.5), describing the contextual background of Malawi as one of the poorest 
countries in the world. There is a growing demand for educated and qualified nationals as 
illustrated by an HCO’s vacancy advertisement in Appendix 3. Qualified national professionals, 
some of whom have been educated in countries in Europe and America, are still relatively limited 
in numbers and prefer to work in international organisations where there are favourable terms of 
employment, more job security, and access to the opportunities that international organisations 
offer:  
“There are plenty of jobs out there, and people have to decide whether it’s worth 
it:….Which place should I go to, should I go to the one that pays [a]£100 or I go to one 
that pays £700?” (HCO 8) 
Leaving the organisation is an option that may not be available to all employees as it may represent 
uncertainties such as a risk of job security, problems of logistics such as distance from the base, or 
                                                     
30
It was not possible to discover the precise remuneration packages for staff of different IVCOs and estimation could only be based on 
observation of and indicators for staff retention and satisfaction based on attitudes and information gained from the interviews.   
31
 It was not possible to obtain data from the HCO staff of IVCO5.  
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inadequate qualifications. Grievance emerges in different ways among dissatisfied staff who may 
consent to the power of head office over resources (remuneration) while resisting through what 
Scott (1985, p. xvi) refers to as the “everyday forms of resistance” of the weak over the strong 
(Chapter 3, section 3.4): 
“Because [the staff] are frustrated….instead of putting in 99%; they’re just putting 
50%.….[or] they’re taking it out on the wrong people like the volunteers….[or] they’re 
finding their own ways of making money…. there have been a lot of staff stealing funds…. 
just because they’re not rewarded for what they do.” (HCO 6) 
 
Despite increased opportunities for qualified national professionals to work in IVCOs and HCOs, 
they experience disparity between their remuneration packages and those of their foreign 
colleagues. Several interviewees from placement-focused HCOs expressed that HCO staff’s 
dissatisfaction is not only related to being considered undervalued and underpaid but the blatant 
disparity between terms and conditions and benefit packages enjoyed by international staff that add 
further cause for disappointment (HCO 10,5, 6, 8). One example illustrates:   
“The remuneration [for internationals] is double that for [nationals]. [Also], they… get 
their salaries [in] Pounds [sterling], and the locals are getting Kwachas
32
 ... [so] 
internationals are cushioned against the effects of local inflation
33
 , but the Malawian 
[staff] are not.” (HCO 10) 
 
The above quotes reflect Caprar’s (2011, p. 608) observation of obstacles in ‘noticing’ the HCO 
staff, which allow “hardship benefits to expatriate employees but not to local employees…[and 
credit] expatriates with cultural challenges, but consider it less necessary to worry about host 
country nationals.”  The examples also suggest that in these instances, while the placement-focused 
HCOs have autonomy concerning programmatic decisions, head office retains the power to 
overrule decisions that relate to organisational policies and procedures, without providing an 
opportunity for negotiation. This reinforces historical notions of Western dominance and 
                                                     
32
 Kwacha is a unit of Malawian currency. Average equivalence £1 = 921.5 MKW at the time of fieldwork 
33 Depreciation of currency is a matter of significant fluctuation as it dependent on the production of the harvest of 
tobacco, Malawi’s most important exportable product. During 8 weeks of fieldwork the Kwacha fluctuated against the £ 
by 200MKW due to drought conditions impacting on the tobacco harvest  
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superiority by conveying more value and trust based on the Western characteristics of international 
staff while suppressing the power of national staff to influence organisational policies towards 
more equitable outcomes. It represents a contradiction of the espoused principles of IVCOs and 
hence, affects the personal and professional commitment, and loyalty, of the HCO’s staff to the 
parent organisation, potentially leading to a weakening of institutional trust of HCOs in their head 
office.   
“[Head office] are saying ‘our premise is that locals are equal’ and then [colleagues are] 
getting more [money]as ex-pats, you see?... Malawians are not represented… Malawians 
are supposed to be put in their place….and get nothing.” (HCO 10) 
 
The disparity of remunerations between national and international staff is not unusual in INGOs 
and other development agencies, however, the sensitivity of the issues is  more pronounced in 
IVCOs because the packages and benefits received by volunteers can sometimes exceed those of 
the employed staff of placement-focused HCOs.  
 
 “[The HCO staff] are not looking at it like you really volunteered, left your other job and 
come here to support [sic]… They look at you like you just come to look for jobs in their 
country… [and] we are benefitting from their land.” (VOL 12) 
 
The above statement shows that volunteers can be perceived by HCO employees as having more 
power to access resources, as well as more (apparent) power to influence head office - through 
complaint procedures - than the HCO staff who are required to coordinate their work and welfare 
(Chapter 5, sections 5.4 and 5.5). It makes HCO staff question their own value and work, within the 
wider organisation and, again, reinforces unequal power relations and mistrust of head office to 
‘walk the talk’ of their espoused principles in their relationship with their HCOs’ staff.  
“There has been real resentment [towards head office]….[resulting in]some bad attitudes 
among staff…. [Several volunteers had to leave because] they felt that they hadn’t been 




Access to adequate and fit for purpose resources such as office space and equipment, and budgetary 
allocations for transportation, fuel allowance and expenses for carrying out additional activities 
allows HCOs to be more effective in the wider aspects of their roles. However, there is a disparity 
between IVCOs in their ability to justify and defend the necessary resources for similar 
programmes. For example, while some can justify full use of a car for volunteers working in rural 
areas (VOL 1, 2, 3, 5), the range of support by other IVCOs include a motorbike (VOL 11, 12), a 
bicycle (VOL 18), cost of fuel only (VOL 9), or insistence on use of public transport (VOL 9). This 
implies that although donors are open to considerations of justifiable remuneration and resource 
packages for IVS placements in development projects, there are differences between HCOs of 
development-focused and placement-focused IVCOs in their power to influence donors to reach a 
favourable outcome (see Appendix 2). The inability of some placement-focused HCOs to negotiate 
favourable remuneration packages and resources to carry out their work is either an indication of 
capacity shortfalls at the HCO or reflects an IVCO policy, both of which constrain the day to day 
functioning of the HCO.  The impact on HCO staff behaviour is observed in compliance to policy 
and procedures, staff retention, effective communication and employee attitude towards their work 
and colleagues of IVCOs 1, 3 and 5 (HCO 8, 6, 10). One example is given below:  
“Local staff, are not happy so….if they want a raise [in wages], and the management 
seems not to be addressing it, they tend to take it out on…the volunteers.” (HCO 6) 
 
These attitudes lead to delays and obstructions during project implementation (VOL 9, 10, 11), 
conflict with volunteers (VOL 17, 18,11, 12) and in some cases volunteer departures (VOL 12, 11, 
16). The consequences can be severe, not only for the HCO and the volunteers but also for the 
continuity and consistency in the contribution of IVS to the processes and outcomes of 
development projects: 
“I asked for a small grant and [the HCO] accommodated to that [sic]…but they didn’t pay 
the money!.... This office is not functioning … I said: if I don’t hear anything before the end 
of September, I’m going to stop.… I didn’t hear anything and… I said: ‘OK now, this is 




Crucially, several HCO staff of placement-focused IVCOs 1 and 3 (HCO 6, 8, 9, 10) acknowledged 
a history of complaints to head office by volunteers, who had been disappointed or frustrated by the 
lack of support from HCO. However, as shown in the previous section, no discernible action or 
change had resulted in head office’s response to the complaints (HCO 6, 8, 5, 11). One of the 
volunteers who had complained to head office explained:  
“All these volunteers are going out to Malawi, many of them are leaving, and nobody [at 
the head office] seems to even care about the reasons or doing anything about it… [I asked 
at the head office]: “There are so many volunteers that leave Malawi early, why don’t you 
deal with it?.... You need to acknowledge how many volunteers leave Malawi early.”” 
(VOL 11) 
 
As shown in Chapter 3, trust develops out of a process where shared values, knowledge, integrity, 
reliability, and fairness provide the backdrop for collaborative behaviour. The statement below 
suggests that although institutional trust can provide the basis for alignment between head office 
and HCOs, maintaining institutional trust relies on processes that allow trust to be strengthened by 
meeting the expectations of HCO staff in respect of their work and career prospects:  
“There’s always room for better work for [IVCO3] if [IVCO3] are willing to invest in staff 
because the staff that [IVCO3] has, they are qualified staff - professionals.” (HCO 6) 
 
Resource allocation at the host country office level is more than simply remuneration packages. 
While financial rewards are significant incentives, the association of voluntary work with the 
institutional values of IVCOs is likely to impact on the expectation of its staff. They are likely to be 
motivated by respect and appreciation of their efforts and the merits of their professional and 
personal contributions to the organisation (Fowler, 1997; Li, 2005). These less tangible indicators 
of employee performance are important but neglected because they are difficult to measure (Lister, 
1999; Mawdsley et al., 2005). However, their importance is confirmed in the examples of HCO 
staff of development-focused IVCOs for whom remuneration did not appear to be a problem, and 
there were no significant or observable indicators of dissatisfaction in the HCO staff turnovers, 
180 
 
attitudes, or responsiveness. The quote below from a senior staff member from IVCO2 shows 
recognition of the need for a strategic approach towards staff development: 
“Leaders…have this very complex set up of different levels and different types of personnel 
…The training is…focused on how to manage programmes…..Volunteers with managers 
sit together…to know each other better, but as well to have the same comprehension on 
how the system is working.” (HQ 4) 
 
However, this type of strategic approach to staff training and development for HCO staff was not 
apparent in any of the participant responses or documents from other IVCOs in this research, other 
than in the format of in-house short courses and technical workshops. For IVCO3, as seen in the 
quotation below, any form of useful training appears to have stopped completely:  
“The [staff] don’t have any [in-house] training apart from induction…The [management] 
are saying [it is] because it’s all donor money [now] and it’s not important to donors in 
the proposals when they are written and [IVCO3] doesn’t have resources to train people. 
I’ve been here since 2002…[and] have a degree in Human Resource Management [but] I 
haven’t grown that much. So, I’m not competitive34” (HCO 6). 
 
The above quotation shows the importance of personal development and career progression to 
HCO staff without which, their motivation can be affected, or they can feel taken for granted and 
trapped in positions that they are unable to improve upon.  
 
This section has shown that the perceived value of the resources and support promised or made 
available to HCOs by head office are seen by HCO staff as indicative of IVCOs ‘Walking the Talk’ 
of their espoused principles and shared organisational values. Tensions related to value-related 
disparities between HCOs and their head offices are not unusual in INGOs and other development 
agencies, but the association of voluntary work with the institutional values of IVCOs influences 
the expectation of its staff in respect of consistency between the external and internal approach 
taken by head office to its proclaimed principles. It has been shown that IVCOs’ internal policies 
                                                     
34
 Based on interaction with this participant, the interpretation of her final statement is likely to be: “I have not developed personally; I 
can no longer match competition from others with my qualifications.”  
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and procedures are important indicators of organisational practices that support process-based trust 
generation and strengthen the organisational commitment of HCO staff to their parent organisation. 
In particular, policies that are related to i) fairness of remuneration packages; ii) transparency in 
financial accounting; iii) parity of  the terms, conditions and benefit packages between national and 
international staff; iv) power to access resources to carry out their work, and v) opportunities for 
personal development and career progression  
 
Tensions arise between HCOs and their head office when HCO staff are powerless to influence 
favourable outcomes in negotiating a relationship with head office and is more noticeable in 
placement-focused HCOs. This diminishes institutional trust and opportunities to build process-




This chapter has shown that HCOs are not seamless extensions of IVCO head office and that the 
way IVCOs describe the roles of HCOs is not always consistent with the way HCOs perceive and 
experience them. The relationships between HCOs and IVCO head offices are shaped by the 
history of the way external factors have been interpreted into internal policy and practice by IVCO 
organisations since their inception. Differences emerge between IVCOs that were focused on 
development (IVCOs 2 and 4) rather than voluntary service (IVCOs 1, 3 and 5) at inception, 
showing how the latter were less equipped to respond to external changes that were taking place at 
HCO operations level over the years. External influences impacted on the intra-organisational 
processes, distribution of power and the types of trust between HCOs and their head offices. 
 
Study of the relationships shows that while institutional trust is embedded within the relationship 
between HCOs and their head offices, openness in knowledge sharing promotes process-based 
trust, encourages collective behaviours, and is observed to be more important in strengthening 
intra-organisational relations between HCOs and IVCO head offices. If the HCOs are not resourced 
properly or their concerns are not addressed, the embedded institutional trust in the organisation 
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becomes eroded as staff adopt informal coping mechanisms to address the resource and 
administrative constraints that they face. Consequently, both HCOs and head offices’ management 
control over the day to day operations is lost, potentially leading to negative attitudes and self-
serving practices among HCOs’ staff. 
 
The disconnect in the relationships between the HCOs and their head offices, referred to by the 
IVCO Forum participant at the start of this chapter, reflects an asymmetry of information between 
the two organisational units.  However, it does not always appear to impact on the institutional trust 
placed on the HCOs by placement-focused IVCO head offices and suggests a ‘moral hazards’ 
(Chapter 3, section 3.2.4) in the relationship between them. This suggests an absence of, or 
unenforced, reporting and feedback structures and processes that allow HCOs the freedom to 
conduct their work unchecked (Chapter 3, section 3.2.4). The persistence of policies that are not 
applied, enforced, or reconsidered, lessens their value and efficiency as administrative tools, while 
the scarcity of opportunities for information exchange leads to role uncertainty and conflict of 
priorities among the staff, limiting opportunities to generate or build upon process-based trust. The 
implications are that head offices are, either not fully aware of the everyday practices of the HCOs, 
or they ignore the challenges being faced by them.  
 
The previous two chapters have shown that HCOs are neither passive facilitators of volunteer 
placements nor are they entirely submissive to the power of IVCO head office over resources, or 
always compliant with the parent organisation’s rules and procedures. HCOs’ function involves 
managing multiple relationships across the interface of different ‘worlds’, one of which is the 
‘world’ occupied by international volunteers and the other is the IVCO head office. Another 
‘world’ could be described as the institutional context of development in the host country where 
HCOs are based, and where they are embedded in, and influenced by, the network of relationships 
with different IVS stakeholders with diverse interests. This other world will be explored in the next 





Negotiating IVS Relationships in the Institutional Landscape of 




HCOs are faced with a complex network of partner-related assumptions that support or limit their 
ability to steer an IVS programme towards its intended aims. Increasing reliance on restricted 
funding and resources from international donors as well as head office on the one hand, and the 
structures of the public institutions of Malawi on the other means that HCOs have to be flexible 
and creative in negotiating inter-organisational relationships.  
 
This chapter argues that contextual factors in the institutional landscape of development in Malawi 
influence the dynamics of trust and power relations between the HCOs and their strategic, 
mobilising and implementing partners in Malawi. The multiplicity of different stakeholders and the 
competitive arena of development in Malawi make building process-based trust problematic. 
Nevertheless, the strategic approach of development-focused HCOs to partnerships increases the 
potential for building trust. In contrast, the fragmented approach to finding projects that can absorb 
IVS makes placement-focused HCOs over-reliant on institutional and characteristic-based types of 
trust, which are founded on assumptions that may not be inaccurate, out of date or unsubstantiated, 
and might not deliver the expectations of trust. The chapter examines the boundaries that HCOs 
have to manage across three different kinds of inter-organisational relationships. I describe these 
boundaries that HCOs have to manage as strategic, mobilising and implementing partnerships: 
strategic stakeholders describe those with whom HCOs’ relationships are centred on the long term 
aims of development intervention in thematic areas of national priority, and include the relevant 
Malawian Government’s ministries and public institutions, as well as multi- and bilateral donor 
agencies. Mobilising partners denote organisations such as INGOs, local government departments, 
umbrella organisations, or individuals such as consultants, with whom HCOs have collaborative or 
cross-cutting relationships in activating and operating the processes of delivering the aims of IVS 
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and the wider development programme. The staff of partner organisations (for example 
counterparts to volunteers) and representatives of beneficiary communities or groups with whom 
HCOs place volunteers in specific projects are referred to as implementing partners of HCOs.   
 
This chapter looks at how power relations impact on, or are impacted by, institutional and 
characteristic-based trust in the relationships between HCO and their strategic, mobilising and 
implementing partners, linking them to knowledge sharing as an influential factor in negotiating 
these relationships. Institutional trust and characteristic-based types of trust are deemed to be 
important in guiding inter-organisational strategies and decision-making processes of the HCOs 
and their strategic, mobilising and implementing partners when the opportunities for building and 
maintaining process-based trust are limited. 
 
Section 7.2 examines the relationships between the HCOs and their strategic partners: the donor 
agencies and the Government of Malawi, drawing attention to the interdependence between them. 
Having multiple strategic partners means that the HCO is not only accountable to the IVCO head 
office, but also the donor agencies and the host country public institutions. This blurs the 
distinctions between not only what is being accounted for, but to whom it should be accounted. 
Uncertainty has an impact on, and is impacted by, knowledge sharing, the types of trust and power 
relations in the relationships between the strategic partners as each tries to minimise risk within the 
relationship and advance their interests. It shows that a history of financial irregularities and wider 
political, structural and capacity issues have led to a loss of institutional trust in the Government of 
Malawi by the donor agencies and subsequent redirection of funding for development programmes 
through INGO (including IVCO) host country offices based on both institutional and characteristic 
based ‘by proxy’ trust of the HCOs. This represents a change in the distribution of power over 
financial resources among the strategic partners and reflects institutional and characteristic-based 
trust of donor agencies in IVCOs, and ‘by proxy’ of IVCO host country offices, to demonstrate 
professionalization in both financial and technical reporting.  
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Section 7.3 shows that changes in donor strategy for fund disbursement have created both 
opportunities and challenges for HCOs as they find themselves in a favoured position for having 
access to the expertise of international volunteers but in an increasingly competitive environment 
with other INGOs and HCOs. The inclusion of IVS in development programmes cannot be 
assumed and has to be justified when negotiating relationships with mobilising partners, for whom 
IVS may not be a priority. Thus HCOs develop strategies that involve responding to a request or 
making an offer of an IVS placement to potential mobilising partners who might not have bought 
into the agenda of IVS. This section argues that the fast-moving and competitive environment of 
development in Malawi constrains opportunities for knowledge transfer and shared experiences 
that can support the generations of process-based trust. Consequently, HCOs’ relationships with 
partner organisation are largely reliant on socially-based expectations of institutional or 
characteristic-based trust, which can be constructed or inflated and are not based on direct 
experiences. It shows that Malawian partners consent to the power of the HCOs over resources on 
offer through IVS, for reasons that are sometimes different from the aims of IVS and can impact its 
processes and outcomes. Six possible reasons for Malawian partners’ consent to IVS have been 
identified from the data: i) cultural norms in Malawi, ii) financial benefits for the Malawian 
partner, iii) issues related to human resources, iv) increased access to materials and equipment, v) 
transience of relationships and vi) reputation and prestige. 
 
Section 7.4 looks at how knowledge sharing, types of trust and power relations influence the way 
relationships are negotiated between the HCOs and the people directly involved in the 
implementing the development projects in which IVS is incorporated: the volunteers’ co-workers 
and counterparts in partner organisations, and representatives of the beneficiary groups. It argues 
that lack of an HCO’s responsiveness to contextual changes in the host-countries and the needs of 
the intended beneficiaries, and persistence in promoting the interests of the volunteer-sending 
countries in IVS policy and practice, constrain the relationships between the HCOs and their 
implementing partners. This diminishes institutional trust in IVS and characteristic-based trust ‘by-
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proxy’ of HCOs, sometimes reinforcing internalised inequalities associated with historical or 
economic supremacy and adversely impacting on knowledge exchange.  
 
Section 7.5 concludes by reflecting on a summary of the discussion in this chapter. 
 
7.2 Negotiating relationships with the strategic partners 
 
This section examines the relationships between the HCOs and their strategic partners: the donor 
agencies and the Government of Malawi, drawing attention to the interdependence between them. 
It argues the multiplicity of strategic partners means that an HCO is not only accountable to the 
IVCO head office, but also other powerful stakeholders, namely the donor agencies and the host 
country public institutions. This blurs the distinctions between not only what is being accounted 
for, but to whom it should be accounted for. This has an impact on knowledge sharing, the types of 
trust and power relations in the relationships between the strategic partners as each try to minimise 
risk within the relationship and advance their interests. 
 
Being subordinate to donor power over resources and the Government of Malawi’s power over 
policies and structures of the national institutions constrains the way HCOs negotiate their 
relationships with their strategic partners. However, HCOs occupy a preferred position as agents of 
development by both donors and national institutions, based on institutional trust in their status as 
value-based organisations, and characteristic-based trust ‘by proxy’ as a result of their associations 
with established international development agencies - the IVCOs. Furthermore, their role as 
facilitators of IVS, as an instrument of development intervention, affords HCOs power over a 
necessary technical resource – the knowledge and expertise of foreign volunteers. Consequently, 
there is a high level of interdependence between the HCOs and their strategic partners, as depicted 
















Figure 7: Interdependence between the Government of Malawi, the international donors and IVCO host country offices  
(Source: author) 
 
Figure 7shows, firstly, how the Government of Malawi is dependent on both the flow of funds from 
international donor agencies and IVS as one of the available channels for technical assistance 
(MW1, HCO1, 4). Secondly, the international donor agencies need to maintain a working alliance 
with Malawi’s public sector institutions to help deliver Malawi’s long term development plans 
(IMF, 2017; The World Bank, 2017) while relying on INGOs and HCOs for project 
implementation (Government of Malawi, 2017, pp. 38–9). Finally, HCOs are connected to donor 
agencies through their reliance on funding for projects as well as approval and cooperation of the 
state institutions in Malawi to deliver technical assistance through IVS.  
 
In Malawi, the "Cashgate" scandal in 2013 (Chapter 4, section 4.5) led to the international donors 
freezing direct budgetary support to the Government of Malawi and re-directing funding for aid 
through non-governmental organisations (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). One interviewee 
described the impact on the relationships between the key stakeholders:  
“What has changed [in the working relations between the government workers and the 
donors] is the funding mechanism, the level of motivation and the level of trust [in] the 
working relations [between] the government workers [and] the donor.”  (HCO 3) 
 
The dilemma faced by the international donors in Malawi lies at the heart of their mandate for 
development: to support capacity building within public sector structures in Malawi in ways that 
would address the needs and rights of its people. The challenge presented, then, is how to achieve 











this aim in light of past experiences which have proven their most important partner, the 
Government of Malawi, to be unreliable and untrustworthy.  
“[This] is a disaster because we came here to build the capacity of government….[but] we 
are not strengthening the government counterparts as much as we should” (HCO 3) 
 
Furthermore, low levels of trust were also associated with wider political, structural and capacity 
issues within Malawi’s public institutions that constrained the delivery of the agreed development 
objectives, leading to a decline in trust of the donors and international agencies in the Government 
of Malawi’s ability and capacity to steer both development policy and practice. This was widely 
acknowledged by the majority of senior HCO staff (HCO 3, 4, 5, 10), consultants (PTNR 1, 8) and 
some volunteers who were placed in government institutions (VOL2, 7):  
“The way that the state operates, it’s difficult to see where we’re going…. Everything’s 
quite a lot of reacting to situations rather than strategic planning and trying to work 
towards a plan.” (HCO 4) 
 
“The problem is….due to the not-yet-honest structure or missing structure in the Ministry 
X; they cannot tell me with who can I work with.” (HCO 1) 
 
The change in donor strategy to redirect funding away from the Government of Malawi to 
international aid agencies reflects the donors’ power over financial resources but also the power to 
influence partnership choices for programme implementation. There are, nevertheless, limitations 
on the extent to which international donors and HCOs can operate in a sovereign state. In Malawi, 
the power of the international development community over development interventions extends 
only to its reach within the prevailing Malawian laws and formal structures:  
“If you had a blank piece of paper….you wouldn’t set up the ministry for example, in the 
way it’s set up today…..but it’s not ours; it’s Malawi. So we have to work within what we 
have…..We have no legal right to be here at all….We can’t argue with anybody.” (HCO 4)   
HCOs are often forced to find creative means to increase their power to influence within the 
relationships with the government ministries through formal and informal activities that help build 
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process-based trust and facilitate working relationships that help maintain IVCOs’ effective 
presence:  
“We work with the government and say: “For this your plan [sic], this is how we are going 
to help you achieve.” (HQ 5) 
 
“I have a very strong relationship within the ministry…..Good relationships give me a 
good appreciation and understanding of how things are going in terms of basic questions 
[that] we have.” (HCO 4) 
 
However, the change in donors’ strategy for fund disbursement has led to HCOs having increased 
power over resources, straining the relationships between the ministries, the donor agencies, and 
INGOs working in Malawi, including HCOs. These tensions are associated with uncertainties, and 
potential conflict of priorities between the different ‘worlds’ (Chapter 2, section 2.6) of the donors, 
the Malawian government and HCOs as each tend to function through very different sets of rules. 
Lewis (2014, p. 146) observes that organisational problems emerge in the areas of ambiguity in the 
boundary between the different ‘worlds’, leading to confused roles and identities. The two 
contrasting quotations below, first from a senior staff member of a Malawian public institution and 
the second from a senior HCO staff member, illustrate their contradictory perspectives:  
“Here, we don’t allow the NGOs to just work on its own [sic]; they use our structures.” 
(MW 1) 
 
“There have been cases whereby some international NGOs go down to the ground [sic] 
and start implementing [projects] on their own.” (HCO 10) 
 
The contradiction in the above statements show that Malawian public institutions may have power 
over the formulation of rules, regulations and procedures, but weak infrastructures and capacity 
shortfalls mean that they do not always have the power to enforce those rules. Thus the increased 
power associated with HCOs’ access to international resources was being perceived as suspicious 
and a potential political threat in some government departments:  
“[The government] are looking at the INGO-Forum as a parallel structure to CONGOMA, 
the Council for Non-Governmental Organisations in Malawi. If we meet as the people from 
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the International NGOs-Forum, these guys from CONGOMA and the government, they’re 
full of: “What are these guys discussing?  Are they may be planning to overthrow the 
government, or what?” (HCO 10) 
 
The redirection of funding disbursement by donor agencies from Malawian government to HCOs 
signifies a combination of institutional and characteristic-based trust on the part of the donors in 
NGOs and INGOs as value-based organisations (Korten, 1990; Brett, 1993; Lewis, 2002). Positive 
responses to the donors’ strategy for fund disbursement were widely evidenced among the staff of 
all five HCOs as well as their mobilising and implementing partners including other INGOs, 
Malawian NGOs, beneficiary groups and even volunteers’ co-workers and counterparts. Two 
examples are provided below:  
“When we work with anyone who is not the government we get excellent results….We see 
the change in the ideas…... And the attitude is not there; these people are working very 
well with the beneficiaries and our [Malawian] traditional structures and the district 
structures.” (HCO 3) 
 
“The benefits [of working with the INGO/IVS] are that they are actually providing us with 
support. They already have systems in place that we can borrow…. It’s hard for just a 
local NGO to spring out of nowhere and to be able to access funding or just do operations 
and accountability to donors, it’s very hard.” (PTNR 16) 
 
The donors’ trust in HCOs is grounded in reputation (institutional trust) of the parent organisations, 
their history of work in international development as well as their familiarity with the language of 
reporting and other management and administrative procedures that constitute donor imperative for 
professionalism and accountability (Chapter 2, section 2.3): 
 
“Sometimes the donors will simply come to us to say okay we have this money for this.” 
(HCO 8) 
 
“We ensure that the organisations that we enter into a partnership with are registered in 
Malawi [and that] they have got all the… financial policies and the human resource 
manuals and the like…. because no donor will risk to put his or her money into a pot which 




The rationale for the trust donors place on HCOs can be described as a form of institutional trust 
‘by proxy’ which reflects the HCO’s association with the IVCO. This institutional trust ‘by proxy’ 
implies assumptions by donors that HCOs have the power to implement projects because, as 
subsidiaries of IVCOs, HCOs are ‘trusted’ to have the required contextual knowledge, 
administrative tools and processes, management skills and organisational capacity to deliver the 
agreed programme objectives. However, Chapter 6 showed that HCOs are not mechanical 
extensions of their head offices and declared policies of development agencies might not 
necessarily characterise the views of those tasked with their implementation (Uzzi, 1997; Cornwall 
and Brock, 2005). Historical and current organisational strategies, structures, policies and 
procedures can lead to conditions that constrain the HCO’s ability to carry out its day to day 
functions and have consequences for IVS on the ground. 
 
Achieving transparency in complex donor imperatives for financial reporting - particularly when a 
single project may involve several donors with diverse programme schedules and technical 
specifications, is problematic for HCOs (Charlton et al., 1995; Igoe and Kelsall, 2005; Lewis, 
2014). Given donors’ growing demand for time-bound and evidence-based indicators for 
programme achievement (Chapter 2, sections 2.3 and 2.4), information exchange between the HCO 
and the strategic stakeholders becomes a critical element in generating process-based trust (Butler, 
1999, p. 231) in the duration of the programme. For development-focused HCOs creating and 
maintaining process-based trust, from its basis in institutional trust, is grounded in the strategic 
nature of their approach to projects and partnerships and how they share information. The 
participant below from IVCO 2 illustrates:  
“Malawian government would be our main partner in all our projects. We ask of course 
for relevant at planning material…which covers a period of 4 years and it is designed to 
achieve various SDG’s35. There are also other very prominent players in the country like 
                                                     
35
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), are17 Goals build on the successes of the Millennium Development Goals and are a 





DFID…Norway, Canadian Aid… that we are working [with], based on the parastatal 
relations [and]… to avoid fragmentation of the sector you are working in.” (HCO1) 
 
The above statement shows the importance of continuity in the HCOs relationships with key 
strategic partners, clarity of roles and objectives and, crucially, includes a length of time (4 years) 
that can potentially facilitate cooperation through repetition of expectations being met over time - 
process-based trust. 
“In 2012, I found the project at the beginning of its second phase…after each phase or 
before each phase ends, we have a project evaluation where we decide whether the project 
was from the SWOT analysis and [decide the] areas which worked or …we may have to 
amend…or we will need to include.” 
 
In contrast, the fragmented approach to IVS to be included in disparate projects makes it difficult 
for placement-focused HCOs to build process-based trust and makes them over-reliant on 
institutional and characteristic-based types of trust. In the absence of first-hand knowledge or 
experience, institutional trust is founded on presumptions of the HCOs’ ability and capacity to 
deliver the contractual terms of the agreement and is based on the established reputation of the 
HCOs’ parent organisations:  
“Volunteering has become our identity; people know us because we have these 
specialists.” (HCO 5) 
 
“From a partner’s perspective, everyone wants to work with us; which is really amazing!” 
(HQ 6) 
However, this exposes placement-focused HCOs to potential weaknesses if the assumptions on 
which donor trust are based are incorrect (Chapter 6, sections 6.2 and 6.3). When caught in the 
dilemma of maintaining the trust of donors to implement projects without having the necessary 
physical or human resources or capacity to do so, HCOs have to minimise the risk of loss of the 
donors’ trust, on which their organisational survival depends. In doing so, the HCOs’ staff 
sometimes engage in behaviours and tactics, such as under-reporting of operational weaknesses and 
unintended or negative outcomes, that bring into question the accuracy, integrity, and utility of 




“[The] Country Manager asked [the volunteer] “How did you develop that report?” [The 
volunteer said]: “I submitted the report to you.  You were supposed to read it and then 
change the things which you thought were not supposed to be meant for the donor. I didn’t 
know that there was [sic] other things that were happening behind the scenes.” (HCO 10)  
 
“When I looked at the budget from the donors, they had budgeted for two persons for 
Lilongwe…  But [since] I arrived no-one [at the HCO] is talking about two…. [I] did ask 
but they said no, it was like maybe a mistake.” (VOL 12)  
 
The statements above find congruence with Nauta’s (2006, p. 68) observation that HCOs 
“strategically translate” the needs of the different stakeholders in a way that allows them “to 
control the messages that are relayed from “grassroots” to the stakeholders” and, in turn, can 
adversely affect the outcomes of a project and undermine the contribution of IVS.  
 
Another hazard associated with characteristic-based trust placed on the HCOs by their strategic 
stakeholders is that representations of ‘characteristic’ can be manipulated. For example, reputations 
can be constructed or enhanced into brands which underpin the expectations associated with the 
character through the use of language and multi-media marketing techniques, rather than 
corroborated data. One participant from IVCO3 head office described the IVCO’s strategy for 
brand improvement:   
“My focus is on…. the new ways of working which have more results for us…how do we 
use the information to then build up our brand, build up our influencing power with 
governments, with the public sectors, with the private sector.” (HQ 3) 
 
The combination of institutional and characteristic-based types of trust tips the balance of power to 
influence the aims and processes of IVS in favour of the international donors and HCOs, but 
undermines the role and contribution of the Malawian partners (MW 1, 5, CPRT 4, 3, 5, PTNR 1, 
3): 
“[The HCOs] come and say “We have this work to support you… are there any skills 
gaps?”… But in many cases, we find that the money-is-fixed syndrome takes precedence in 
the sense that [HCOs] say “As long as the money is coming from this direction we have to 
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decide who to bring to you”...So, in the end, we find that the negotiation is tilted towards 
the supplier and not the demand.” (MW1) 
 
Although empirical data reveal weaknesses in practice and implementation of IVS, they do not 
appear to impact on the level of trust in placement-focused HCOs, in the eyes of the donors, for 
example, they sometimes choose to overlook the investigative mechanisms that support project 
proposals on the assumption that the process has been undertaken. 
“[Sometimes] we do not include [participatory processes at community level] in the 
[project] proposals. Donors are very prescriptive; they say “We won't go down to that 
level…. just follow through on the format you have been given.””(HCO 5) 
 
The above statement makes it clear that donors’ control of funding affords them the power to 
influence the aims and processes of IVS. Lewis (2014, p. 97) notes that donors’ preference is for 
rapid results rather than long term goals, to show their constituencies back home, leading to the 
view that the value of NGOs to donors may be limited to “a cheap way of getting things done”. It 
could, therefore, be argued that although donor power may look like over-reliance on institutional 
and characteristic-based trust, it also reflects a disparity in the donors’ focus between reaching an 
operational goal within a project cycle (Chapter 1, section 1.4) and achieving the strategic goal of 
social change through development intervention. This concurs with Gulrajani’s (2014, p. 90) 
suggestion that evaluating donor performance using information based only on the mechanics of 
aid delivery, undermines the more important questions of donor effectiveness. The participant 
below illustrates:  
“One of the donors was trying to give the money to the districts to go out to tender [for the 
construction], not knowing what capacity there was to do that… It was basically an 
accounting trick on their side because they can say they spent the money and report it to 
[their] donors…. They were saying you have to be assessing the capacity and training 
them.  We don’t have the capacity to do that…that would be a project on its own because 
we’d have to recruit several other people.” (VOL 16).  
 
The global trend away from unrestricted to project-based funding (Chapter 2, section 2.3) has 
impacted on the relationships between NGOs, including HCOs, and their development stakeholders 
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across the globe. Continually shifting priorities in pursuit of  the next funding opportunity, often 
before one or more projects cycles (Chapter 1, section 1.4) have been completed, work against 
longer-term relationship building (Lewis, 2009) and contradict the ultimate aims of the 
development interventions: 
“In the other projects, we jumped out….I don’t think it was enough time for [the 
beneficiaries] to sustain it….We have proceeded to extend [this project], but still, we 
haven’t realised some of the impacts at the local level; even [if] we extend [this project], 
what about the other two that we left out?”  (VOL 9) 
 
The findings point to possible inaccuracies with regards to the information shared by HCOs with 
other stakeholders, and hence concur with van Eekelen et al.’s (2012, pp. 16–17) independent 
report of an IVCO’s operations at host country level that revealed inconsistencies between 
documented and raw data, incorrect attribution of achievements, unsubstantiated statistics and 
“heroic assumptions”. As with the relationship with the IVCO head offices, if formally documented 
or informally agreed reports are not verified, contested or acted upon, both types of trust become 
devalued as they merely come to represent a façade of professionalism. The implications are that 
the processes and outcomes of IVS in a development programme are overlooked, or not correctly 
supervised and are potentially contradictory to the original aims.  
 
To conclude this section, then, being reliant on funding and resources from international donors on 
the one hand and the structures within the public institutions of Malawi on the other to deliver their 
mandates, HCOs need to exercise a high degree of flexibility and creativity in how they negotiate 
relationships, depending on who they are negotiating with and what the agenda might be. This 
implies that while control of resources may yield power over the spending or use of the resources, 
it does not transform into power to achieve the intended developmental goals in Malawi. 
Consequently, far from creating a clear division of power between the HCOs, the Government of 
Malawi and the donors, it has increased the ambiguities of roles and priorities that lead to 
suspicions and erosion of trust among the actors. The fallout of these uncertainties has an impact on 
the formal and informal relationships, hence the day to day functions of project mobilisation and 
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implementation, in ways that can undermine the intended contribution of IVS to development 
projects. 
 
7.3 Negotiating relationships with mobilising partners   
 
Re-direction of funding disbursement from donor agencies through INGOs and HCOs, rather than 
Malawian public institutions has led to the proliferation of contracts and sub-contracts, whether 
formally documented or informally through verbal agreements. Development agencies, HCOs, 
consultant practitioners, Malawian contractors, and other foreign and national actors compete for 
access funds and resources necessary for their development projects and organisational survival 
(see Figure 3, Chapter 1). “Malawi is awash with foreign aid” (VOL7) is how a participant 
volunteer described the arena of development in Malawi.  
 
The multiplication of international and national development organisations has had an impact on all 
the HCOs in this research. Whereas the numbers of their main partners in the past had been limited 
to the Government of Malawi and possibly a small number of other agencies, they now find 
themselves contracted to, or sub-contracting, a variety of other agencies in the delivery of 
development programmes: 
“Now we are bringing in non-governmental agents….They are standing in for whatever 
gaps we are experiencing at the district councils…we also have a way of transferring 
resources to them and then it’s them that implement it.” (HCO 3) 
 
Li (2005) observes that competition weakens trust. ‘Competing for funding’ (HCO 10 above) 
leaves little opportunity for the generation of process-based trust between HCOs, the donors and 
even target beneficiaries. This is particularly pertinent when there is little shared history between 
the parties and information sharing has to be taken at face value to meet the time limitations of 
projects. The growing number of actors in IVS presents HCOs with challenges in reconciling the 
demands arising from the policies and procedures of multiple mobilising stakeholders with the 
tasks of programme implementation.  
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“Now it’s stiffer competition for the same resources…[Our] current partnership agreement 
is running up to 2016, and then we will have to compete again, so we are not sure whether 
we will still be on the list or not.” (HCO 10) 
 
“We’re working towards a standard…[building] design, because each donor wants their 
own thing at the moment which doesn’t work. How are you supposed to get them all 
authorised through local authorities…and [keep up with] updating the drawings?” (VOL 
16)  
 
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising to find duplications, and omissions of projects as 
numerous national, international, public and private sector and non-profit actors vie for funding and 
project approval in relatively few key developmental sectors. Overlaps and omissions in 
development activities permeate all levels of development intervention from institutional and 
policy levels, to project identification and subsequent implementation through beneficiary groups, 
thus inhibiting meaningful knowledge sharing:   
“The data is getting confused now because from these small, misaligned implementing 
partners, can we really collect enough data that can be used for proper planning? No!” 
(HCO 3) 
 
“The challenge of the District Council is that there are a ton of interventions by different 
NGOs, foreign agencies, and they don’t really align generally…Also so many committees 
at national level…that the information flow is [very poor]….. NGOs don’t really know 
whether someone else [is doing the same thing].” (VOL 2) 
 
Participants reveal that pockets of initiatives have been set up by various actors by way of 
organised meetings, fora and other collaborative opportunities (HCO 1, 3, 5, 10) to share 
information, reduce duplications, and identify possible gaps in knowledge:  
“All the developing partners are experiencing this in one way or the other. So we meet we 
say…:‘As development partners, we should be looking at a, b, c, d.’….How we give aid 
and aid effectiveness will have to be reviewed. So it is a learning time as well as a 




The INGO-Forum mentioned in the previous section is one example of collaborative action among 
mobilising stakeholders; another involved using an international volunteer in an IVS placement to 
support a District Council in producing a map of development activities in the district, showing 
gaps and overlaps between projects undertaken by different INGOs and NGOs.  Interview 
statements were corroborated by observing the presence of charts, maps, diagrams and lists of 
activities against the names of actors on office desks, boards and walls as well as in minutes of 
meetings, official reports and strategy documents of the participants.  
 
However, despite the rhetoric of collaboration and coordination, it was widely acknowledged by 
participants that, in practice, the levels of information exchange could be unreliable as actors 
pursue diverse agendas. One example is given below: 
“We have partners … [with whom we might] get into a kind of team agreement. Sometimes 
rules are broken…..so you run the risk of some partners doing what they are not supposed 
to be doing in the partnership.” (HCO 5)  
 
Trust is viewed as a form of the gamble taken on the behaviour of another, with the expectation of 
reducing the potentially damaging effects of risk (Luhmann, 1979; Diallo and Thuillier, 2005; Li, 
2005). The above example points to a degree of acceptance of risk between the HCO in their 
relationships with some partner organisations (Koeszegi, 2004, p. 644).  McEvily et al. (2003, p. 
99) posit that judgement calls are made in response to gaps in knowledge about an actor that 
prohibit the generation of trust and constrain rational decision-making based on the information. 
Thus, in negotiating their relationships with mobilising partners, HCOs sometimes have to make 
decisions based on judgements that are risky and can increase uncertainties in the relationships. 
However, the level of risk in the relationship between the HCO and the partner organisation is 
crucially important to HCOs, particularly when it is a matter of organisational survival, more 




The role of IVS in development programmes is acknowledged as one of many tools available for 
the managing of development projects, so its inclusion in development projects cannot be assumed; 
it has to be justified and negotiated with mobilising partners for whom IVS may not be a priority:  
“[Sometimes] you have an agenda and [the Malawian partners] haven’t bought into that 
agenda. It’s a challenge [balancing] the demand for a volunteer to address a [partner’s 
need], with the specific objective that [IVCO] has and wants to achieve." (HCO 8) 
 
Recognition of the “risk of some partners doing what they are not supposed to be doing in the 
partnership” by participants HCO 5 above, illustrates the challenges that HCOs face in balancing 
the risks in their relationships with some partners with the expectations of the volunteers regarding 
their placement. 
“[Malawian] partner organisations can sometimes say yes to having a volunteer because 
they think if they say no, then we won’t go back to them and we might think they don’t want 
to cooperate. So the volunteer comes and then they have nothing to do. They get frustrated, 
and sometimes they leave, or they complain to the office.” (HCO 9) 
 
As shown in Chapter 5, when the realities on the ground fail to meet the expectations of volunteers, 
it impacts on the dynamics of trust and power relations between them and the HCOs, leading to 
volunteers’ demotivation, poor performance or departure.  
 
The justification for an IVS placement, centres on whether assistance through IVS is requested by 
the partner organisation or offered by the HCO (HCO1, 5, 8, 9, 10). When IVS is requested by an 
organisation for a specific need, it conforms to demand-driven and development focused approach 
to IVS, and the partner organisation is willing to subsidise, or buy into, the IVS agenda.  However, 
different partner attitudes emerge when IVS is offered to partner organisations, rather than 
requested by them, taking the form of supply-driven and placement-focused collaboration. 
However, although there is a clear division between development-focused HCOs responding to 
requests from partners and placement-focused HCOs offering IVS, there were a small number of 
overlaps that are included in the examples below from senior HCO staff, first from IVCO3 
followed by another from IVCO2:  
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“When [a Malawian] partner has a need [for a] skill but cannot afford it, we give them 
that skill [and] they manage that... But when you say: …“Would you like to work with us?” 
They will say: “Yes!”…. [But then] they don’t care whether the volunteer is there, [as if to 
say] “I didn’t ask for that.”” (HCO 8) 
 
“[The volunteers] are paid by us [but they should be] subsidised by our [Malawian] 
partners…The local employers say… “Even if we know, there is a contribution…we don’t 
want to subsidise.”” (HCO 1) 
The above statements show that while HCOs aim to promote IVS as a component of development 
projects, Malawian partners sometimes consent to the power of the HCO over resources even 
though they have not bought into the agenda for reasons that are different from the aims of IVS and 
can impact its course and outcomes. This implies a lack of transparency in the disclosure of the 
needs, and expectations of outcomes of IVS by the participants, which may be either deliberate or 
unintentional. Six possible reasons for Malawian partners’ consent to IVS have been identified 
from the data: i) cultural norms in Malawi, ii) financial benefits for the Malawian partner, iii) issues 
related to human resources, iv) increased access to materials and equipment, v) transience of 
relationships and vi) reputation and prestige. 
 
7.3.1 Cultural norms in Malawi:  
When negotiating the terms and conditions of IVS placements, some Malawian partners’ consent is 
in deference to the HCOs and grounded in domestic cultural and social norms, as described by a 
consultant working in a Malawian public institution:   
“Sometimes people give in too easily because it is nice. I say people in Malawi can’t say 
no,….[they are] always trying to see what will accommodate [sic].” (PTNR 8) 
 
Deference without prior experience of collaboration implies their trust in the HCO is either 
institutional through the network of international development agencies, or characteristic-based, for 
example by association with of the reputation of the IVCO, or both. Institutional-based or 
characteristic-based trust may also represent an internalized history of oppression, possibly 
traceable back to colonial rule or even earlier history of the slave trade in Malawi. Internalised 
deference to power pervades at different levels of Malawian society and is encountered by foreign 
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HCO staff and volunteers. The examples below, first from an HCO staff member, followed by a 
Malawian counterpart to a volunteer illustrate: 
“If you look back at the history of Malawi, looking at how the whole population of Malawi 
lives in such a suppressive state, you cannot expect from [someone] whose position is 
[within] the structure….[to] raise her voice …This is a very suppressive environment.” 
(HCO 1) 
 
“Some of us, we are down in the management system structure; we are not able to know 
exactly what [the volunteer] is here for. But I’m sure our senior bosses knew exactly what 
he was here for because… those are the bosses…the leaders of all these things; they are 
the ones that maybe can influence… I don’t have confidence [that they would listen to 
me].” (CPRT 6) 
 
This suggests that the characteristic deference to the power of a more dominant form opens the 
opportunity for Malawians to be manipulated into consent by other actors, including the HCOs.  
 
“[For] the [volunteer placement]…we have to shape the type of our work. So you say: 
“Why you don’t need [sic] somebody who has skills in 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5?” And they say: 
“Yeah [that] would be OK.”” (HCO 1) 
 
The behaviour of the HCOs in response to cultural or historical issues in Malawi might be 
manipulative, but this is not to suggest that HCOs are not always acting in the interest of the 
partner organisations. On the contrary, often their actions are founded in their past experience and 
knowledge of the limitations of the partner organisations, which are then aimed at trust generation 
and empowerment of the partners in the longer term:   
“Some of the (partner organisations) usually are forthcoming, especially when you say: 
“What you are doing is really good, and for you to really have more donors funding, you 
need to be registered.”” (HCO 10) 
 
“I will say: “I feel that Malawi would be well off if we look at [a particular] area” and I 




Nevertheless, there are also occasions when HCOs misuse their power over the IVS process to 
make ‘offers’ to partner organisations for less transparent reasons as the consultant working for a 
Malawian institution could not fail to witness: 
“[One volunteer’s] contract expires in September and….she wants to extend her contract 
[for personal reasons] so now [the HCO] are pushing [the institution] to ask for a 
volunteer; so they are creating a job for her to stay right here.”  (PTNR 1) 
 
7.3.2 Financial considerations:  
Another easily recognisable incentive for mobilising partners to agree to an IVS placement is 
related to financial considerations associated with IVS:  
“International volunteers are advantageous because normally they have a bit of funding 
behind them.” (PTNR 8)   
 
“The Programme Officer will say…“If you were to recruit professionals and consultants, 
half of your budget will go to just pay them. But….volunteers will be a quarter of your 
costs [and] you’ll get the same return on your investment in terms of quality and even the 
speed of delivery.””(HQ 5) 
 
Or, the partner also recognises IVS as ‘a cheap way of getting things done’ (Lewis, 2014, p 97): 
“[Local government is not interested in subsidising volunteers]…It should be their 
institution which should approach us…[because there are] structural deficits in…these 
institutions…[but]it’s always the argument: “Let’s look for the cheapest option.” which is 
sad.” (HCO 1) 
 
Moreover, senior staff of at least three HCOs (IVCO1, 2 and 3) described the challenges that they 
face in negotiating relationships with partners where the prior experience of financial irregularities 
and structural and capacity issues in the partner organisation have constrained the relationship 
between the HCO and the partner:  
“There are cases whereby organisations do double-funding…when [a Malawian partner] 
organisation got funding from another donor, and then you’ve also provided funding, not 




Negative experiences, of the type shown in the above examples, lead to mistrust of the partner by 
the HCOs and drives them to tighten their power over the partner’s finance administration which, 
in turn, can be interpreted as a threat by the other party. In response to the perceived threat, the 
partner organisations sometimes attempt to re-establish their power by defaulting on contractual 
agreements in ways that can have an adverse effect on IVS: 
“There are lots of fraud and corruption in most of the [Malawian] partner 
organisations…Sometimes [the partner] will say: “Yeah, yeah, bring a volunteer!” But 
then they will realise that “Oh! This guy has cottoned on too much!” and they…say: “We 
don’t want the volunteer.” Then the volunteer just gets frustrated, and that becomes a 
problem also.” (HCO 8) 
 
7.3.3 Human resources:  
Mobilising partners may sometimes agree to IVS because they see it as an opportunity to fill gaps 
in their employee numbers or skills which might be different from the agreed and contracted 
placement criteria, or they may not be entirely clear in the type of skills or experiences that they 
need as the next two examples illustrate: 
“The volunteer is there specifically to build the capacity of the [Malawian] partners... But 
where they don’t have enough staff or capacity in the partner’s [organisation], then the 
volunteer is left with no option but also to deliver [service as a member of the ] partner’s 
staff.” (HCO 5) 
 
“Sometimes, you have to be careful with what the partner says they want and what is 
needed. In one of the Health programmes, there was an element of agriculture-related to 
nutrition. If we hadn’t looked carefully, we would have brought a health volunteer….It 
hadn’t been made clear that the skill required was agriculture and not health.” (HCO 9) 
 
Highly detailed and ambitious development plans for each district formally signed Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU), and volunteer placement descriptions exist and are available, some of 
which reveal discrepancies between negotiated agreements and the reality on the ground (Chapter 
5, sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3). One HCO interviewee acknowledged that sometimes HCO’s 
assessment of a potential partner organisation could be less than adequate at the time of negotiating 
the terms of IVS: 
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“Sometimes we make some assumptions….We do assessments [for funding proposals], but 
we may not be thorough [enough]…we find in the course of the project that [the 
Malawian] partner still lacks capacity.” (HCO 5) 
 
7.3.4 Increased access to materials and equipment:  
Another reason for IVS stakeholders’ consent to using IVS in development projects is that it is seen 
as a gateway to accessing physical and material resources.  
“The country is not very rich, and often they lack some very basic things; not enough 
stationery, no fuel for the cars… There’s a printer and a laptop but no money to buy the 
cable so they cannot print.” (VOL 7) 
 
“Some [volunteers] will take initiative, collect money from their families and buy things 
that we need.” (MW 2) 
 
The resources associated with IVS incentivise Malawian partners of HCOs to accept IVS 
placements. Access to functional resources allows Malawian partner employees to be more 
effective in their work. However, at times the restrictions placed on the use of bespoke assets (the 
power over the resources) by HCOs leads to conflict and frustration at the level of project 
implementation as it removes, or fails to support, the partner’s priorities:  
“[The volunteers] have also support in terms of their vehicles. We are challenged in terms 
of transport, but their regulation is that they use the vehicles strictly for their programmes. 
We may need their transport for slightly different problems, but we cannot do that.”  (MW 
5) 
 
It has to be noted that Malawian partner organisations also provided physical resources, usually by 
way of office space, use of available equipment, or fully or partially subsidised accommodation for 
volunteers in rural areas. Flexibility in sharing of resources is one of the ways that process-based 
trust can be generated between volunteers and Malawian partner organisation staff as they develop 
their working relationship over time. However, the rules that restrict the use of resources reinforce 
the dominance of the party owning the resource and may serve to undermine the generation of 




7.3.5 Transience of relationships:  
The brevity of interaction time between the different actors in IVS programmes constrains 
opportunities for generating process-based trust even when there are good intentions to do so. The 
numbers and diversity of participant responses given below are intended to demonstrate the 
challenges of retaining continuity in relationships between stakeholders that act as drivers of IVS 
aims and processes: 
“There is very little planning since officers in the government [in] Malawi frequently have 
to change their workplace, and they cannot really build a fire [sic].” (VOL 2)  
 
“In the last say, seven months, I’ve been to New York, Washington, London, Paris.”  (HCO 
4) 
 
“The foreign volunteers just come for a short time and go back home faster than they 
came.” (BG 11) 
 
The above quotes are only a handful of examples of widespread findings within the data and reflect 
the patterns of mobility among the different IVS actors, from donors and HCO staff to 
counterparts, consultants and volunteers themselves. They illustrate how the continuous movement 
of actors limits opportunities for knowledge transfer and trust generation through stability and 
shared experiences. They also provide a possible explanation for the apparent absence of interest or 
enthusiasm of some partner organisation for IVS, which may simply be the result of lapses in 
knowledge and information transfer as a consequence of the frequent movement of individuals or 
key actors in the relationships within and between HCOs and their diverse IVS stakeholders. 
 
7.3.6 Reputation and prestige:  
The association of HCOs with their parent organisation’s reputation and brand is a reason why 
partners sometimes agree to IVS in a number of the prominent public institutions as well as 
communities in Malawi. However, the reason for agreeing to IVS appears to have less to do with 
the operational contributions of IVS than its role as a prestigious achievement in qualifying for 
partnership with an international organisation, particularly one with a recognised status: 
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“I think [the Malawian institution] likes the volunteers because we look good! They can 
say they have a partnership with [IVCO5].” (VOL 5)  
 
“I could see that [although] the community representatives…. didn’t know what I was 
there to do, they thought that having someone like me there was better than not having 
someone.” (VOL 18) 
 
This view supported my observations during fieldwork in respect of some of the choices and 
locations of offices for volunteers which, in Malawi, are associated with the status of the occupants. 
In one instance a volunteer had been allocated a spacious and well-equipped office on the same 
level as the senior management while her (equally qualified) Malawian counter-part had a small, 
overcrowded office on the lower ground floor (VOL 15). Another volunteer in a different 
programme and location was assigned an office that had already been promised to a senior 
employee and caused the latter serious grievance (VOL10).  The importance of prestige is unclear 
but may be linked to an actual or perceived increase in ‘power to influence’ institutional hierarchies 
by way of association with another powerful partner. Including IVS in development programmes 
based on prestige may be perceived as advancing the power of the IVS recipient organisation to 
qualify for further international support, or support the mandate of the HCOs in promoting IVS, but 
its contribution to developmental goals can be questionable, if not negative: 
“We’ve got two [Malawian] faculty members; one of them is PhD prepared from the 
United States …and the other one has got her Master’s Degree in the UK, so really highly 
educated. So [if] you’re bringing a third person to be co-teaching…. a third of lectures, 
they’re not [going to be] teaching a whole lot.” (VOL 5)  
 
The section has shown the challenges that HCOs face in managing their relationships with partner 
organisations with which they need to collaborate to justify the inclusion of IVS as in development 
projects. Following from the discussion in section 7.2, it was shown that although changes in donor 
strategy for fund disbursement have produced opportunities for HCOs to access donor funding for 
IVS placements, they have also created challenges as HCOs find themselves in an increasingly 
competitive environment with other INGOs and HCOs. This section has argued that the fast-
moving and competitive environment of development in Malawi constrains opportunities for 
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knowledge sharing and shared experiences that can support the generation of process-based trust. 
Consequently, HCOs’ relationships with partner organisation are largely reliant on socially-based 
expectations of institutional or characteristic-based trust, which may not be accurate or valid 
(Chapter 5, sub-section5.3.2). This section has illustrated the risks associated with reliance on 
institutional or characteristic–based trust by showing six possible reasons for partner organisations 
to accept an IVS placement without ‘buying into the agenda’. This means that HCOs have to adopt 
strategies, for example, partner assessments, that increase their power to influence their 
relationships with their diverse partners. However, such strategies rely on the availability of the 
necessary time and resources to assimilate information on which to make partnership decisions. 
This exposes HCOs to risks, driving to make judgements that can backfire and have consequences 
for IVS that can undermine the development aims of projects. This is precisely what the next 
section examines as it looks at the relationships between the HCOs, the staff of partner 
organisations and representatives of beneficiary groups and volunteers, who are directly involved 
in IVS and the implementation of the project on the ground. 
7.4 Negotiating relationships with implementing partners  
 
This section looks at how knowledge sharing, the types of trust and power relations influence the 
way relationships are negotiated between the HCOs and the people directly involved in the 
implementing the development projects in which IVS is incorporated: the volunteers’ co-workers 
and counterparts in partner organisations, and representatives of the beneficiary groups. It argues 
that lack of an HCO’s responsiveness to contextual changes in the host-countries and the needs of 
the intended beneficiaries, and persistence in promoting the interests of the volunteer-sending 
countries in IVS policy and practice, constrain the relationships between the HCO and their 
implementing partners. This diminishes institutional trust in IVS and characteristic-based trust ‘by-
proxy’ of the HCO, sometimes reinforcing internalised inequalities associated with historical or 




As with many other developing countries, changes in the institutional infrastructure of Malawi - no 
matter how gradual - and the increasing number of educated and qualified Malawian professionals 
have changed the profile of IVS placements from direct service provision to capacity building and 
technical assistance (Chapter 2, section 2.7). One participant from IVCO4 head office observed: 
“I think that the expectations are that there will always be a demand for…competencies 
[based on], enthusiasm and commitment. [But] countries have a limited absorption 
capacity, and…we are trying to promote… [the] ownership capacity of the local 
institutions. So, one of the challenges … is having adequate demand for the supply of… 
volunteers.” (HQ 1) 
 
The above statement suggests that negotiating IVS placements is based on understanding the local 
context and supporting and prioritising national candidates subject to availability and suitability of 
qualifications. Sustainable development involves a change in the distribution of power among the 
stakeholders, with power shifting away from dominant actors to empower the weak to develop 
themselves (Edwards and Sen, 2000). In Malawi, the empowerment of qualified nationals is 
supported by the Government of Malawi’s rationale for the recruitment of international volunteers 
as “Not merely meant to fill vacancies, but to build capacity where specialized expertise is needed 
and only in cases where it is evident that there are no Malawians to occupy such posts” (Chilabade, 
2016, pp.2–3). This is further reinforced, as shown in the following excerpt  from a Directive 
issued by the Department of Human Resource Management and Development (DHRMD), 
Government of Malawi (2016): 
“[Despite] the approved procedures for recruitment of international volunteers into the 
Country….it has been observed that some institutions hosting international volunteers’ by-
pass DHRMD …..Government has with immediate effect directed that it will not approve 
security clearance for any international volunteer recruited in violation of the approved 
procedures.” (Chilabade, 2016, pp.2–3) 
 
However, Malawian public institutions may have the power to influence the formulation of rules, 
regulations and procedures, but weak infrastructures and capacity shortfalls mean that they do not 
always have the power over the necessary resources to enforce those rules. This weakness in 
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Malawian public institutions tips the balance of power in favour of those who match the criteria 
preferred by international donors and HCOs: 
“Some of the donors will trust a local partner that has a muzungu36 there; then they will go 
there [sic].” (HCO 8) 
 
This presents a challenge for HCOs, as well as other INGOs who recruit international staff and 
volunteers, in balancing conflicting priorities, namely, to comply with the time-bound terms of 
agreement for a donor-funded IVS placement, conformance with Malawian state regulations and 
observing the wider implications of engaging a foreign national to undertake work that a qualified 
Malawian may be able to do. The challenge of meeting the expectations of qualified nationals for 
employment is defining what is meant by appropriate qualifications for the role. The example 
below is from a participant from IVCO2 head office: 
“We wouldn’t send volunteers [when] our analysis would clearly say that its national 
colleagues that should have those job opportunities….but there is a variety of posts that 
only volunteers can fill, and they fill successfully.” (HQ 2) 
 
The difficulty is in differentiating roles that only an outsider can do or how to test that assumption 
by engaging potentially qualified nationals. Given weaknesses in infrastructure, it is not guaranteed 
that suitable candidates would necessarily be able to access relevant information.  
“In Malawi, we have so many challenges because of lack of useful information…we don’t 
know what process [is for applying for jobs]. How do you go about it?”(CPRT 6) 
 
Moreover, the ambiguities linked to the term ‘volunteer’ (Chapter 2, section 2.7) do not always 
inspire the most suitable candidates to apply, particularly if vacancies are also aimed at appealing 
to international volunteers:   
“When we first saw the ad…my friends laughed at it….Who volunteers?!.... [People with 
my qualification] make their own money out there,…have a laptop [and] a car, that kind of 
thing.” (VOL 17) 
                                                     
36
The term muzungu (or plural wazungu) is used in reference to multinational expatriates as well as the white postcolonial community 




Almost all participants, from HCO office staff, counterparts to volunteers, and even the volunteers 
agreed that most of the criteria could equally have been met, and sometimes more favourably so, if 
there had been another qualified Malawian instead of a foreigner (PTNR 6, CPRT 1, 3, 4, 8, 6, BG 
1, 2, HCO 8, 9, 10, VOL 7, 8, 10, 17): 
“Unfortunately most of the work that the volunteers do, there are local people that could 
do….. There are lots of them out there.”  (HCO 8)  
 
“I’m sure if you’d advertise this job, not as a volunteer but as a job…. online today, you’d 
get in your email one hundred applications before the end of the day.” (VOL 17) 
 
The response from Malawian professionals (including some of the HCO’s staff) to the ways in 
which HCOs’ promote IVS, is one of consent. Participants recognise that although HCOs have 
power over the use of donor funding for capacity building in Malawi, a supply-driven approach 
means that HCOs are often seen as promoting IVS to supporting qualified nationals. This is in line 
with the role of HCOs as boundary managers that straddle several social worlds and are 
accountable to them all. Mowles (2012, pp. 5–6) suggests that faced with conflicting priorities of 
meeting donor demands (and head offices’ expectations) for professionalization and attending to 
the relationship with beneficiaries and partners, “it is often the latter which suffers”, as illustrated 
by the following two participants:  
“It is possible that for some roles, the expertise can be found in Malawi, but at the moment, 
the priority for [IVCO3] is international volunteers.” (HCO 9) 
 
The practice of IVS sometimes contradicts the espoused principles of IVCOs concerning 
prioritising qualified nationals and suggests a process that does not recognise or include qualified 
Malawians as stakeholders. There is prevalent belief across the full range of participants that the 
roles undertaken by foreign volunteers can be carried out by qualified Malawians (PTNR 6, CPRT 
1, 3, 4, 8, 6, BG 1, 2, HCO 8, 9, 10, VOL 7, 8, 10, 17), and the scale of participant responses that 
acknowledged the availability of qualified Malawian show that the issue is not confined to either 
development-focused or placement-focused HCOs. It suggests that insufficient effort is being made 
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by donors, as well as HCOs, to provide mechanisms for identifying and supporting qualified 
Malawians in roles that are then occupied by international volunteers. Instead, they use their power 
to influence the promotion of  IVS based on a combination of institutional and characteristic-based 
trust of the IVCOs, which is applied to their HCOs ‘by proxy’ (section 7.2 of this chapter), as the 
two participants below illustrate: 
“We usually have applications from Malawians… But [for example], one….[international 
donor agency] indicated in the proposal that we need an international person.” (HCO 10) 
 
“I’ve always advocated for capacity to be located from within the country. I believe we do 
have those capacities in Malawi and we can get them... But [HCO] has been leaning 
towards having more of an international person…. At the end of the day, it was decided by 
[the donor and the HCO] to bring an international person.” (PTNR 3) 
 
The statements above show the challenges of having to balance multiple mandates, which can 
sometimes be perceived as advancing their organisational interests rather than the broader aims of 
development. The above statements correspond with the common criticism of NGOs that they are 
excessively focused on upward accountability to donors and authorities such as governments and 
their own head offices but are less mindful of downwards accountability in their relationships with 
the target beneficiaries, or the other development actors, colleagues and counterparts (Lewis, 2014, 
p. 193). The examples above find congruity with Lewis’s (2014, p. 193) observation that real or 
perceived disparity between upward and downward accountabilities can work against NGOs as 
“they can be seen as either the instruments of donor or foreign government interests, or the vehicles 
used by unscrupulous individuals to pursue their self-interested agendas.” 
 
Placing foreign volunteers into roles that qualified nationals can fulfil, contradicts their declared 
objectives for capacity building in institutional development in Malawi by blocking the 
opportunities for Malawians to participate in development activities in their own country. It 
diminishes the institutional trust of Malawian partners and colleagues in the fairness of the 
international volunteering processes, and the organisations that operate it. Institutional trust is 
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replaced with characteristic-based trust in ‘outsiders’ that can potentially reinforce internalised 
inequalities associated with colonialism or Western supremacy: 
“I think when you are from outside, you think that Malawi people are poor and they are 
even poor in their minds. So if I come, because I am the muzungu, it means I need to teach 
them. So that’s the challenge: [the volunteers] think you don’t know. They think they are 
there to educate you; they think they are there to do things in their own way. So that’s the 
challenge.” (MCPRT 11) 
 
The participant is expressing anger and resentment in the way IVS can reinforce cultural 
dominance. Data show widespread conviction among HCO staff and their implanting partners that 
most of the criteria for IVS placements reflect the variety of available placements which can 
potentially be translated into job vacancies for qualified nationals. This raises the expectations of 
qualified Malawians in the powers of HCOs to influence the decision-making processes of IVS in 
ways that are more favourable to educated Malawians. One participant observed that real or 
perceived inequality of power between the volunteers and their co-workers that was being used to 
justify IVS placements was related not to differences in technical proficiency, but the educated 
Malawians’ lack of exposure to professional experiences outside Malawi which call for a more 
reciprocal approach to international volunteering: 
“We only see [international volunteers] coming here. Are there no any chances that 
Malawians can go and volunteer there?....Sometimes people make decisions because 
they…don’t know what really happens in the developed countries, so their vision isn’t very 
far [sic]. So one way of helping the development of this country is to let people from this 
country get exposure to what really happens out there. When they come back, their 
decisions would be improved.” (MCPRT 4) 
This is not to say, however, that there aren’t occasions when valid reasons exist for the presence of 
an outsider, even it is not immediately apparent. Sometimes Malawian partner organisations 
distrust fellow Malawians and would rather place characteristic-based trust in ‘outsiders’,  not only 
in respect of their technical qualifications for the role but through fear linked to the potential risk of 
misuse of shared information. The following Malawian HCO staff members explain: 
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“We have to deal with government at a certain level. With the position, I am on 
now….when I see a risk I….forward it to the right desk, so it doesn’t stick on me. Because 
if [I] say the same thing, it will be received in a different way: “Ah, she is attacking us!” 
But when an international organisation says it, it’s constructive criticism.” (HCO 3) 
 
“The [Malawian partner] organisations are very tricky…..they’ll say: “What can my 
fellow Malawian tell me?” At least if it’s somebody from outside Malawi, they have that 
level of respect for them.” (HCO 10) 
HCO staff recognise that the costs associated with bringing in foreign volunteers could be better 
spent if redirected to support the employment of qualified nationals to do the same roles because 
“the partner organisations may not have the [financial] capacity…. to pay for those skills” (HCO 
8), but they do not always have the power to influence the candidate selection and recruitment 
processes: 
“[International volunteers] are expensive.  If you look at the budget, probably you will find 
that a lot of resources went towards the volunteers than the actual implementation.” (HCO 
5) 
International volunteers subsidised by IVCOs are a cheaper alternative for public or private sector 
employers, although the overall costs surpass the requirement for further training and employing 
qualified nationals. A further inference is that in the absence of a significant gap between the skills 
and/or knowledge of a volunteer and their colleagues in the partner organisation, an IVS placement 
can adversely affect the existing employees’ ownership of their tasks and responsibilities and 
counteract the broader aims of capacity-building (HCO 3, 8, 10) 
“The volunteers kind of cover-up for the [partner employees’] inactivity, because...they 
will be found as underperformers. [The] volunteers are making up for the missing 
technical officer who has decided to fold their hands [sic].” (HCO 3) 
 
HCOs are seen as having the ability to mediate between ‘grassroots’ and other stakeholders - such 
as government policymakers, multi-and bi-lateral institutional donors and other aid agencies, as 
well as their head offices and the volunteers. HCOs are deemed to be closer to the beneficiaries 
than donors, governments, aid agencies and IVCO head office, thus more likely to have access to 
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information that supports the aims of development interventions, allowing them to mediate 
between knowledge and action (Clark et al., 2016). However, interviews with beneficiary group 
representatives revealed little or no references to HCOs or their staff, reinforcing that the view that 
their perspective on IVS is based on their relationships with volunteers rather than HCO staff. In 
the absence of directly collectable data from beneficiary interviews, it was only possible to make 
judgements based on observations of behaviours and status of projects, as well as data from other 
interviewees such as volunteers and their counterparts and co-workers. Based on this analysis, it 
was possible to link the beneficiaries’ perceptions of HCOs to participatory approaches and 
communication channels that facilitate meaningful information exchange to and from the 
beneficiaries.  
 
Positive perceptions were linked to the ability of the beneficiaries to receive feedback information 
and to participate in, and contribute to, the processes of project implementation. In one example, 
the volunteer shared an office with her counterparts and collaborated on producing project plans 
which were shared and discussed with the beneficiaries at the beginning of the project, and were 
followed by frequent reviews and training workshops in which the beneficiaries were able to share 
experiences. I was able to observe several planning meetings including one where the entire group, 
including co-workers and volunteers, were able to jointly apply for an extension to the project, 
facilitated by the development-focused HCO and attended by the donor. Availability of spaces and 
opportunities to for the beneficiaries to exercise power to influence the project facilitated process-
based trust generation among the stakeholders, and was evidenced in the positive way the 
beneficiaries experienced the benefits to their lives. 
“Based on the lessons we get, and the financial benefits… we think in the near future; we 
shall have something to be proud of.” (BG 4) 
 
“There is plenty of goodness. These people [the volunteers] are neither selfish nor partial. 
They always help us in a lot of agricultural equipment such as seeds, hoes etc. in addition 




In contrast, negative perceptions of placement-focused HCOs were linked to poor communication 
and lack of participation by the beneficiaries in the processes of project implementation. In one 
such example, the counterparts and beneficiaries had not been involved in the design process, given 
a project plan or informed of the arrival of the volunteer. The logistics of the volunteer’s role 
prevented her from living near the project site or visit it more than 2 or three times per year. The 
counterparts and beneficiary groups had no contact with the HCO and could not form a relationship 
with the mostly absent volunteer. Consequently, problems during implementation could not be 
reported or acted upon. At the time of the fieldwork at the site, the project was almost one year 
behind schedule, physical and logistical aspects of the projects had failed, and lack of 
communication and training had left many of the co-workers and beneficiaries anxious, confused 
and uncertain about the future. The inability of the beneficiaries to influence the project processes 
had not only prevented the construction of process-based trust but resulted in diminished 
institutional trust of the HCO.  
 
This section has shown that the relationships between the HCOs, the staff of partner organisations 
and representatives of beneficiary groups, who are directly involved in IVS and the implementation 
of the project on the ground, is shaped by the way HCOs are seen to respond to contextual changes 
in the host country and the needs of the intended beneficiaries. It is shown that supporting 
opportunities for suitably qualified Malawians and engaging beneficiaries in the design and 
implementation of projects, not only enhances institutional and characteristic-based trust in the 
HCO among the implementing partners, but it contributes to the broader goals of development. 
However, HCOs face challenges in balancing the above with donors’, as well as IVCOs’, 
organisational mandates that promote the interests of the volunteer-sending countries in IVS policy 
and practice. Failing to achieve the right balance diminishes institutional trust in IVS and 
characteristic-based trust ‘by-proxy’ of HCOs, sometimes reinforcing internalised inequalities 






This chapter has examined the role of HCOs at the boundaries of their relationships with IVS 
stakeholders at the levels of strategic, mobilising and implementing partnerships. It has shown that 
contextual factors in the institutional landscape of development in Malawi impact on knowledge 
transfer, the types of trust and power relations between the HCOs and their strategic, mobilising 
and implementing partners. Thus influence the HCOs’ ability to act as manage the boundaries of 
their relationships with their partner organisations.  
 
Being tasked with multiple mandates, but also having to mediate between various stakeholders 
means that HCOs’ function parallels that of NGOs within their right, rather than a passive 
extension of IVCO head offices. This means that HCOs’ work situates them ‘between a rock and a 
hard place’ (Igoe and Kelsall, 2005, p. 1) because of unequal relationships with their different 
stakeholders. While HCOs need to have collaborative relationships with the donors for access to 
funding, and the Government of Malawi for approval to continue their work, they have to do so in a 
competitive environment with other development agencies. Thus the HCOs become embedded 
within a network of power and administration, which can distract them from the aims of 
development through social change (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013, p. 15).  
 
HCOs need to maintain their power over resources and power to influence authority for 
organisational survival and to protect their interests. To do so, they ‘strategically translate’ 
information (Nauta, 2006) between the beneficiary groups and the programme stakeholders (and 
IVCOs’ head office) which can lead to inconsistencies between policy and practice of IVS. These 
inconsistencies have an effect on the institutional and characteristic-based trust ‘by proxy’ of the 
HCOs by people who are directly involved in setting the development programme’s long term aims 
(strategic partners), project design (mobilising partners) and project delivery (implementing 
partners), none of whom has overall power over the range of resources required to achieve the 
desired goals of IVS. Moreover, the discrepancies between policy and practice of IVS and its 
subsequent impact on development projects, do not appear to influence the institutional and 
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characteristic-based trust ‘by proxy’ of the HCOs by the donor community. This corresponds with 
Fowler’s (1997, p. 168) observation that donors avoid critical evaluation of organisational 
conditions or characteristics which might have contributed to project results “as if organisations in 
the aid chain are not part and parcel of what happens.” Thus it supports the focus of this research 
that the nature and longevity of the challenges in IVS are less likely to be related to value-based 
principles of volunteering than to the failures of the organisational processes of IVS programmes 





























This thesis has argued that different types of trust, power relations and the way knowledge is 
shared in the negotiation of relationships between the HCOs and their IVS stakeholders, influence 
the course of development through IVS towards its intended aims. The study addresses a gap in the 
literature of development interventions through IVS. Despite their critical role in the provision of 
volunteer services (Hustinx and Lammertyn, 2003; IVR, 2004; Sherraden et al., 2006, 2008; Studer 
and von Schnurbein, 2013), IVCOs are almost invisible in development management literature as 
an organisational form and “have remained a black box” (Nelson and Child, 2016). Even more 
conspicuous is the absence of IVCO host country offices in development management, NGO 
management and volunteer management literature. This study bridges the gap in the literature by 
drawing from relevant parts of the literature on MNCs and boundary organisations to examine the 
role and influence of HCOs as a distinct component of development management in steering IVS.    
 
HCOs have to negotiate relationships with a large array of individuals and organisations with 
diverse interests. Negotiating relationships involves the range of human behaviour of which trust 
and power are key influential variables that shape the expectations and behaviours of people and 
organisations (Chapter 3, section 3.2). In turn, types of trust and power relations influence, and are 
influenced by, factors such as histories of individuals or organisations, differences in culture, and 
use of language, but most crucially by information exchange and knowledge sharing between 
stakeholders (Chapter 3, section 3.2.4). 
 
By analysing the roles of trust and power in how relationships are negotiated between HCOs and 
the IVS stakeholders this research makes theoretical, empirical and policy contributions to the 
literature on development management and volunteer management through international 
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volunteering. This chapter presents a discussion of the main empirical and conceptual findings of 
this study and shows how they contribute to, and move forward, the existing understanding of the 
role of HCOs in international volunteering.  
 
Section 8.2 discusses the key findings of Chapters 5 and 6 and 7 across the three fields of inquiry 
to suggest the overall insights from the study.  
 
Section 8.3 revisits the theoretical framework that was developed for this research and considers its 
contribution to, and limitations in, addressing the key research question.  
 
Section 8.4 sets out the overall conclusion of this research. It establishes the centrality of the role 
of HCOs as key actors in development through international volunteering and reinforces their 
status as boundary managers tasked with negotiating relationships with multiple stakeholders to 
whom they are accountable. The section shows the importance of different types of trust and power 
relations, and the way knowledge is shared in how these relationships are negotiated by HCOs. 
 
Section 8.5 presents the contribution of this research to empirical, theoretical knowledge, 
methodological approach and policy considerations 
 
Section 8.6 Concludes this thesis by offering recommendations for wider research including a 
further investigation of the strategic orientation of IVCOs to development; more in-depth study of 
the role of HCOs and NGOs as boundary managers; further study of the potential moral hazard in 
the relationship between stakeholders in development interventions, and examining the 
relationships between host country employees and employed foreign staff in the same 






8.2 Summary of key findings 
 
To find out how relationships are negotiated between IVCO host country offices and the 
stakeholders in IVS programmes, this study directed its attention toward five IVCO host country 
offices, using Malawi for the contextual background. This section presents a discussion of the main 
findings of Chapters 5 and 6 and 7 in each of the three categories of stakeholders that HCOs 
negotiate relationships with:   
i) The international volunteers  
ii) Their IVCO head offices, and 
iii) The other stakeholders such as partner organisations, government and international 
funding agencies.  
 
Issues related to conflicts between HCO staff and volunteers have been reported in the literature on 
IVS for over sixty years (Chapter 2, section 2.2) and remain unresolved to the present day. In 
exploring possible underlying reasons for these conflicts, chapter 5 argued that the negotiation of 
the relationship between the HCO staff and the volunteers is influenced by the diversity of 
perspectives on volunteering, the organisational focus of the IVCO and the contrasting expectations 
of the professional, personal and administrative support that HCOs can provide for the volunteers.  
 
The proliferation of terminology applied to volunteers, and the growing number of international 
volunteers of diverse social, cultural and demographic backgrounds with different motivations for 
volunteering, has created ambiguities in the perceptions and expectations of volunteering. These 
factors make it problematic for HCOs’ staff, and other IVS stakeholders, to ‘read’ the intentions of 
the volunteers. This can lead to assumptions based on stereotypes that reinforce historical power 
inequalities or failed expectations of characteristic-based trust. The combined effects of 
experiences and accumulation of realised or unrealised expectations build upon existing beliefs and 
understandings of volunteering among individual actors, creating a number of perspectives of 
international volunteers that necessitate mediation. It showed that geographical and cultural barriers 
limit the opportunities for building process-based trust between the HCOs and the volunteers. 
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Therefore, their relationships are informed by institutional and characteristic-based types of trust 
and shaped by real or perceived assumptions of unequal power over resources and power to 
influence. Subsequently, the types of trust and power relations contribute to the way information is 
exchanged between the HCOs, the volunteers and their co-workers in partner organisations. 
 
Volunteers and their eventual partner organisations rely on HCOs to provide them with the 
necessary information to allow them to make informed decisions about their commitment to IVS.  
As boundary managers, HCOs are thus acting as gate-keepers of information (Choudry and 
Kapoor, 2013) and are able to be selective in sharing information (Ebrahim, 2002). HCOs can 
strategically control the flow of information to the different stakeholders (Nauta, 2006) – the 
government, the partner organisation, the volunteers, their head office and the donors – through 
various channels of communication including partnerships agreements, reports, and job 
descriptions. Asymmetry of knowledge between HCOs and other stakeholders can backfire if the 
HCO does not have the necessary power over resources, capacity or clarity of mandate to identify 
and analyse the factors that contribute to the success of a placement. If the expectations of 
volunteers are not met on arrival at their placement, it leads to the erosion of institutional and 
characteristic-based trust, potential conflict between HCO staff and the volunteers, and has a 
consequence for the IVS and the wider development project. This makes ‘managing’ power 
relations and generating process-based trust in the HCOs’ relationship with the volunteers during 
the placement period problematic. During my fieldwork, I found this sometimes led to volunteers’ 
early departure from an IVS placement or undertaking independent work, which may have serious 
consequences for all key IVS stakeholders.  
 
Chapter 5 showed that a development-focused approach to IVS emphasises knowledge sharing 
between the HCO and the partner organisation, and the agreement of long term goals that lead to 
the targeted recruitment of volunteers with explicit skills that add to the partner organisation’s 
existing expertise, strengths and opportunities. This approach makes it easier for HCOs to negotiate 
their relationships with the volunteers since the placement is one of several instruments of technical 
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assistance that allow the facilitation of local effort rather than imported foreign expertise. It 
strengthens the institutional trust of the volunteers and their co-workers in the HCO and lays the 
foundations for building process-based trust, positive relationships and future cooperation. The 
added value of the IVS placement is thus recognised in a meaningful way since volunteers are an 
element in the mix of resources aimed at the delivery of the overall goals of the programme. 
 
In contrast, a placement-focused approach creates role conflict and uncertainty of priorities for 
HCOs in their function as boundary managers, with mandates to act as agents of development 
while simultaneously facilitating volunteer services as a primary organisational objective. The 
impact of role conflict on the work of the HCO is evident in the language and content of documents 
and other forms of shared information which are incomplete and contain ambiguities that lead to 
tensions in negotiating relationships with volunteers. Examples of underlying causes of poor 
relationships between HCOs and volunteers were related to the HCOs’ perceived lack of 
professional expertise, resources, and networks to support their volunteers, as well as unrealistic 
logistics and miscalculation of the context of the IVS placements. Ambiguities open spaces for 
interpretation and assumptions that may not be correct, but the HCO may not have power over 
resources (funds, volunteer management skills), or power to influence IVCO policy, to bring about 
change. This position of the HCOs reflects the dilemma faced by all NGOs in balancing their 
development mandates with the imperatives for organisational survival and can have a negative 
impact on the potential for building process-based trust and a cooperative relationship between 
HCOs’ staff and the volunteers. Although the findings in this research point to a sharp divide 
between development-focused and placement-focused IVCO strategies, the fact that they are based 
on the study of five IVCOs limits their generalizability. More research would be needed to 
understand the consistency of the evidence and its implications.  
 
Chapter 6 argued that the distribution of power over resources and power to influence between 
HCOs and IVCO head offices affects the expectations of trust between these organisational units in 
ways that can support or constrain information exchange. Drawing on literature about MNCs, this 
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chapter showed that, unlike the way they are portrayed on IVCO websites, HCOs are not 
continuous extensions of IVCO head offices. Discrepancies in the way IVCOs’ organisational 
strategies, structures and procedural policies are formulated and communicated influence the 
internal mechanisms of HCO management and administration, impacting on programme selection, 
negotiations and decision-making. Low expectations of trust and inability to influence intra-
organisational policies and procedures leads to a situation of uncertainty for HCO staff and 
increases their perception of risk, driving them to protect themselves through behaviours that affect 
the processes and outcomes of IVS and the development programme in which IVS is incorporated.  
 
The chapter showed that how HCOs negotiate relationships within the IVCO is shaped by the 
history of the parent organisation, the types of trust and power relations that existed when the 
IVCO was first set up, and how and why they changed over the years (Chapter 6, section 6.2). The 
ability of the IVCOs to respond to emerging global trends is related to the types of external and 
internal information that each considers important, how the information is used and for what 
purpose (Chapter 6, sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). The relationships between the HCOs and their head 
offices were therefore informed by the way each IVCO interpreted external factors into internal 
policies and procedures. It was shown that development-focused IVCOs’ outward-facing 
perspective (Chapter 6, section 6.2.1) enabled them to develop internal structures, policies and 
procedures that recognise and support the HCO in mitigating the challenges that they face in their 
role. In contrast, the placement-focused inward-facing perspective (Chapter 6, section 6.2.2) led to 
weaknesses in organisational structures, policies and processes that might support information 
assimilation and knowledge sharing in ways that facilitate organisational responses to growth and 
change (Chapter 6, section 6.2.2).  
 
Global trends in fund disbursement, donor imperative for professionalism and an evidence-based 
approach to development, as well as improvements in education, health and infrastructure in 
developing countries steer IVCOs to reassess their strategies for IVS. Negotiation of relationships 
between the HCOs and their head offices involves changes to the distribution of power of resources 
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and power to influence, that in turn, impact on institutional and process-based trust of trust between 
them. Findings from development-focused IVCOs showed that process-based trust is more likely to 
develop when in-house formal and informal relationships encourage contributions from staff and 
volunteers. When conformance to policies and procedures is embedded in the long-term 
relationships, the continuity of the relationship allows the opportunity for process-based trust to 
develop at different levels of organisational structure and support knowledge sharing and 
collaborative behaviours among the staff of both HCO and head office. These include not only 
fairer remuneration and benefits packages for staff but the transparency of decision making, 
allocation of the appropriate level of resources, as well as opportunities for professional and 
personal development of HCOs’ staff.  
 
Placement-focused IVCOs in my study struggled to meet the challenges of global trends in 
professionalization and aid disbursement in development, and the changing context of development 
in developing countries, both of which presented serious threats to the IVCOs’ organisational 
survival. The lack of preparedness to respond to the changing topography of global development is 
evident in the day to day operation of the placement-focused HCOs where HCO staff are 
experiencing role conflict, uncertainty of priorities, inadequate power over resources to be effective 
in their work, and lack of power to influence intra-organisational policies that could help improve 
their performance. The consequences are staff frustration, negative attitudes to work, and high 
levels of staff and volunteer turnover that reflect the loss of institutional and process-based trust in 
the IVCO.   
 
Challenges in the relationships between HCOs and head offices of all IVCOs are not exclusive to 
individual IVCOs or even to particular levels within IVCOs internal structures, although they may 
be less visible, or more skilfully mitigated by some IVCOs than others. A level of acceptance was 
noted in the staff of placement-focused HCOs, of the weaknesses in organisational structures and 
processes that are designed to capture and respond to information exchange. However, these 
weaknesses undervalue the integrity and reciprocity of information being shared and might meet 
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the expectations of institutional trust but not of process-based trust between the HCO and head 
office. This resonates with insights from the literature on boundary organisations (Chapter 2, 
section 2.6) in respect of the purpose of policies or procedures that apply to the production of 
information that is neither scrutinized for integrity of the content, nor subject to internal 
accountabilities, thus resembling a ‘moral hazard’ (Guston, 1999, p. 93) in the relationships 
between the HCO and its head office.  
 
Chapter 6 showed that, as boundary managers, the ability of the HCOs to manage their 
relationships with their IVS stakeholders’ is as much a product of their relationship with their head 
office as that of the domestic context in the host country. Enduring policies that are not applied 
enforced, or reconsidered, diminish in value and efficiency as administrative tools and lead to role 
uncertainty and conflict of priorities among the HCOs’ staff. When the issues of concern, whether 
at HCO or head office level, are not addressed satisfactorily, they are likely to remain and possibly 
be repeated. This may explain why problems that were reported decades ago continue to exist in 
the present day.  
 
Chapter 7 argued that contextual factors in the institutional landscape of development in Malawi 
impact on the dynamics of trust and power relations between the HCOs and their partner 
organisation at a programme’s strategic (donors and the government of Malawi), mobilising 
(partner organisations and other aid agencies) and implementation levels (communities and 
beneficiary groups). It showed that HCOs are in interdependent relationships where they have to 
collaborate with the donors for access to funding, with the Government of Malawi to endorse the 
continuation of their work, and with local partners and beneficiary groups for project mobilisation 
and implementation, while simultaneously competing with other development agencies. Thus, as 
boundary managers, they are forced to operate “between a rock and a hard place” (Igoe and Kelsall, 




Interdependence underlines the challenges that HCOs face in negotiating relationships with actors 
when the boundaries of interactions are not only unclear but are unstable. The shift in power 
distribution as a consequence of the Cashgate scandal (Chapter 4, section 4.5) characterises the 
shifting nature of the power relations in the interdependent relationships between the HCOs, as 
boundary managers, the donors and the Government of Malawi. The donors’ decision to redirect 
fund disbursement represented an exercise of their power over resources, as well as the loss of 
process-based trust and diminished institutional trust in the Government of Malawi. On the other 
hand, it showed the donors’ institutional and characteristic-based trust ‘by proxy’ in the HCOs (and 
other NGOs). The removal of this power from the Government increased the power of HCOs over 
resources but diminished the basis for institutional trust in the HCOs’ relationships with state 
departments and ministries (Chapter 7, section 7.2).  
 
As boundary managers, HCOs face challenges in negotiating relationships because the multiplicity 
of different stakeholders and the competitive arena of development in Malawi make building 
process-based trust problematic. Their task is further complicated by the transient nature of 
development work where people and jobs change several times within the life-cycle of a project. 
Thus the HCOs and their IVS stakeholders are over-reliant on institutional and characteristic-based 
types of trust which are founded on assumptions that may not be accurate, or may change (for 
example as in the consequences of Cashgate), and therefore might not deliver the expectations of 
these kinds of trust. The donors’ trust in HCOs is founded on presumptions of the HCOs’ ability 
and capacity to deliver the contractual terms of the agreement and is based on a combination of 
institutional and characteristic-based types of trust in the HCOs’ parent organisations. However, 
Chapter 6 showed that HCOs, and in particular, placement-focused HCOs, do not always have the 
required contextual knowledge, administrative tools and processes, management skills and 
organisational capacity to deliver the agreed programme objectives. Although empirical data 
(Chapter 7, section 7.2) reveal weaknesses in practice and implementation of IVS, they do not 
appear to impact on the level of trust in HCOs in the eyes of the donors. This suggests that although 
donor power may look like over-reliance on institutional and characteristic-based trust, it also 
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reflects a disparity in the donors’ focus between reaching an operational goal within a project cycle 
(Chapter 1, section 1.4) and achieving the strategic goal of social change through development 
intervention. This concurs with Gulrajani’s (2014, p. 90) suggestion that evaluating donor 
performance, using information based only on the mechanics of aid delivery, undermines the more 
important question of donor effectiveness. 
 
IVS can be requested by a partner organisation when it is demand-driven and development-focused 
in principle, or offered by the HCO when it is often supply-driven and placement-focused (Chapter 
7, section 7.3). The combination of the donors’ institutional and characteristic-based trust on HCOs 
can tip the balance of power over resources and power to influence the aims and processes of IVS 
in favour of the international donors and HCOs but undermines the role and contribution of the 
Malawian partners. This is particularly noticeable in placement-focused HCOs where the 
persistence of donors, IVCOs and INGOs in promoting the interests of the volunteer-sending 
countries in IVS policy and practice, rather than appointing qualified Malawians, constrain the 
relationships between the HCOs and their implementing partners.   
 
On the other hand, HCOs are themselves equally susceptible to receiving inaccurate information 
that can impact on their performance. Malawian partners sometimes consent to the power of the 
HCO over resources even though they have not bought into the agenda for reasons that are different 
from the aims of IVS and can impact its course and outcomes. This implies a lack of transparency 
in the disclosure of the needs, expectations of outcomes - a lack of process-based trust - by both the 
HCO and the partner organisation, which may be either deliberate or unintentional. Six possible 
reasons for Malawian partners’ consent to IVS have been identified from the data: i) cultural norms 
in Malawi, ii) financial benefits for the Malawian partner, iii) issues related to human resources, iv) 





The preceding summary of the findings shows that this research has produced new data by 
examining host country offices as boundary managers of five IVCOs, using a theoretical 
framework that examines different kinds of trust and power in situations when knowledge sharing 
is a key factor. Next, the chapter revisits the framework to reflect on its contribution and limitations 
in this research. 
8.3 Revisiting the Theoretical Framework 
 
 
This research has produced new data by examining host country offices of five IVCOs, as 
boundary managers, using a theoretical framework that examines different types of trust and power 
relations in situations when knowledge sharing is a key factor in the negotiation of relationships 
between the HCOs and their diverse IVS stakeholders. The framework, which was presented in 
Chapter 3, showed the diversity of IVS stakeholders, which was grouped into three categories in 
the process of data analysis, based on the relationships between the HCOs and: 
i) The international volunteers  
ii) Their IVCO head office, and 
iii) The other stakeholders such as partner organisations, government and international 
funding agencies.  
The purpose of this framework was to reach a better understanding of the relationships between 
HCOs and key IVS stakeholders at different operational levels of their work, why these 
relationships matter and how they affect what the HCOs do, to answer the research question: 
How do host country offices negotiate the multiple and diverse relationships involved in 
setting up and overseeing international volunteering service in development projects? 
 
Figure 8 below, reflects the way insight gained during the research developed in the course of this 
research combined to characterize the complexity of the relationships between the HCOs and their 
IVS stakeholders. It draws out the interplay between trust and power relations in the negotiation of 
relationships between the HCOs and their IVS stakeholders, and the significance of different forms 
of trust and the dynamics of power that support or constrain relationships in development 
programmes through IVS.  
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This study has developed a new theoretical framework (Figure 8) for analysing the role of trust and 
power in influencing the way HCOs negotiate relationships with IVS stakeholders at both global, 
and local, levels. The empirical evidence drawn from five international IVCOs in Malawi provides 
an extensive explanation of this framework, presented across three empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 
6, 7). The research has revealed that the factors that can help bridge the gap between the theory and 
practice of IVS are related to how formal and informal relationships are negotiated between the 
HCOs and the IVS stakeholders. This thesis has argued that that different types of trust, power 
relations and the way knowledge is shared in the negotiation of relationships between the HCOs 
and their IVS stakeholders, influence the course of IVS, and the development project in which it is 
incorporated, towards their intended aims. In doing so, this study moves beyond the established 
analysis of trust in IVS and links this domain to wider conceptual debates on power and knowledge 
sharing, through which, it offers new insight. It has reinforced the importance of knowledge 
sharing (Chapter 3, section 3.2.4) and its reciprocal connection to different types of trust and its 










































Access to information (asymmetry of information leading to a moral hazard), utilisation of 
information to create knowledge is key to the role of HCOs as boundary managers. Their role as 
boundary managers is to make sure information reaches where it needs to so that it can become 
knowledge. In so doing, HCOs have to negotiate various relationships between different 
stakeholders by reducing the asymmetries of information or by providing information to partners 
who need that information. Showing the HCOs as boundary managers has been useful in 
conceptualising the multiple mandates and accountabilities that HCOs have to manage and the 
opportunities and challenges that they face in delivering these mandates. 
 
Nevertheless, the framework also presented limitations and impedes the generalizability of some of 
the findings in this research. First, it is largely constrained by its static form, despite efforts to 
convey movement, and does not take into account the impact of changes and pressures brought 
about by external factors (global trends, histories, environmental issues) or contextual changes 
within the host country's institutional landscape of development, such as political, social or 
economic matters. Second, although the framework distinguishes between the three sets of 
stakeholders with which HCOs negotiate relationships, there are nuances in the relationships 
between the stakeholders that include different forms of trust, knowledge exchange and power 
relations that can influence the context of other relationships within IVS. Chapter 7 identified 
interdependence between the donors, the Government of Malawi and the HCOs, but on reflection, 
similar interdependencies also exist to varying degrees between different stakeholders - for 
example between the HCO and their head office - that also impact on their relationships with the 
other stakeholders. Thus relationships between the stakeholders, that might not directly involve the 
HCOs, also influence HCOs as boundary managers in ways that the framework does not capture.  
 
The third factor is related to the diversity of the characteristics and organisational forms of HCOs. 
Much has been claimed in this research about the differences between HCOs and their head offices, 
but HCOs are also different from each other as organisational units and have different histories, 
mix of national and international staff and internal cultures, as well as objectives, policies and 
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procedures that influence their external relationships with the other IVS stakeholders. Crucially, the 
difference between development-focused and placement-focused IVCOs and the subsequent impact 
on the characteristics of their HCO was not recognised in the original framework. However, as 
shown at the end of section 6.2 of Chapter 6, the primary focus of the IVCO has a direct effect on 
how HCOs negotiate relationships within and outside of their parent organisations. Fourth is 
recognising the diverse conceptualisations of power in the relationships that have been examined. 
The literature on power is extensive and addresses various types of power in different levels, spaces 
and positions (Chapter 3, section 3.4). By focusing only on power over resources, and power to 
influence, other features in power relations that may be influential in the negotiation of the 
relationships are likely to have been neglected. Conceptualisations of trust in the literature are less 
numerous when compared to power, and tend to be nuanced forms of the Zucker’s categorisation 
used in this research. However, the interplay between the different bases for trust, and the 
relationships between trust as “goodwill” or as “predictability” (Hardy et al., 1998) have not been 
captured in this research.   
 
Fifth, although Chapter 3 (section 3.2) recognised histories, cultural norms and language as 
influential elements in the negotiation of relationships, they were only referred to anecdotally in 
this research, for example, in the histories of IVCOs (Chapter 6, section 6.2), and that of financial 
mismanagement in Malawi (Chapter 7, section 7.2); the cultural norms associated with time, and 
deference (Chapter 7, section 7.3), and language used to construct institutional and characteristic-
based trust (Chapter 5, section 5.3). However, they signify that histories, cultural norms and 
language are influential factors in negotiating relationships in their own right and merit deeper 
investigation. Finally, the framework is limited to looking at a specific type of IVS for 
development but does not consider other potential influences such as age, ethnicity or gender of 
HCO staff or the volunteers and other stakeholders. Furthermore, the characterisation of 
international volunteering (compared to home country volunteering) is continually evolving in 
response to global political, social, economic and demographic trends leading to increasing 
232 
 
ambiguity surrounding the meaning and perceptions of IVS among all the stakeholders, which was 
captured in Chapters 5 and 7 of this thesis, but not represented in the original framework. 
 
This section has examined the contribution and the limitations of the conceptual framework in 
investigating the dynamics of trust and power relations in the way relationships are negotiated 
between the HCOs and their IVS stakeholders. The next section draws together the findings of the 
study to answer the overall conclusion of this thesis and is followed by an outline of its 
contribution to the policy, practice and theory of IVS, as well as recommendations for further 
research. 
8.4 Overall conclusion 
 
This research has sought to contribute theoretical and practical insights into the gap between the 
theory and practice of IVS. It has responded to Nelson and Child’s (2016, p. 543) allusion to 
IVCOs’ organisational form as a black box, by studying the role of host country offices and how 
the way they negotiate relationships with the other IVS stakeholders supports or constrains the 
realisation of the intended outcomes of development intervention through IVS. In doing so, it 
attempted to prise open the black box and examine what might be inside.  
 
The research has highlighted the crucial role of HCOs in development through international 
volunteering and provided new insight into existing inconsistencies between the theory and practice 
of IVS. By conceptualising and critically exploring HCOs as ‘boundary managers’, this study 
provided new insights not only in the ways in which HCOs can identify the tensions between 
Global North and Global South contexts, but also the strategies that can be deployed to effectively 
manage these in a way that enhances the impact of development programmes and initiatives in the 
host country. This research offers insight into the ways placements are affected by organizational 
structures. This is important since to date, the majority of the literature on IVS focuses on 
international volunteers and on their experiences of success or failure. The approach used helps 
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situate these experiences within the wider political economy of development, highlighting a new 
area of interest for academics in this area. 
 
This study has identified mismatches around HCO’s development orientations and the needs of 
volunteers that help explain some of the inconsistencies between the theory and practice of IVS. It 
shows that the gap between theory and practice of IVS is narrower when HCOs are able to focus on 
strategic development interventions through long-term partnerships that allow trust to develop over 
time. Such a focus also involves providing the HCOs with adequate access to resources to do their 
work, spaces and opportunities to participate in democratic processes, facilitating information 
exchange and reciprocal knowledge sharing, while holding HCOs accountable for what they do.  
 
In contrast, the gap between theory and practice of IVS becomes wider when IVCOs’ 
organisational focus drives their HCOs to ‘farm’ projects opportunistically (Chapter 5, section 
5.3.1), to satisfy the mandate from their head offices. Such an approach to IVS adds situational 
variables which can affect the delivery of the intended outcomes of IVS. A fragmented approach 
that engages IVS in thematic areas of development increases the likelihood of conflicting priorities, 
goal uncertainty and inadequate evaluative processes for HCOs’ staff, and potentially leads to a 
breakdown of trust which can adversely affect the contribution of IVS to the development 
intervention. Thus the research has shown that delivery of development goals reliably, and 
consistently, is more of a challenge for IVCOs that remained a volunteer-sending agency for a 
sustained period of time before directing their efforts more towards development.   
 
Locating international volunteering within the Malawian development landscape (Chapter 6), the 
thesis helps move debate further again from the emphasis on the international volunteer and on the 
dynamics that shape their decisions to volunteer. In other words, it moves the discussion towards a 
more critical engagement with the setting in the global South and the ways these articulate with 
international organizational forms. Furthermore, the study adds a new dimension of research to IVS 




Perceptions of risk can be minimised when trust in the relationship is based on repeated past 
experiences of positive outcomes (process-based trust). This research has shown opportunities for 
building process-based trust are limited in the arena of international development through IVS. 
Thus there is an over-reliance on institutional-trust and characteristic-based trust between the 
HCOs, and the other stakeholders, including the volunteers (Chapters 5 and 7) based on prevailing 
perceptions and beliefs. However, institutional trust and characteristic-based types of trust can be 
misplaced or misleading because they can be based on inaccurate or outdated perceptions or 
expectations that can be constructed - particularly by placement-focused IVCOs - to appeal to 
targeted audiences (such as donors, and potential volunteers) through documents, reports, web 
pages and the media. Geographical and cultural barriers present asymmetry of knowledge and limit 
the possibility of process-based trust between the HCOs’ staff and the international volunteers 
before their acceptance and arrival at the post. Thus, if volunteers’ expectations of are not met on 
arrival, they can exercise their power to engage in activities outside the mandates of IVS, or return 
home, either way, creating a gap in the processes and outcomes of IVS and the wider project.  
 
The next section sets out the study’s contribution to empirical, theoretical knowledge and policy.   
 
8.5 Contribution of research 
 
8.5.1 Empirical contribution   
The empirical focus in this thesis is on a project with a very specific organisational unit of a 
particular type of INGO, yet the findings are relevant to a range of non-profit, decentralised 
organisations where  relationships have to be negotiated with multiple and diverse stakeholders, at 
different levels and across national and international boundaries  to achieve joint outcomes. HCOs 
are considered anecdotally in the literature and externally to their contextual situation. This not 
only excludes the perspectives of HCOs, but it also ignores the possibility that HCOs’ perspectives 
might be of importance and value. This assumption pervades much of the literature, not only on 
international volunteering but in NGO and development management literature.  
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By using HCOs as the unit of analysis, this study explored what is valued in HCOs’ work from the 
HCO staff’s own perspectives and those of the people and organisations that they work with. This 
study has shown how the HCOs perceive their work is sometimes different from the IVCO 
narrative of what is expected of them, and that the HCOs’ relationships with IVS stakeholders, 
including with their head offices, is shaped by complex formal and informal relationships in 
different contextual settings.   
 
Insights from this research can add to knowledge on how to achieve improvements in the quality of 
programme implementation and explain the paths that led to intended and unintended outcomes of 
development interventions. The acknowledgement that rapid change is occurring worldwide and 
locally, and that historical factors influence contemporary situations ultimately brings clarity and 
depth to analyses. 
 
Finally, this research has highlighted the importance of process-based trust in supporting 
cooperation in relationships and positive outcomes of those relationships. This is because process-
based trust facilitate both of the key characteristics of trust: ‘goodwill’ defined as mutual 
expectations of reciprocity between partners (Ring and Van De Ven, 1992) and ‘predictability’, 
defined as the probability with which an actor assesses that another actor will act in a certain way 
(Luhmann, 1979; Zucker, 1986). What differentiates process-based trust from institutional and 
characteristic-based types of trust is the element of predictability based on the continuity of past-
experiences which make it a process, rather than assumptions that may or may not be accurate or 
may have changed over time.  
 
The study has also shown that process-based trust is difficult to build in development programmes. 
Geographical distance, diversity of cultures, languages social and economic backgrounds, the 
multiplicity of actors with dissimilar motivations and agendas and movement of personnel leave 
little time for learning or reflection and make it extremely difficult to build process-based trust. The 
challenges of building process-based trust in IVS, are further complicated because the inclusion of 
236 
 
the volunteer adds an extra variable element into the mix of relationships between the HCOs and 
their IVS stakeholders. Consequently, any initiative or action that increases time in the 
relationships between actors will also increase opportunities for building process-based trust. For 
example, internal mechanisms that improve both staff and volunteer retention (such as appropriate 
resourcing, remunerations, training and career development); longer-term IVS placements, 
frequency of formal and informal communications and feedback systems that involve face to face 
interactions between HCO staff, their head office colleagues and the volunteers (including using 
technology such as mobile phones and Skype). 
 
8.5.2 Contribution to theory  
HCOs are pivotal to the course of determining development interventions appropriate for volunteer 
placement and managing all the processes involved before, during, and often after the volunteers’ 
time in post. This research contributes to knowledge by addressing a gap in the literature on 
development management through international volunteering by focusing not on volunteers, but on 
the HCOs of IVCOs. In doing so, it has provided insights into the underlying reasons for the 
contradictions and imbalance between theory and practice of IVS.   
 
The significance of the role of HCOs is illustrated in the way the theoretical framework created for 
this research evolved from its original form in Chapter 3 (section 3.5) into a conceptual construct 
(this Chapter, section 8.3), that adds to the literature on development management through IVS. 
The conceptual framework has provided an innovative and multi-disciplinary perspective of IVCOs 
as an organisational form, and the HCOs as a distinct component of development management. It 
has done so, by drawing from the literature on MNCs and boundary organisations, linking them to 
the way trust and power relations in intra- and inter-organisational relationships influence how 
HCOs share knowledge and negotiate relationships with their IVS stakeholders.  The research 
contributes to the understanding of the influences of trust and power in the negotiation of 
relationships between actors in the following situations: 
 It adds to the literature on MNCs and NGO management by showing that the HCOs’ intra-
organisational relationship with their central office influences how they negotiate their 
237 
 
inter-organisational relations with the other IVS actors, thus influencing how HCOs make 
connections across organisational boundaries. Furthermore, the study shows that power 
relations between head office and HCOs of decentralised organisations are linked to the 
institutional values of the organisation, which in turn, determines its approach to 
knowledge sharing within, and outside, the organisation, how it responds to external 
change and how external influences are then interpreted into internal policies. 
 
 It extends the concept of boundary organisations from its origins in scientific/non-scientific 
work (Chapter 2, section 2.6), linking it with the literature on development management. In 
this way, it provides a better understanding of the challenges that HCOs face in negotiating 
several relationships with diverse stakeholders. HCOs have to bridge not just two, but 
multiple, boundaries as ‘agents of development’ (Chapter 2, section 2.3) with several 
accountabilities. Framing HCOs as boundary managers has also provided an appreciation 
of the importance of symmetry in information exchange and knowledge sharing in IVS 
work.    
 
 It shows that in situations when the multiplicity of stakeholders in a competitive 
environment makes building process-based trust problematic, institutional and 
characteristic-based trust can be used to partially or entirely include or exclude actors in 
relationship negotiations, resulting in changes in the distribution of power that can help 
legitimise and maintain the supremacy of the dominant or colluding actors.   
 
 Using insight from science studies to frame HCOs as boundary managers has helped 
highlight the critical and multiple challenges that they face and can be extended to the 
study of other INGOs and aid agencies that work through host country offices. The 
diversity of IVCO forms and structures, as well as the interconnected relationships with 
multiple stakeholders, make it difficult to offer generalised insights. Nevertheless, 
conceptualizing HCOs as boundary managers offers the possibility of integrating multiple 
types of information in useable forms for the different stakeholders and can help support 
the negotiation of power relations, particularly with powerful actors such as international 
donors or governments (Clark et al., 2016).  
 
Consequently, insights from this study have extended the relevance of this thesis to the wider 
literature on development management, and NGO and volunteer management as sub-sets, and 
provided the potential for using the findings from this study in further investigative work around 
the role of host country offices of international non-profit organisations. Furthermore, few studies 
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within the volunteer management literature have sought to understand the implications of managing 
and coordinating the activities and welfare of international volunteers in geographically and 
culturally different contexts.  
 
8.5.3 Contribution to methodology 
The relationships between the HCOs and their stakeholders are important and influential in IVS 
processes, yet are persistently understudied. Using a cross-case approach, this research moved 
beyond the tendency of contemporary literature to focus on volunteers and, instead, attended to 
theory and research associated with HCOs and the way that they negotiate the different 
relationships with their stakeholders. A cross-case study involves examining a mixture of data from 
multiple sources within the same study (Miles and Huberman, 1989).  Multiple cases allow 
comparisons that clarify whether an emergent finding is unique to a single case or generalizable by 
several cases.   
 
The choice of cross-case study to methodology represents an innovative approach to investigating 
relationships that have to be negotiated with multiple actors with diverse interests and in different 
contexts. The approach to data collection is original in the sense that it engages a set of actors often 
ignored in international volunteer research. Making use of structured and diverse perspectives in 
the data, the approach allowed for considerations of similarities and differences within and between 
cases (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 19), making possible a deeper interrogation of the beliefs and 
behaviours that underpinned the relationships between the HCOs and their stakeholders.  
 
The study advances existing workplace relationships literature on development management 
through IVS by integrating trust and power as elements of human behaviour in the analysis of data. 
In doing so, it moves beyond the positive/negative discourse on IVS by showing how the interplay 
between trust and power affect interpersonal functions for HCOs workplace relationships, and 




8.5.4 Contribution to policy   
Lewis (2014, pp. 36–8) observes that many NGOs and INGOs are reluctant to get involved with 
management because i) their leaders consider time should be used to “get out there and get things 
done”, rather than on organisational issues and ii) the belief that donors consider that money spent 
on management and overheads can be better spent on helping intended beneficiaries of 
development. This research has enabled a closer investigation of how the way relationships 
between individuals and organisations are negotiated impact on the aims and processes of IVS. It 
reveals implications, not only for the design and management of IVS processes in development 
projects, but the management of host country offices within IVCOs in particular and in NGO 
management in general. In doing so, considering the role of HCOs as boundary managers is useful 
in developing an understanding of the challenges that they face in their day to day work and 
support the formulation of policies and practices that can help them to fulfil their multiple 
mandates. 
 
Volunteering presents challenges for accountability, the management of intra- and inter-
organisational relationships and the need for operational effectiveness to be rooted in these 
relationships. Yet policy implications rarely consider that HCOs should be allowed the autonomy 
to pursue and develop their own unique characteristics, to be primarily accountable to their target 
beneficiaries, even though they are held accountable for financial reporting and technical 
assessment of their activities (Johansson et al., 2010, p. 372). This study has highlighted a number 
of ways in which HCOs could be assisted in strengthening their boundary management role 
notably:  
 Minimising the ambiguity of definition and descriptions of IVS its objectives and the roles 
of the actors. 
 
 Closer alignment of IVS policy and practice requires a shift of the intra-organisational 
norms and behaviours to allow the integration of HCOs through increased opportunities for 




 In a rapidly changing and complex world, people working in HCOs are also in increasing 
need of relevant knowledge and skills. Changes in organisational practices are not just 
deliverable through formal structures, policies and procedures, but informal behaviours and 
attitude that promote trust-generation, openness in reciprocal information exchange as well 
as opportunities and spaces for empowerment through democratic participation.  
 
This research has shown that a development-focused/demand-driven approach to IVS can facilitate 
the formulation of robust proposals, that are realistic for human, physical and logistical resources, 
and can create trust-based relationships between the HCOs and their IVS stakeholders leading to 
better processes, and potentially, to better outcomes. 
 
8.6 Recommendations for wider research 
 
Chapter 2 revealed that HCOs are occasionally mentioned in the literature that examines IVS but 
mainly about research questions focused on volunteering. The scarcity of research focusing on the 
organisational characteristics of IVS (Nelson and Child, 2016) and the dearth of academic work on 
the role of HCOs in development management (Chapter 2) mean that this thesis can only serve as a 
first step to gaining further insight into this critical but neglected component of IVS. However, 
rather than viewing relationships among the stakeholders of IVS in purely professional, technical 
and contractual terms, this study has probed how the dynamics of trust and power shape, and are 
shaped by, the way relationships are negotiated. 
 
Although the scope of this research extended only to the in-depth study of five IVCOs in Malawi, 
the conceptual and practical basis of this thesis has created room for improvement by learning from 
the similar operations in other countries. Thus findings from this research could also find 
applicability in other contexts. By increasing the diversity of national level studies on development 
IVCOs, research can continue building a framework to assess how global and local contexts 




Not surprisingly, peripheral issues of significance appeared in the course of the research that would 
provide interesting avenues for further theoretical and empirical exploration. The most pertinent 
issues are:  
 A more in-depth exploration of the concepts of development-focused and placement-
focused approach to IVS as strategies for development intervention  
 
 More extensive examination of the role of HCOs and NGOs as boundary managers, in 
different settings, with particular emphasis on symmetry in knowledge sharing and 
information exchange. 
 
 The relevance of Guston’s ‘moral hazard’ in the relationship between key actors (donors, 
INGOs (and their HCOs), NGOs, governments, partner organisations and community 
groups) in a development management context 
 
 The relationships between host country employees and employed foreign staff in the same 
administrative unit of the organisation, for example: 
o Power and trust  relations 
o Issues related to culture and authority  
o Remuneration and benefit packages 
o Career development affecting national staff  
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Appendix 1A: United Nations Volunteers (UNV) 
  
UNV was launched by the United Nations General Assembly and started its operations in 1971 
(UNV Volunteers - Chronology, 2001). Based in Germany, UNV is active in around 130 countries 
and reports to the UNDP Executive Board. 80 per cent of UN Volunteers are from the global South 
and serve for 30 months on average (UNV, 2016b).  
 
The UNV facility in Malawi is situated within the UNDP complex in Malawi’s Capital, Lilongwe. 
UNV does not have its own funded project or programme in Malawi but is a key partner in the 
implementation of programme activities of some UN agencies in the country. The UNV 
Programme Officer role is also a volunteer position that has access to the heads of Agencies and is 
occasionally required to provide status updates on UNV programmes and activities. The UNV 
programme in Malawi has the largest number of volunteers in the Southern Africa portfolio - the 
target number of placements in Malawi for 2016 was 64. UN volunteers work in a range of 
placements in Malawi including as medical professionals, health and nutrition advisors, and 
programmes aimed at the empowerment of women, climate change mitigation, poverty reduction, 
emergency relief and infrastructure improvement (UNV, 2016a).  
Appendix 1B: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
The German Development Service (Deutsche Entwicklungsdienstes, DED) was established in 1963 
but merged with the German Technical Cooperation Agency, GTZ, and InWEnt (Capacity Building 
International) to form GIZ in 2011 (GIZ, 2016a). According to the website, GIZ is a German 
enterprise operating  in 120 countries and engaged 577 development advisors (GIZ, 2018a). 
 
In Germany, although the revision of the term ‘volunteer’ to ‘Development Advisor’ was 
accompanied by a revised benefit package in the 1980s, the Development Advisors continue to be 
protected by the "Entwicklungshelfer-Gesetz" (Volunteer Law), introduced 1969: 
“A volunteer is somebody undertaking a minimum of two years' service in developing 
countries for a state-approved provider of development services without any view to 
265 
 
pecuniary gain….The Volunteer Law stipulates that they receive a maintenance allowance 
for the duration of their assignment and that their social insurance contributions are paid” 
(Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development b 2010-2016) 
 
GIZ has been operating in Malawi for over 30 years and, in 2015, 35 seconded staff, 75 local staff, 
25 development advisors and 15 Integrated Experts worked in Malawi in 2015. GIZ Malawi’s 
priority areas are: education, health and social protection; private sector development in rural areas; 
sustainable infrastructure, governance and democracy, as well as public financial and economic 
management (GIZ, 2016b). Details of all programmes including objectives, partner organisations 
and latest reviews are available on the GIZ Malawi website as well as in brochure form available 
freely at the GIZ office in Lilongwe. Each Programme brochure is designed to state context, 
objectives, approach, success factors, as well as introducing partners, the commissioning body, the 
overall budget and overall project terms (see Appendix 4). Noticeable in all electronic and paper 
documentations is the high emphasis on staff welfare, education and development.  
 
Appendix 1C: Voluntary Service Oversees (VSO) 
VSO was founded as an independent organisation by Alec and Moira Dickson in 1958 (Bird, 1998, 
pp. 11–15). From the start, VSOs emphasis was on service, rather than technical assistance, 
through the deployment of youths from post-war Britain to poor countries. VSO received support 
from the British government through the use of administrative offices of the British Council 
until1980, and financial contribution from the UK government which peaked in 1979-80 at 90% of 
expenditure incurred in sending volunteers (Bird, 1998, pp. 42–100). In 2011 the UK government 
introduced a strategy of reducing the level of support for VSO from DFID from 52% in 2010/11 to 
35% in 2013/14 with the intention of reducing VSO’s dependence on centrally funded DFID 
support and stimulating the increase and diversification of VSO’s sources of income (OECD 2010, 
p.151; Ledward and Trivedy, 2010). Currently, around 73% of VSO income are from both DFID, 
and ‘other governmental incomes’(VSO International, 2018b). 
 
VSO’s has retained its organisational focus on placing volunteers in development, making use of 
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opportunities to expand its portfolio by ‘mopping up’ younger European citizens who were not 
qualified or experienced enough to become development workers (Bird, 1998). Later, a national 
membership programme introduced by VSO in 1982 collapsed in 1989 when “the expectations of 
the members for… a more democratic governance, did not materialize” despite payment of 
subscriptions (Bird, 1998, p. 122). In 2005, a merger with British Executive Services Overseas 
(BESO)
37
 provided VSO with increased opportunities to deliver technical assistance through older 
and professional international volunteers.  
 
VSO has been in Malawi at least since 1965. A country-specific website was introduced or made 
accessible to public in 2017 (VSO International, 2016c). The number of international volunteers in 
programme placements in Malawi in 2016  is not declared on the website but the number of staff  
in the Malawi office is stated as 15 (VSO International, 2016c), although the number, according to 
the organisational structure obtained during data collection staff were numbered at 30.  Areas of 
programmatic activity for VSO Malawi are education, women and girls’ health, and agriculture and 
climate change. Annual Report document as well as job descriptions and MOUs with partner 
organisations are available for most volunteer placements. 
 
Appendix 1D: Progressio 
Progressio, originally called The Sword of the Spirit, was founded by a group of lay Catholics in 
1940, but expanded its activities to include issues such as food aid and human rights leading to 
collaboration with the British Volunteer Programme in 1963, which involved  recruiting  volunteers 
to work overseas (Progressio, 2016b). After a name change in 1965, it changed name again to 
Progressio to reflect its wider values and efforts in developing countries (Progressio, 2016b). 
 
In 1974 Progressio substituted volunteers for  ‘development workers’: “skilled professionals to do 
specific jobs in response to specific needs identified by partners in the South”, (Progressio, 2016b). 
                                                     
37
BESO was a UK independent charitable organisation  that provided development assistance through professional 
volunteers undertaking short consultancy and training assignments (Open Learn Works, 2016) 
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Progressio (2016b) also declares itself as the first international development agency to begin 
recruiting local staff – rather than expatriates – to run its offices in the countries where it worked. 
Progressio remained largely reliant on funding from DFID up to 35% in 2014 – 2015 (Progressio, 
2016a), finally falling victim to the revised strategy by DFID to discontinue its unrestricted grant 
programme from December 2016, and issued a closure notice, effective at the end of December 
2016 (Progressio, 2016c).  
 
Progressio opened its country programme in Malawi in 2007, shifting resources from its 
programme in Namibia which was being wound down. In 2016, Progressio Malawi was facing 
financial challenges, with the only remaining operations being those of a single Development 
Worker, and the ICS (Chapter 6, section 6.2.2) placements sub-contracted through VSO. The 
Progressio office in Lilongwe had a staff of three, inclusive of the Country Director who, 
incidentally, was the only Malawian national in that position among the five IVCOs in the case 
study. 
Appendix 1E: The Peace Corps 
The Peace Corps was founded in 1961, based on a vision expressed by President John F. Kennedy 
“for Americans to serve their country and their world” (Peace Corps, 2016b). Amin (1999, p. 39) 
suggests that the founding of the Peace Corps was rooted in the politics of the Cold War which 
explains why the Peace Corps was established within the “‘Mutual Security Act’…..intended to 
promote America’s interest in the Cold War”.  
 
The Peace Corps is an independent agency within the executive branch of the United States 
government, and its Director and deputy director are appointed by the U.S. President. The Peace 
Corps works in over 60 countries worldwide but receives 100% of its funding from the US 
Government, although significant resources are invested in returning volunteers: “bringing the 
learning home” (Interviewee HQ 6). Although Peace Corps has remained predominantly for the 
younger people (Interviewee HQ 6), shorter placements are available through Peace Corps 
Response (PCR) scheme for  returned volunteers or those “with significant professional and 
268 
 
technical experience”(Peace Corps, 2016b). More recently, the Global Health Service Partnership 
(GHSP) was founded in 2012. However, these initiatives remain a small percentage of the total 
level of activity undertaken by Peace Corps (Peace Corps, 2016b). 
 
Malawi’s first Peace Corps volunteers arrived in 1963, and following a period of suspension under 
the Banda regime, the programme was restored in 1978. Peace Corps Malawi (2016d) website 
stated that 122 volunteers worked in partnerships with the Government of Malawi in: Education, 
Environment and Health sectors. Additionally, Peace Corps Malawi  implements the PCR and 
GHSP pilot programmes where American doctors and nurses “work with Malawian medical and 
nursing students to build the cadre of health professionals in Malawi” (The Peace Corps, 2017). 
Peace Corps Malawi website provides photograph and full list of all 45 staff members, by name, 
including support staff such as drivers and janitors. Peace Corps is the only IVCO in this study that 
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 Able to import car tax-free 
 Diplomatic immunity 
 Business expenses and fuel 
 
 Able to sell the car 
at local prices, 
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security 
guard) 
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allowance 
 Car & business fuel 
 Able to import tax free vehicle 
 Diplomatic immunity 





jobs for up 
to 6 years. 
Able to sell the car 
at local prices, 
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Table showing the benefit packages received by international volunteers engaged in Malawi by IVCOs in this 
research. The figures are based on values in May/June 2016 (Source: author) 
















Appendix 4: Example of an IVCO2 programme brochure 









DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE 
Consent form for persons participating in a research project  
 
THE ROLE OF HOST-COUNTRY OFFICES IN INTERNATIONAL 
VOLUNTEERING 
 
Name of participant: 
Name of principal investigator(s): Behi Barzegar 
Please tick the box to indicate your agreement 
 
1. I consent to participate in this project, the details of which have been 
explained to me, and I have been provided with a written statement in plain 
language to keep. □  
 
2. I understand that my participation will involve TAKING PART IN 
INTERVIEWS, DISCUSSIONS OR OBSERVATIONS WHICH MAY BE 
AUDIO-TAPED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED and I agree that the 
researcher may use the results as described in the plain language statement. □ 
 
3. I acknowledge that: 
(a) The possible effects of participating in this research have been explained to my 
satisfaction; □ 
 
(b) I have been informed that, during the data gathering phase, I am free to withdraw 
or modify my consent and to ask for the destruction of all or part of the data I have 
contributed at any time without explanation or prejudice and to withdraw any 
unprocessed data I have provided; □ 
 
(c) The project is for the purpose of research; □ 
 
(d) Please select ONE of the following: 
 I would like my name used and understand that anything I have contributed to 
this project can be recognized. □ 
 I do not want my name used in this project; if necessary any data from me 
will be referred to by a pseudonym in any publications arising from this 
research □ 
 
(e) I have been informed that with my consent the data generated will be stored on 
SECURE MOBILE DEVICE AND ENCRYPTED FLASH DRIVE and will be 
destroyed after five years; □ 
 
(g) I have been informed that a summary copy of the research findings will be 
forwarded to me, on my request. □  
I consent to my participation being audio-taped/photographed     □yes  □ no 
(please tick)  
 
Appendix 5: Informed Consent Form 
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Appendix 6: Semi-structured interview questions 
                     
APPENDIX A1 
The Role of Host-Country Offices in International Volunteering  
Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
Name:        Role: 
Organization:       Duration: 
Partner organisation      Target Beneficiaries: 
 
For Programme Offices: 
 
 What do you understand the objectives (name of the IVCO) to be? How do 
you know? 
 
 Have these objectives been the same while you’ve been here? If they have 
changed, do you know why? 
 
 Do you report to a specific person/department? What is the feedback loop 
between you? 
 
1. What is the relationship between your organization and HQ/IVCOs? How 
does it work? How are organizational objectives shared?  
 
2. What is your role in this relationship? What do YOU do? How do you do it? 
 
3. What constraints do you face in the relations/interactions with the HQ? 
(IVCO)s? Are there differences between different IVCOs?? What constraints 
do you think they face? How effectively do you think these challenges are 
overcome? 
 
Thinking of a specific project as an example……. 
 
4. How are projects identified & their objectives negotiated? Who is involved? 
Why? How? 
 
5. Who would you consider are the stakeholders? Why? 
 
6. How much of your work involves interactions/relations with other 
stakeholders? How do you go about it? 
 
7. How is the role of an international volunteer negotiated and agreed? With 
whom? How? 
 
8. Describe your relations with the international volunteers. What were the 
opportunities and what were the constraints in this relationship? Please try to 
give examples to illustrate 
 
9. How would you describe the impact of the presence of international 





Appendix 7: Beneficiary group questions 




This is to find out about the relationship between IVCO programmatic staff and the people 
who receive their services. It tries to find out what people think about the work that the 
programmes that involve international volunteers, the positive and negative ways that it 
impacts their lives; and what feelings they are left with, after the volunteers leave. 
 
Introductions: Please tell me a little about yourself, your background, and what do you 
normally do for a living? 
 
1. What is the relationship between you and the programme organisers? (for example: 
teacher/student).  
 How often do you see them? 
 How does the relationship with the volunteer work? 
 How many international volunteers have you personally worked with? In what 
roles were they? 
 
2. How did you become involved in this programme? 
 Why were you interested? 
 Where did you hear about it? 
 How did you join the programme? What was the process? 
 What choices did you have? And why did you choose the one that you did? 
 
3. Tell me how the programme actually works? What do you do? 
 How often do you see the organisers (volunteer or other organisers)? 
 
4. What have you learnt from this programme? 
 How will what you have learnt change what you do?  
 What do you think are the benefits of the programme? 
 How do you know that? 
 What changes will the program make to the community? In your opinion, what will 
be the indicators of change in the community? 
 
5. What are the challenges for you in this programme? Can you give me some examples 
please? 
 How do you deal with these challenges? 
 What do you think the challenges are for the foreign volunteer? Why do you think 
that?  
 How well do you think she copes with them? 
 What are some challenges about working with an international volunteer? Can you 
give me some examples please? 





Appendix 8: Volunteer questions 
 
                         
Appendix A3 
 
The Role of Host-Country Offices in International Volunteering  
Questionnaire for International Volunteers 
 
Name:       Role: 
Organization:      Duration: 
Partner organisation     Target Beneficiaries: 
 
1. Describe your actual activities during your placement. How did these 
compare with your expectations of the role?  
 
2. Describe what resources were available to you by the organization. 
How did the availability/non-availability of these resources impact 
on your performance in the role? 
 
3. Describe your relations with the partner organization/ counterpart. 
What were the opportunities and what were the constraints in this 
relationship? Please try to give examples to illustrate 
 
4. Describe your relations with the community. What were the 
opportunities and what were the constraints in this relationship? 
Please try to give examples to illustrate 
 
5. Describe your relations with the program office. What were the 
opportunities and what were the constraints in this relationship? 
Please try to give examples to illustrate 
 
6. Would you volunteer with the same organization again? Please give 























Appendix 9: Contact Summary Form 
                 
CONTACT SUMMARY FORM 
 
Contact type:       Site:  
Visit:         Contact date:  
Phone:       Today’s date:  
(with whom)       Written by: BB 
 







2. Summary of the information I got (or failed to get) on each of the 



















3. Anything else that struck me as salient/ interesting / illuminating or 










4. What new (or remaining) target questions do I have in considering 
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Appendix 11: Terms of Reference for research 
 
The Role of Host Country Offices in International Volunteering - the case of Malawi 
This research is led by Ms Behi Barzegar, a PhD student from the Development Policy and Practice Unit of the 
Open University in the UK.  
 
The research aims to gain insight into the significance of local context in international development work and 
international volunteering, thus addressing a gap in knowledge about the role of host country offices of 
international development organisations that work through volunteers. Host country offices are the mediators, 
negotiators, decision makers and administrators, who research and identify host country recipients, design 
programmes, select partnerships, as well as oversee the security and welfare of the international volunteers and 
monitor their performance, thereby significantly contributing to the delivery of developmental activities. This 
research acknowledges the crucial role of host country offices in the diverse outcomes of development 
interventions by international volunteers; thus leading to the central question: How do host country offices 
negotiate the multiple and diverse relationships involved in setting up and overseeing international volunteering 
service in development projects? 
 
Malawi closely reflects the historical and current challenges of development in the context of global politics and 
economics. Also, its multitude of active NGOs and INGOs, and its long history of engaging with international 
volunteers from a diverse range of countries make it an ideal choice for this study. 
The research activities consist of a number of elements which involve interacting with the host country office 
during an eight-ten week period through:  
·         Stakeholder Analysis: A mapping study of the individuals, groups or organisations that can affect or 
are affected by what the host country office does.  
·         One-to-one interviews: with senior staff of the parent organisation and the host country offices; 
representatives of some of the partner organisations, target beneficiaries and the international volunteers. Each 
interview will take approximately 1 hour involve and will involve talking about experiences and knowledge. 
Audio-recording may be used to record the activities for greater accuracy during analysis. 
·         Observation of the formal and informal host country office activities in working with their partners, 
beneficiaries, and volunteers  
·         Document analysis Examination of organisational policy and procedures documents; minutes of 
meetings; agenda preparations; planning meetings, review meetings, seminars and workshops.  
 
This study relies on the voluntary co-operation of the participants and contributions will be used for research 
purposes only. All data will be treated confidentially and no individual will be identifiable in the thesis [1].   
  
I would like to thank you in advance for supporting this research. At the end of the data collection, I will be happy 
to conduct a feedback session with the staff of each country office, and to submit a written report to the 
participating development organisations within 6 months of return. In the meantime, if you have any questions at 
all about the study, you are welcome to contact me using the details given below. 
Contact Details: Behi Barzegar, Development Policy and Practice, The Open University, Milton Keynes, MK7 
6AA, United Kingdom Tel: +447736 429599, In Malawi: +265 997 409061 E-mail: behi.barzegar@open.ac.uk  
 
Principal Supervisor: Dr Rebecca Hanlin, Development Policy and Practice, The Open University, Milton 
Keynes, MK7 6AA. E-mail: Rebecca.hanlin@open.ac.uk or Rebecca@africalics.org  
 
[1] The security of the data collected has received approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee of the 
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Dedza District CouncilDedza District CouncilDedza District Council  
P.O. Box 140, Dedza 
represented by 
J.J. Kanyangalazi, District Commissioner J.J. Kanyangalazi, District Commissioner J.J. 




Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH 
Social Protection Programme 
10/319, Mtendere Drive 
P.O. Box 31131, Lilongwe 3, Malawi 
represented by 
Ralf Radermacher, Team Leader  Ralf Radermacher, Team Leader  Ralf Radermacher, Team Leader   
 
 
hereby enter into the following  
cooperation agreement  
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Preamble 
This agreement follows the principles of the bilateral agreement between Malawi and 
the Federal Republic of Germany governing technical cooperation dated 9.11.1967 as 




GIZ is currently implementing the Project Social Protection for People in Extreme 
Poverty in Malawi, commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The project is embedded in the framework of 
the National Social Support Policy (“NSSP”), adopted in 2013 by the Malawi 
Government. It serves as a top-level framework for social protection, currently 
covering the five key programs: social cash transfers, public works, school meals, 
village savings and loans (VSLs), and microfinance.  
The country´s 28 district councils are responsible for implementing the NSSP at 
district level. This requires the improvement of efficiency of decentralized 
administrative structures and the councils´ capacity to coordinate and harmonize the 
five sub programmes at district level. Dedza District Council is one of the two pilot 
District Councils for a harmonised NSSP and thus a relevant actor for the 
implementation of new procedures and coordination mechanisms.  
By mutual agreement, Dedza District Council and GIZ have agreed that development 
advisors will be assigned to assist the local partner organisation Dedza District 
Council in providing NSSP services. Given the important role played by Dedza 
District Council in the sector and the results structure of the above-mentioned project, 
development advisors are to be assigned to build its capacities. Based on the project 
results structure, the following mandate of and services provided by the District 
Council have been identified, and will be supported through the assignment of 
development advisors: 
 
 Implementation of National Social Support Policy at district level, especially 
improved coordination of the sub-programmes;  
 Piloting harmonized approaches including the UBR  
 Support to the district level M&E 
 
Dedza District Council and GIZ hereby agree on the following services and activities: 
 Capacity development; 
 Support coordination between different NSSP sub-programmes; 
 Support communication between district and central level; 
 Ensure district perspective is included in NSSP discussions.  
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It is expected that this cooperation will result in more effective implementation of the 
NSSP in Dedza and the documentation of lessons learned for the central level and other 
districts. 
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Core tasks of the development advisor(s)  
o Exploring the level of implementation of the National Social Support Programme 
(NSSP) in the district identifying gaps and opportunities for improvement; 
o Supporting the development and implementation of integrated district social support 
committees; 
o Supporting the implementation of the Unified Beneficiary Registry (UBR) and 
harmonised targeting; 
o Supporting the development of an M & E system at district level;  
o Supporting the implementation of Best Practices Manuals; 
o Providing support to capacity development (technical and managerial) and follow up 
support to capacity development/technical trainings;  
o Implementing and Managing the pilot ‘Making public works inclusive’. 
 
The rough outline of the work plan is finalised in consultation with the local partner 
organisation and the officer responsible for the commission no later than six months after 
the development advisor has commenced her assignment, and a detailed work plan is 
jointly drafted.  
 
Provision of development advisors 
Based on the job description drafted jointly with Dedza District Council, GIZ shall enter 
into a contract with 1 development advisor for up to 24 expert months. The curricula vitae 
shall be submitted to Dedza District Council in advance for approval. Dedza District 
Council's approval shall be obtained in writing. GIZ shall recruit and brief the 
development advisor. If a development advisor is being replaced, the same approval 
process shall apply. 
 
Role and integration of the development advisor 
The development advisor's line manager is Ms Selvi Vikan  from GIZ Malawi/Social 
Protection Programme.  
Within Dedza District Council the Director of Planning  is the contact and is responsible 
for steering the development advisor’s technical inputs. 
 
GIZ's inputs 
Development advisors are assigned pursuant to the Entwicklungshelfergesetz (EhfG - 
development advisors act).  GIZ shall assume the following costs for the development 
advisor (and where applicable for his/her family): 
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 recruitment, selection and preparation of contract in Germany 
 briefing in Germany and briefing of up to three weeks in Malawi 
 subsistence allowance 
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 contributions to health and unemployment insurance and to pension and 
compulsory long-term care insurance 
 outward and return flight from and to Germany 
 reintegration allowance 
 travel expenses for GIZ events (that are required by GIZ) 
 third-party liability insurance and contributions to school fees and security costs 
 accommodation 
 official vehicle, mobile phone, office equipment if not provided by the partner 
organisation 
 other inputs directly related to the assignment of development advisors such as 
financial contributions, assignments of short-term experts, and HCD measures 
For staffing changes (for example, if the contract is terminated prematurely), GIZ shall 
inform Dedza District Council promptly, so that it can be involved to the appropriate 
extent.  
 
Dedza District Council's inputs 
Dedza District Council undertakes to provide an office, office furniture, basic stationery 
and a counterpart.  
 
The partner organisation also undertakes to: 
 grant the development advisor leave of two-and-a-half working days per month 
for a five-day working week or three working days every month for a six-day 
working week 
 following every two years of service, grant additional leave of eight working days 
for home leave, in line with GIZ's regulations 
 grant the development advisor leave if: 
o GIZ requires the development advisor to participate in GIZ activities 
o the development advisor needs to undergo a medical examination in order 
to extend his/her contract 
 grant the development advisor special leave in the case of the serious illness or 
death of a first-degree relative 
 grant maternity leave to the development advisor in line with the German 
Maternity Protection Act 
 participate in the exchange of expertise with GIZ and the partner organisations of 
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German international cooperation, and allow representatives of GIZ and of the 
Federal Republic of Germany access for project/programme placement visits. 
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Validity/termination 
This cooperation agreement between Dedza District Council and GIZ on assigning 
one development advisors shall enter into force once it has been signed by both 
parties. The development advisor assignment(s) shall start on 01.09.2015 at the 
earliest and end on 30.09.2017 at the latest.   
The assignment may be extended, depending on the term of the BMZ commission and 
on whether adequate financing is secured.   
This agreement may be modified at any stage by mutual agreement to reflect changed 
circumstances. All modifications must be made in writing. 




             
[Place, date]      [Place, date] 
 
 
           
  
Ralf Radermacher  J.J. Kanyangalazi 
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As a federal company, GIZ supports the Federal Government in achieving its goals in 
international cooperation for sustainable development. 
 
GIZ makes a contribution to permanently improving the living conditions of local people by 
sending qualified specialists as development workers. 
 
We are looking for the Dedza location in Malawi 
 
Development worker to implement the National Social Security Strategy on district life 
Strengthening decentralized management 
 
Field of activity 
The development worker will assist the District Council (DC) in implementing the National 
Social Support Policy (NSSP) and, in particular, improving the coordination of sub-
programmes of social security in of the District. It is therefore important to make 
decentralized management structures more efficient. The aim is that the District Council has 
improved capacities to ensure the coordinating and harmonizing of sub-programmes of social 
security strategy of the District in technical exchange with the national level. 
 
Your tasks 
The Advisor will assist the District Council in the implementation and the M & E of pilot 
activities in the context of newly developed procedures and processes. Another advisory role 
is to work with the DC to develop processes and tools that improve communication between 
national and district levels. 
 
Qualifications required:  
Degree as social scientist or administrative scientist 
Experience in public administration and /or social security 
Good English skills, driver license 
 
The following skills round off the profile: 
Knowledge in the Field of Management/Information System  
Knowledge in the Field of Organisation Development 







Location details: Dedza is 85 km south of the capital, Lilongwe. 
Climate: Dedza at 1600 is the highest altitude city in Malawi and has a cooler climate 
Health Care: There is a small district hospital in Dedza, good health care in Lilongwe 
Shopping and care options: Limited supply in the city; small supermarket available, local 
products are cheap, imported goods are expensive 
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Accessibility: well-developed road from Lilongwe to Dedza. Internet access and mobile 
networks mostly available 
Children/ infants: International School is only available in Blantyre and Lilongwe 
Security: 24-hour security and safety precautions are taken at the property 
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General conditions: 
The location of the project is not suitable for school-aged children  
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It is assumed that the Development Advisor is available for work in remote locations  
Experience in Development work is desirable.  
 
Our offer 
We offer you cooperation in an innovative, globally active development policy institution. 
Your skills are in demand in an interdisciplinary team on site. GIZ's development service 
offers a comprehensive package of services. This also includes targeted technical and 
personal preparation. The term of the contract is at least 2 years with the option of extension 
 
Hints 
The GIZ Development Service welcomes applicants with a completed vocational training and 
/ or completed stage who have at least two years of relevant work experience. In addition, 
they have the German citizenship of the state or another EU member state or Switzerland or 
Norway. 
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PLACEMENT OUTLINE COVERSHEET  
 








Job Title: Development Advisor 





























8-12 months (flexible) 
Names and email addresses &/or Phone Numbers of serving volunteers and 
returned volunteers, that can be contacted by prospective volunteers looking at 
this placement including e.g. volunteers working with same partner, at similar 
placements or nearby locations.  
 
cottin.florent@gmail.com   
Potential for posting with a ‘volunteering partner’ or ‘accompanying partner’? 
 
None, as no other placements in the vicinity are envisaged 
Funding  
Is this placement part of a funded project?  Yes (VSO Annual Strategic Fund) 
If yes, what is/are the fund code(s)? 
Fund code(s) should also be entered on Starfish (VSO database) 
 




 July 2013  




IMPORTANT REFERENCE INFORMATION  
 
This placement documentation provides information specific to this particular placement. 
Additionally, prospective volunteers should read the following essential country-level 
information, which can be found on VOLZONE. 
 
 Country briefing pack http://   
 Medical information 
 Security information http://  
 Programme strategy/background information (though these documents are 




The following information about the local area can also be found on: 
 
 Partner/employer information http://  
 Location information 
 Partnership agreement, including terms and conditions (not available on Volzone 
but e-version can be sent on request) 
 
PLACEMENT OUTLINE 
Please Note: VSO tries to ensure that the information in Placement Outlines is accurate 
at the time of writing. However, VSO relies on information received from external sources 
and circumstances can change. Placement Outlines should be seen merely as a 
guide. VSO does not accept any liability in the event that any information is inaccurate.  
With new partners and new placements, volunteers need to be particularly prepared for 
changes to arise as it becomes clearer what the needs are once in placement.  
 
 
PLACEMENT PROFILE  
 
Headlines: 
To include any recent programme developments or achievements, future developments 
 
VSO Malawi has been working with …   for the last six years supporting the service to 
strengthen the HIV&AIDS response…... An HIV&AIDS management structure in the 
service was set up and …staff was trained in managing the programmes by VSO 
through volunteers and training workshops. A study initiated and carried out by VSO 
established that there is significant transmission of HIV among      largely due to sexual 
abuse        . This is appalling at the level of the individual       but in addition if it is not 
controlled and managed, it has the potential of spilling over to the larger population 
making the efforts to fight HIV difficult.  
 
The UNODC United Nations Office         describes a model    that is managed on the 
basis of justice and humanity in which….. spend their time engaged in purposeful 
activities such as education, vocational skills training and health care   . .However, the 
Malawi   fall short of these standards. Care and support    …particularly those with HIV 
and TB remain a challenge as there are significant shortfalls in food supply and nutrition 
due to erratic government funding since food is mostly dependent on central government 
subvention.  
 
Though there are rehabilitation and transformation services   such as education and 
some skills development, they are inadequate, in that that many    come out with little or 
no rehabilitation….  With this background of challenges facing the Malawi…., VSO and 
the Malawi    have developed an integrated rights based framework of interventions that 
should bring long term and sustainable provision of services which enables the Malawi 
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….to improve …management and easily meet all basic human needs while developing 
the… skills and behaviour to facilitate re integration into society. . 
 
Background and rationale for placement: 
To include how this placement builds on achievements/activities of any previous 
volunteers with reference, where appropriate, to the relevant objectives in the Country 
Strategic Plan and Programme Area Plan.  
 
The Malawi …is a government Department whose constitutional mandate is to house   
persons….. It derives its mandate from Chapter XVII of the Republic of Malawi 
Constitution, the …Act and relevant subsidiary legislation made there under. One of the 
challenges of the… Services is insufficient funding by government hence the …services 
faces challenges to achieve sustainable rehabilitation, reformation and transform of….. 
This is further compounded by lack of technical and vocational experts to develop the 
…..capacity to impart skills ….as a sustainable rehabilitation and reformation measure.  
 
Overall placement purpose and specific placement/partner objectives:  
These are subject to change – the final work plan will be subject to agreement between 
the volunteer, the employer and VSO at the start of the placement. 
 
This is a long-term development programme for VSO and the Malawi…., which is 
expected to see the Malawi …to be self-sufficient in the provision of services …and 
become a model for learning and development. The placement has been developed to 
begin a process of enhancing the capacity of Malawi …..to sustain itself in its operations 
in the country’s ….in order to reduce abuse, which leads to new HIV infections and 
mental trauma….., particularly juvenile  The seed funding will be utilised as a pilot to 
generate learning. That learning will be used to raise bigger funding which will ultimately 
assist the service to become a self sustaining entity that is able to provide rights based 
reformation, rehabilitation and transformation  
 




1. Supporting the Malawi prison service to develop and use policies and systems on 
prison gardens, which will improve the physical and mental health of inmates, as well 
as increase food production, and develop the skills of inmates with a view to 
reducing reoffending. Once policies are developed, they will be piloted in three 
prisons 
 
Likely duties and responsibilities of the volunteer: these are subject to change – the 
final work plan will be subject to agreement between the volunteer, the employer and 
VSO at the start of the placement.  
The Agricultural Technology Development Advisor provides advice on the use and 
management of Malawi Prison Services agricultural land. Typically s/he specialises 
either in business or technical expertise. Whatever the specialisation, the ultimate aim of 
the post is to balance the commercial viability of the Malawi Prisons Agricultural land with 
sustainable development to increase food production, and develop the skills of inmates 
and staff with a view to reducing reoffending. Key tasks include: 
 Visiting prison farms to facilitate data collection, measurement, analysis and 
interpretation; 
 Designing prison farm structures, equipment and processes; 
 Giving demonstrations and presentations on land, water and machinery utilization; 
 Developing ways to conserve soil and water  
 Improving the processing and storage of plant/crop and livestock products  
 Designing farmhouses, barns, and other farm structures. 
 Planning sanitation, ventilation, and heating systems in farm structures. 




 Providing advice on machinery used for tilling, fertilization, and harvesting 
 Developing ways to use power for curing and drying crops. 
 Designing irrigation, drainage, and flood control systems 
 Preparing reports; 
A large proportion of the work is office based, while regular visits to prison farms may 
require a substantial amount of car travel, although the distance and the need for 
overnight stays depend on the location of the target Prison Area. 
Note: if there is flexibility regarding length of the placement please indicate in this 





Essential : A Degree in Agricultural Engineering, Irrigation Engineering or Horticulture   
Desirable: A relevant Postgraduate Qualification in any of the above technical areas  
 
Professional qualifications and experience: 
 
Essential : Due to the nature of the work, it helps if the volunteer enjoys working 
outdoors. The role is suitable for individuals with evidence of: 
 Initiative; 
 Good written and oral communication skills; 
 Sales and persuasion skills, along with the ability to maintain relationships; 
 Technical and analytical skills; 
 Business acumen; 








Commitment to Learning – This will be an essential quality. The volunteer will take a 
lead in taking the organization through a self assessment hence there will be need to 
have this facilitated rather than doing the actual assessment for them.  
 
Working with others – The ability to fully involve others in both identifying issues and 
seeking solutions  
 







PLACEMENT SPECIFIC INFORMATION 
For general location & organisational information please see Volzone 
 
Partner Profile/Organisational Summary (include any information not on VolZone) 
 
Potential sources of Professional Support i.e. line manager/counterpart/volunteers 
and Programme Office 
 
The volunteer will be located at and formally report to the Chief Commissioner of Prisons 




and other staff at the National Prison Headquarters in Zomba 
 
In terms of VSO Path to Partnership materials including the GSAP toolkit the volunteer 
will receive remote support from the SL Senior Programme Manager in the VSO 
Programme office in Lilongwe (4-5 hours drive north of Zomba) where an initial briefing 
and end of placement debrief will be arranged. 
 
Risks and assumptions and other key considerations/factors prospective 
volunteer should be aware of as identified during the organisational assessment 
and actions agreed to minimise these risks: Minimal in this instance, this is an 
established and committed partner who have supported and appreciated their volunteers 
well in the past. The short placement does not need significant resources or external 
funding to accomplish and any changes in staff will in fact be taken into account as part 
of the process. 
 
Terms and Conditions: These should be placement specific and could relate to annual 
leave, hours of work, work related travel and work place conditions, etc. Working hours 
are 7.30 am to 5.00 pm Monday to Friday with 1 hour for lunch. In all other respects the 
volunteer should consider themselves an employee of Malawi Prison Services and be 
bound by their conditions of service. 
 
Resources available at the placement: Office space will be provided by Malawi Prison 
Services at the National Prison Headquarters and the volunteer will be allowed to access 
other office facilitates including internet at the same offices.  
 
Language requirements: Chichewa is the language spoken across the whole of 
Malawi. Many Malawians speak good English although this is not so much the case 
when it comes to poorer rural or urban communities. Most of the staff that the volunteer 
will be working with understand and speak English.   
 
Security: The volunteer will have a well-secured house within Zomba City. The doors 









(i) Distance and travelling times from Programme Office and nearest major centre 
& what medical facilities are available there e.g. hospitals / HIV/Aids Care?   
 
The placement is some 4-5 hours drive or 6 hours by bus from the programme office in 
Lilongwe. 
 
Zomba is approximately 60km from Blantyre, which is the main commercial city of 
Malawi. Blantyre also has two of Malawi’s best equipped and staffed hospitals  
 
(ii) Common health complaints in the placement location 
 
None specific to Zomba – see medical information above.  
 
(iii) Risk of malaria  
High all year round –but with a peak after the rains in March-May. 
 
Any gender issues particular to this placement 
 
None specified – although an ability to be aware of and analyse issues with a gender 
lens will be expected – e.g. always asking the question “in what way is this different for 
men, women, youth, etc” 
 
Motorbike riding essential Yes/No  
If motorbike riding is not required please give details of any available transport – Malawi 
Prison Services have vehicles and drivers for work purposes, for personal use there is 
local minibus taxi transport around town although these services stop soon after nightfall. 
 
Likely accommodation  
State if accommodation is shared and availability of electricity and water  
 
Accommodation with electricity and water will also be provided by VSO, on a sharing 
basis, rented within the locality of Zomba City. 
 
Location information specific to placement 
 
There are three volunteers based in Zomba working in HIV/AIDS, Head and Climate 
Change Projects and a significant academic experts population. 
 
Any additional information not covered above or on Volzone regarding this 
placement? 
 
 
